

Wolpert

Jinnah of Pakistan

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JINNAH
of
PAKISTAN

Stanley Wolpert

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for
Dorothy
with love

Preface

Few individuals significantly alter the course of history. Fewer still modify the map of the world. Hardly anyone can be credited with creating a nation-state. Mohammad Ali Jinnah did all three. Hailed as "Great Leader" (*Quaid-i-Azam*) of Pakistan and its first governor-general, Jinnah virtually conjured that country into statehood by the force of his indomitable will. His place of primacy in Pakistan's history looms like a lofty minaret over the achievements of all his contemporaries in the Muslim League. Yet Jinnah began his political career as a leader of India's National Congress and until after World War I remained India's best "Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity." As enigmatic a figure as Mahatma Gandhi, more powerful than Pandit Nehru, Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah was one of recent history's most charismatic leaders and least known personalities. For more than a quarter century I have been intrigued by the apparent paradox of Jinnah's strange story, which has to date never been told in all the fascinating complexity of its brilliant light and tragic darkness.

Many people have helped make this book possible. To the late Lord Louis Mountbatten I am indebted for his having so generously given me a morning in the last year of his life to recall personal meetings with and impressions of Jinnah. To Begum Liaquat Ali Khan I am equally indebted for her gracious hospitality and assistance in Karachi. Professor Z. H. Zaidi of London University most warmly encouraged me to write this book more than a decade ago and helped in many ways; he shared his Jinnah letters with me, and his own cogent articles, and introduced me to his old friend and one of Jinnah's closest colleagues, Mr. M. A. H. Jafarhan, who was still living in London then. Vice-Chancellor Sir Cyril Henry Phillips of London University kindly assisted me during the early stages of my long search for Jinnah.

My dear friend, the late Professor B. N. Pandey of London, helped by inviting me to participate in his "Leadership in South Asia" seminar in 1974. Warmest thanks to my mentor, Professor Holden Furber, for inspiration and generous criticism.

Professor Sharif al Mujahid, the director of the Quaid-i-Azam Academy in Karachi, was most generous in assisting me during my visit to Pakistan in 1980 as a Fellow of the American Institute of Pakistan Studies. I thank him and AIPS Director Professor Hafeez Malik for all of their invaluable help. I gratefully acknowledge the aid provided by the AIPS and its board in awarding me a fellowship to complete my research in Pakistan. My sincere thanks also to Dr. Charles Boewe, Mr. Arshad, Mr. Afaqi, and Akbar, of the United States Educational Foundation in Islamabad for their kind hospitality.

Dr. A. Z. Sheikh, the director of the National Archives of Pakistan, and his fine staff were most cooperative in opening the full resources of their archives to me during my visit to Islamabad. I am especially grateful to Mr. S. M. Ikram, the microfilming and photostating officer of the NAP, for expediting the filming of Jinnah papers for me. Vice-President Khalid Shamsul Hasan of the National Bank of Pakistan in Karachi was most helpful in granting me full and immediate access in his office and home to the excellent Shamsul Hasan Collection of primary Jinnah papers. I am deeply grateful to him, and to Dr. M. H. Siddiqi, the director of the University of Karachi's Freedom Movement archives, who introduced me to his very impressive collection.

My continuing gratitude and appreciation to the librarian and staff of the excellent India Office Library in London, with special thanks to Deputy Archivist Martin Moir and to Dr. Richard Bingle, both of whom were singularly helpful in steering me toward new material. For this book I have interviewed a great number of Jinnah's colleagues and contemporaries in Pakistan, India, and Great Britain, as well as in the United States, over the past fifteen years; and although there is not space to mention each by name, I wish to thank them all for helping me to better understand this singularly secretive and complex man.

To the Rt. Hon. S. S. Pirzada, the minister of law of Pakistan and chairman of the Quaid-i-Azam Biography Committee, my sincere thanks for sharing with me his personal memories and writings on the Quaid-i-Azam. To Admiral S. M. Ahsan I am most warmly indebted for historic insights and generous hospitality. My grateful appreciation also to Mian Mumtaz Daultana, Sardar Shaukat Hayat, Justice Javid Iqbal, Brig. N. A. Husain, former Chief Minister of Sind Mumtaz Ali Bhutto, former Karachi Mayor Hashim Raza, and former Ambassador Mohammad Masoor, for many helpful insights concerning Jinnah's personality.

To Lady Dhanavati Rama Rao, Srimati Pupal Jayakar, and Srimati Sheela Kalia I am deeply indebted for singularly sensitive keys to the character not only of Jinnah, but of his wife and daughter as well. I thank Ved Mehta for sharing with me his father's memory of Jinnah. I am most thankful to Professor Fazlur Rahman for recalling all that he did about Jinnah, and to Professor Khalid Bin Sayeed for his help. Many colleagues and students at the University of California have helped me stay the course in this long search, and I especially thank Professors Damodar Sar Desai, Nikki Keddie, Jisha S. Galbraith, H. Arthur Steiner, Steven Hay, Peter Loewenberg, and Gmali Poomwala. For the past decade and a half, my seminar students have posed useful questions about Jinnah, each stimulating deeper investigation into his life and motivations; and for this I especially thank Ravi Kalia, Juan Cole, Roger Long, Anand Mavalankar, David Keister, Sasha Jemal, Nosh Khan, Rajan Samtani, and Professor Saleem Ahmad.

I spoke many times by phone with Jinnah's only daughter, Mrs. Dina Wadia. In 1980 I was to have interviewed her at her Madison Avenue apartment in Manhattan, but unfortunately, perhaps because of her acute shyness or illness, the meeting was canceled at the last moment. One question she asked in a conversation has often echoed in my memory as illustrative of their relationship, "Why so much interest in my father's life, after all these years?" Mrs. Wadia's only son, Nushi, was unavailable to meet with me in Bombay, both in 1978 and in 1982, but he did write: "My grandfather died when I was four. . . . My memory of him is vague indeed." Nushi's father was equally elusive, writing from Switzerland in 1962 to inform me that "As Mr. Jinnah disapproved of my marriage to his daughter on religious grounds [Wadia was born a Parsi and converted to Christianity], I saw very little of him & therefore regret I cannot help. . . . My daughter was too young to remember him & saw little of him so there would be no use in contacting her." In 1980, Jinnah's last surviving sister was bedridden in Karachi; I was unable to see her, and she died shortly after my visit there.


I thank my editor, Nancy Lane, and my copy editor, Kathy Antrim, for their help in bringing this book to press, and I thank Kate Wittenberg as well. To Faye Fauman, who typed the manuscript, and to my friend Elaine Adams, who so kindly photographed me, heartfelt thanks.

As for my dearest wife, who has nurtured, sustained, and inspired me and my works throughout the past thirty years, I confess that no good thing I have ever done or written would have been possible without her co-authorship.

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WEST PAKISTAN from 1947-71

JINNAH OF PAKISTAN



EAST PAKISTAN from 1947-71

Karachi

Students, barristers, and benchers rushing in and out of Lincoln's Inn now-and-then cast a glance at the oil painting, hung since July 1965, on the stone wall over the entrance to their Great Hall and Library in London. Those who do may wonder why on earth the gaunt, unsmiling face of "M. A. Jinnah, Founder and First Governor-General of Pakistan" should be staring down at them. Tall, thin, monocolled, astrakhan-capped, the portrait's subject was, so the strip of brass secured to its frame attests, "born 25 December 1876 and died 11 September 1948." Nothing more is revealed of M. A. Jinnah's history. The anonymous artist captured his upright, unbending spirit, as well as his impeccable taste in clothes, yet Jinnah's face is almost as enigmatic and spare as the shining brass plate beneath. His eyes, opened wide, are piercing; his lips, tightly closed, formidable. One would guess that he was a man of few words, never easily thwarted or defeated. But why is he there—in so honored a place on that hallowed wall of British jurisprudence?

Across the timeworn stairs of stone that supported Queen Victoria and Her Majesty's entourage when she came to dedicate that Great Hall and oak-paneled Library in 1845 are two portraits of Englishmen who obviously do belong. Sir William Henry Maule was baron of the Exchequer, a judge of the Common Pleas, and a benchler, one of four officers elected to administer Lincoln's Inn. Lord Arthur Hobhouse was legal member of the Executive Council of India's Viceroy in 1875, the year Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli persuaded Queen Victoria to add "Empress of India" to her regalia. Two marble busts flank M. A. Jinnah's portrait, like horseguards, their unthinking eyes staring ahead. These also seem appropriate to the setting, for one is Lord Macnaghten, who was "Lord of Appeal in Ordinary" and not only a benchler but treasurer, while the other immortalizes Sir Francis Henry

Coldsmi, "First Jewish Barrister," benchers and member of Parliament. Jinnah, however, held no office at Lincoln's Inn, nor was he ever elected to Parliament or appointed to preside over any British court, nor did he even serve on the cabinet of a single British viceroy.

Yet the story of Jinnah's unique achievement was so inextricably the product of his genius as a barrister, perhaps the greatest "native" advocate in British Indian history, that his portrait richly deserves the place of high honor it holds. During the last decade of his life, in fact, Jinnah may have been the shrewdest barrister in the British Empire. He was certainly the most tenacious. He crossed swords with at least as many great British-born as Indian barristers, defeating them all in his single-minded pleas for Pakistan. He burned out his life pressing a single suit, yet by winning his case he changed the map of South Asia and altered the course of world history.

Jinnah (in Arabic, "wing" as of a bird or army) was born a Shi'ite Muslim Khoja (*Khwaja*, "noble"). Disciples of the Isma'ili Aga Khan, thousands of Khojas fled Persian persecution to Western India, among other regions, between the tenth and sixteenth centuries. The exact date of the flight of Jinnah's ancestors is unknown, but as a minority community within Islam, itself a religious minority in India, the Khojas of South Asia remained doubly conscious of their separateness and cultural difference, helping perhaps to account for the "aloofness" so often noted as a characteristic quality of Jinnah and his family. Khojas, like other mercantile communities the world over, however, traveled extensively, were quick to assimilate new ideas, and adjusted with relative ease to strange environments. They developed linguistic skills and sharp intelligence, often acquiring considerable wealth. Mahatma Gandhi's Hindu merchant (*bania*) family, by remarkable coincidence, settled barely thirty miles to the north of Jinnah's grandparents, in the state of Rajkot. Thus the parents of the Fathers of both India and Pakistan shared a single mother tongue, Gujarati, though that never helped their brilliant offspring to communicate.

Jinnah's father Jinnabhai Poonja (born c. 1850), the youngest of three sons, married Mithibai, "a good girl" of his own community,² and soon moved with his bride to Sind's growing port of Karachi to seek his fortune. After completion of the Suez Canal in 1869, Karachi enjoyed its first modern boom as British India's closest port, only 5,918 nautical miles from Southampton, two hundred miles nearer than Bombay. The population was as yet under 50,000, a far cry from the more than 6 million who inhabit that premier city of Pakistan today, but enterprising young people, like Jinnabhai and Mithibai, flocked to its municipality's commercial heart, pulsating along

both banks of the Lyaree River. There Jinnabhai rented the second floor apartment of a three-story house, Wazir Mansion (since rebuilt and made into a national monument and museum), in the bustling cotton mart on Newnham Road still cluttered with camels and laden with bales of raw cotton.

Here sometime in the 1870's Mohammad Ali Jinnah was the first of seven children born to Mithibai and her husband.³ Certificates of birth and death were not issued by Karachi's municipality prior to 1879, and though Jinnah in later life would claim December 25, 1876, as his true date of birth, the birthday officially celebrated throughout Pakistan, there is reason to doubt its accuracy. Unlike Hindus of comparable wealth and social status, who would have been careful to record the precise date and moment of a child's birth for astrological purposes, Muslims generally did not concern themselves with birthdates and no records were kept prior to their enrollment in a public school. The register preserved at the first such school Jinnah attended, the Sind Madressa-tul-Islam of Karachi, notes October 20, 1875, as the birth date of "Mahomedali Jinnabhai."⁴

At birth, in fact, "Mamad" (his pet name at home) was "small and weak," his devoted sister Fatima (July 31, 1893-July 9, 1967) recalled, "His health caused concern as he weighed a few pounds less than normal."⁵ Mamad was approximately six when his father hired a private tutor to start his son on alphabets and mathematics, but the boy proved "indifferent" to studies, "positively loathed" arithmetic, and could not wait to go outdoors as soon as his tutor arrived. Those private lessons were one indicator of how Jinnabhai Poonja's business had prospered by the early 1880's. The annual value of Karachi's trade almost doubled since he had arrived scarcely a decade earlier, climbing to above 80 million rupees. Jinnabhai handled all sorts of produce, cotton, wool, hides, oil-seeds, and grain for export, and Manchester manufactured piece-goods, metals, and refined sugar imports into the busy port. Business was so good, in fact, with profits soaring so high, that he became a "banker and money-lender" as well for his customers. Despite Islam's prohibition against lending or borrowing money at interest, banking was clearly how Jinnabhai made his fortune, and subsequently lost it.

Early in 1887, Jinnabhai's only sister, Manbai, who had married an even more successful Khoja named Peerbhai and lived in metropolitan Bombay, came to visit. Mamad loved Auntie's witty, vivacious, cosmopolitan good humor, and she in turn adored her bright, handsome young nephew. "Night after night," Fatima remembered, Manbai told them "wonderful tales of fairies and the flying carpet, of jinn and dragons." She hired Mamad back to Bombay with her that year, introducing him to the great city that was to

good girl," as she herself had been. The matchmakers and parents decided everything for Jinnah and his bride, even as young Gandhian parents had done a few years before the war; countless other teenage Indian couples were married in the nineteenth century.

"Mohammad Ali was hardly sixteen and had never seen the girl he was to marry. Fatima reported of the wedding: 'Dressed from head to foot in long flowing garlands of flowers, he walked in a procession from his grandfather's house to that of his father-in-law, where his fourteen-year-old bride, Eim Bai, sat in an expensive Indian dress, wearing glittering ornaments, her hands spotted with henna, her face spotted with gold dust and redolent with the fragrance of attar.' How did young Jinnah feel about this stranger child-bride? He could have had no time to learn much about her. Only days after their marriage he sailed out of her life, never to see her again. Long before Jinnah would return from London, Eim Bai, like his mother, was dead.

In January 1893, Jinnah left for England, "unaccompanied and unchaperoned," aboard a Pacific & Orient steam ship. During that sea voyage he was befriended by an "elderly English woman, who took to him like his own son, and a young girl named Leila, an address when he disembarked at Marseilles. "During the next four years, whenever this Englishman came back to his native land from India, he would call my brother to his house and ask him to have a meal with him, and his family," recounted Fatima. "Mohammad Ali landed at Southampton, catching the boat train to Victoria Station. "During the first few months I found a strange country and unfamiliar surroundings," he recalled. "I did not know a soul and the fog and winter in London upset me a great deal." At Graham's he sat at a small desk surrounded by stacks of account books; he was expected to copy and balance. The agency's head office was in the City of London near Threadneedle Street, a short walk from historic Chancery, the Bank of England, and the old East India Company's original headquarters along the River Thames in Leadenhall Street. Jinnah kept no diary and wrote no autobiography, as did Gandhi and Nehru, but he must have felt at once isolated and depressed to find himself in the cold, remote, inspiring heart of the mighty empire into which he had been born. "I was sitting and lonely far from home. Except for some employees at Graham's, I did not know a soul, and the immensity of London as a city weighed heavily on my solitary life. But I soon got settled to life in London, and I began to like it before long."

He then deposited in the archives of his account at a British bank to allow Jinnah to work in London for five years. There is a record of his early days in a letter to his mother, written at 55, Abchurch Lane, London, in 1898, in which he wrote of his first year in London:

but now displays the County Council's blue and white ceramic oval showing that the "founder of Pakistan" stayed here in 1895. "Now rather run-down, that block of attached buildings must have looked quite fashionable in Jinnah's day. The flat he lived in was owned by Mrs F. E. Page-Drake, a widow with "an attractive daughter who was about the same age" as Mohammad Ali and "lived in another." Perhaps on a rare visit, the spinster Eim Bai told "but he was not the flirtatious type and she could not break through his reserve." She would sometimes arrange mixed parties in her mother's house, and among the various games she would organize was one in which the penalty for a fault was a kiss. Mohammad Ali proved contented to be out of this kissing game. One Christmas Eve, he recalled, "Miss Page-Drake threw her arms around me as I was standing under some mistletoe, the significance of which I did not then know, and said that I must kiss her. I did gently, that we too had our social ties, and he never kissed was not one of them. She let me go and did not bother me again in this manner." Most puzzling perhaps about so innocuous an incident is why Miss Page-Drake should have considered it important enough to report in detail. Was it simply a pious lady's way of immortalizing the historic record to keep her mother's name in perpetuity?

Jinnah anglicized his name in London, replacing the cumbersome Mohammad Ali Jinnahbhai of Karachi with its streamlined British version, "Jinnah," which he first used in coming to his hotel back of Scotland Fields. He also traded in his traditional Sindhi long-sleeved coat for smartly cut and Sakie Row suits and headstretched detachable-collared shirts. "I can tell you he was perfectly content to display London's finest fashions," said a friend, "and was for many a model of sartorial elegance for the rest of his life. He still seemed the best-dressed of the 200 odd hand-tailored suits in his wardrobe closet by the end of his life. As a hairdresser prided himself on wearing the same silk tie twice. The very stiffness of his attire extended to the tips of his toes, which were sheathed in smart two-tone shoes or soled. Few Englishmen ever developed as keen an interest in dress as did Jinnah. His perfect manners and attire always assured him the respect of any English statesman, house, clubs and palaces. Like Anthony Eden and the Duke of Windsor, Jinnah became a model of fashion the world over, rivaled among his South Asian contemporaries only by Motilal Nehru.

Mr. M. A. Jinnah did not take long to abandon the drudgery of his London apprenticeship. He arrived in London in February 1893 and on 15 March 1894 he was granted permission "to be recruited the Latin portion of the Preliminary Examination." The grand and petty lives of London dislodged him from his musty desk in the City. "Walked toward the City, and I was never so tired as I

after his career. If he had any fears or doubts about his future, he left no record of them. On June 25, 1893, he embarked upon his study of the law at Lincoln's Inn.

Lincoln's Inn had a most imposing list of graduates and dropouts, including Thomas More, William Pitt and half a dozen other British prime ministers from Lord Cairns to Asquith. Two of Britain's greatest prime ministers, Disraeli and Gladstone, went there but neither completed his course of study. In 1893 when Jinnah enrolled, John Morley (1838-1923), who first entered Lincoln's premises thirty-one years earlier, was elected a benchers. Author of *On Compromise*, John Stuart Mill's greatest disciple, Gladstone's Irish Home Rule secretary and Liberal lieutenant "Honest John." After Lord Morley, then had his most important had decade as secretary of state for India, 1900-10, still ahead of him. One of Britain's most brilliant Liberals, Morley became one of Jinnah's heroes. The uncompromising idealistic fervor of *On Compromise* went through Jinnah's mind "like a flame," igniting his imagination with arguments such as that which insisted upon putting "truth" first among any choice of "principles." Jinnah quoted Morley to students in 1940s later in life and he personally tried to adhere to the Liberal ideals of a Labour train Lincoln's great benchers.

M. A. Jinnah's legal education was with minor exception, the medieval guild apprenticeship method inherited with the founding of Lincoln's Inn, which was named for the King's Sergeant of Holborn, Thomas de Lincolne, in the latter half of the fourteenth century. Records of that self-governing society's council meetings and business affairs have been preserved at Lincoln's library in annual "Black Books" since 1422, when the students all still lived within the Inn's somber walls. After the recorded number of students became too great to accommodate inside, the hostel tradition was only symbolically retained through the requirement that all students enrolled at a university eat a minimum of three dinners in the Great Hall, or those not enrolled, as in Jinnah's case, eat six. The convivial environment of those dinners, where barristers and benchers sat close enough to students to engage them in conversation, argument or debate, was deemed an important aspect of legal training. For how better could young men sharpen their wits and develop forensic skills, after all, than in debate with their guild elders? The conviviality of table talk was, moreover, a shortcut to friendship or antipathy, and a young apprentice was alert as well as wise, he soon learned what was best said or left unsaid in the company of lawyers.

The Great Hall was used not only on dining, however, since moots, or "balds" were also held here, but on debating days, and elections in the former, students following suit in the latter. The most important

part in Jinnah's legal education, however, was the two years of "reading" apprenticeship he spent in a barristers' chambers. He would follow his master's professional footsteps outside chambers as well, through all the corridors of Temple Court, up every creaking stair of Holborn's crowded pubs. A highly exaggerated one might say that if in addition to the above, a student had read William Blackstone's *Commentaries* on common law he would have enough information to be heard to pass the final examination for admission to the Bar. Jinnah's class still belonged to that old school of diligent men who were deemed fit for a career in law as long as they were well dressed properly, and ate with the right utensils.

As a student was not in chambers or dining in Great Hall, Jinnah passed his time in London strolling or studying in the book-lined Reading Room of the British Museum, a Mecca for scholars the world over. On Saturdays that haven closed, he went at times to Hyde Park corner at the Museum to listen to the open-air oratory of anyone who had a box to be read, or for courage to speak his mind on any subject. Irish Home Rule was one of the burning issues of the day, and Irish Parliamentary party leader John P. Webb, whom Jinnah had heard from Westminster's gallery, would be heard to preside over the Madras Congress in 1894. "I hate tyranny wherever practised, more especially if practised by my own countrymen," he would say for her. "I am in a measure responsible," Webb said to his audience that December. And onto the "Irish question" was resolved, for Webb was not J. P. Webb, like the rest of the British Empire, would be. Jinnah's mind was paralysed with the affairs of under five million people, and he would rise and fall on the question of Ireland rather than on the question of "Irish Home Rule." It was an important lesson for Jinnah, one he would assimilate during those early lonely years in London, of how the most important issues could "paralyze" a huge empire. He would appreciate all the weaknesses as well as strengths of the British Empire. Whether or not he ever rose the requisite moral height to be a barrister at Hyde Park corner to harangue any London audience, he did learn many useful debating tricks merely by listening to these and engaging speakers in argument.

Jinnah's London, however, he went at least once to the British Museum Reading Room that his first "friction with the police" occurred during the annual Oxford boat race, when "I was with two friends and we were caught up with a crowd of undergraduates. We found ourselves in a side street, so we pushed each other up and down the roadway. We were arrested and taken off to the police station. . . [and] let off with a caution."⁴ It was the closest this remarkably law-abiding Indian

would ever come to being placed behind bars—another polar difference that separated him from Gandhi, Nehru, and most other nationalist leaders who spent years in British prisons and cells.

Young Jinnah fell in love with theater while living in London. His secret ambition he never confessed was "to play the role of Romeo at the Old Vic."¹⁵ Exactly when he started to dream of an acting career is unclear, though it was obviously after he had begun to study law. Perhaps law bored him in first or second year, having been watching the performances of barometers, the greatest of whom were often spending thespians, that stimulated his interest in going on stage. At any event, it was no mere whim or passing fancy, but a love affair that lasted till the end of his years. "I recall the days of his most ardent passion for the theatrical profession," when he returned home tired and late, he would read Shakespeare, his voice resonant. The obnoxious monotone remained his major characteristic, prop later and those who witnessed his dramatic interrogations and in various roles, whether to judge or try, often commented that he was a born actor. Many a political opponent made the mistake of believing, however, that Jinnah was "only acting" when he was most serious.

On June 7, 1895, Jinnah wrote a check for £134.19—covering all fees for admission to the Bar. He had ignored his father's letters ordering him to "come home" to help save the family business and paid the full Bar expenses early to not be harassed later to spend any of that sum. He was charges on £10 a month for his room and half board at the house of Mrs. Page Drake and would always be very careful with money. The habits of frugality he developed in those early London years never left him. He even managed to save £7.1.0 of the sum his father had so half-heartedly turned over to him after three years of saving—the heart of what was then surely the most tempting warlike place on earth. Still he dreamed of a life at art, and of remaining in London.

"After I was called to the Bar—was taken by some friends to the Manager of a theatrical company who asked me to go up to the stage and recite a few pieces of Shakespeare," Jinnah reminisced. "I did so. His wife and he were immensely pleased, and immediately offered me a job. I was exultant and I wrote to my parents praying for their blessings. I wrote to them that law was a lingering profession where success was uncertain; a stage career was much better and it gave me a good start and that I would now be independent and not bother them with grants of money at all. My father wrote a long letter to me strongly advising me against it, but there was one sentence in his letter which I did not heed and which ultimately prevailed in my decision, 'Do not be a trailer to the family.' I went to my employers and conveyed to them that I no longer looked forward to a stage career

"We were surprised, and they tried to persuade me, but my mind was made up. According to the terms of the contract I had signed with them, I was to have given them three months' notice before quitting. But you know, they were Englishmen, and so they said, 'Well, when you have no interest in the law, how should we keep you against our wishes?'"¹⁶

The signed contract indicates how serious Jinnah's commitment to London stage and acting had been. It was obviously his first love at this time. His "long letter" had dissuaded him, forcing him to change his mind on a matter of major importance, but that was the last time he would ever be so strongly affected by family "treason" cut his conscience to the quick, leaving him deeply wounded. Apparently that letter also informed him of his father's death—most possible of his wives as well. For in reporting how he had felt after reading her letter, he wrote to his parents, "I am now free of their miseries. What a shock that letter from my father must have been to all of us! I dread news and reprimand. And what a cloud it must have cast over his last days and weeks in London."

On May 18, 1896, Mahomed A. Jinnah became a Barrister of the Supreme Court of the Benchery of London, in for "Court House" attesting his admission to the Bar and of his appointment "With that admission we were come to join the Bar of all courts in British India. Now he could go home—but not to Karachi. There was nothing left. Karachi was a dead city for me more so before leaving London. I transferred the total balance of his bank account to a new account in his name to be held at the National Bank of India, Ltd., Bombay. That was done on May 18. Next day he boarded the gangway of the I & O liner that took him to Karachi, a whole new world to him. A brief stop or night in the city he chose as his new permanent home. His father had lured him from London to Karachi as a vendor, but nothing short of the partition of India would ever bring him back to live in Karachi—and then, only briefly, to live in the shadow of his father's memory.

2

Bombay (1896-1910)

Jinnah was enrolled as a barrister in Bombay's high court on August 24, 1896, precisely one decade after the Karachi country boy was first driven past that Victorian palace of law. His rich variegated London experiences, tempered by the traumas of his brief return home, had made a man of him. He was bereft of mother and wife, his most powerful ties to Karachi had been cut with surgical finality. M. A. Jinnah, Esq., borne out of the bitter disappointment and pain that shrouded his last few months, was launched into orbit on his own.

For Bombay, as for Jinnah personally, it was a time of tragedy and mourning. Bubonic plague from China reached that busy port in the autumn of 1896. The Black Death that claimed millions of Indian lives in the ensuing decades remained most severe in the crowded, bustling cities of Bombay, Poona, and Ahmedabad, at least until the ingenious Dr. W. M. Haffkine, 1866-1930, developed his vaccine in 1899. Jinnah's preoccupation with cleanliness, scrubbing his hands many times daily at almost obsessive length, seems to date from this pre-Haffkine era, when the only known "antidotes" to the Black Death were soap, water, and whitewash. His lifelong obsession with clean, meticulous dress as well as personal hygiene and privacy soon, rather more sensible than surprising, given the humid heat and health hazards prevalent in Bombay, especially at this time, Jinnah rented a reasonable room in the Apollo Railway Hotel on Charni Road without winking a glance of the high court, where he spent most of his days attending the advocacy of others and awaiting his first client.

A decade and a half later, at the passing barrister's first three years in Bombay, W. M. Haffkine, Esq., was hailed as the "high priest" of hygiene. "A man of no small talents," W. M. Haffkine had been in Bombay's

high advocate-general, John Molesworth MacPherson. The latter took immediate liking to young Jinnah and invited him to work in his office. It was the first such invitation MacPherson "ever extended to an Indian," Sarojini (1879-1949), one of Jinnah's most devoted friends, recalled.² MacPherson's confidence and support came "as a beacon of hope" at a low point in Jinnah's early struggles to establish himself. Annie Manbai Peerbhoy, her husband and their circle of friends, assisted him socially, of course,³ and later, come through Lincoln's Inn gave him the proper credentials, but it was MacPherson who did for Jinnah's legal career what Croft had done for his life. He opened to him the boundless realm of legal competition—a more useful arena of power and possibility. In MacPherson's chambers Jinnah had information long before it reached the ears of penurious pleaders, and in the high dim corridors of the court. Within a few months of going to work for MacPherson, he learned, for example, that one of Bombay's four principal judgeships was about to fall vacant. His response to a question of this valuable news offers a glimpse of young Jinnah in the morning, leaning through the window and smoking a cigarette: "In the morning, early office, Jinnah saw a 'Victoria' (a slow, passing by) on the road and jumped into it and drove straight to the office of Sir Charles. Sir Charles was then judicial member of the provincial council of Bombay and found MacPherson's handsome, ambitious young clerk so impressive that he invited him to serve as 'temporary' third pres-

ident for six months on the municipal bench, hearing every sort of case, and the riot charges brought against two Muslim "opium" dealers, and concerning their dispute under the tyrannical, to commoners, Great Indian Peninsula Railway brought against riders accused of paying too high fares. Accusations against ordinary Chinese came to Jinnah to work on their ships while in port. Jinnah proved himself a capable judge. He found the Bench a much less attractive prospect, and a far less fun. With the pugnacity of youth that made him a favorite of the bar, he found the lure of more lucrative rewards? As well as fortune went to great barristers, of course, and Jinnah had to wait. Sir Charles offered him a permanent place on the bench, but at a later date, respecting a starting salary of 1,500 rupees in 1901, Jinnah declined to reply, "I will soon be able to earn that much in a single day!" As soon he did.

The dawn of the Edwardian era, coinciding with that of the twentieth century, found Jinnah firmly established in his chosen career, earning enough to rent a "new office." He "spared no expense" to furnish that office with a comfortable and attractive chamber, his later recalled, in a manner which "any

worst features of the present system of bureaucratic rule—its utter contempt for public opinion, its arrogant pretensions to superior wisdom, its reckless disregard of the most cherished feelings of the people.⁷⁰ As a Bombay Muslim, however, Jinnah was perhaps most remote among all subsets of Indian nationalists from the feelings of outrage and betrayal shared by so many Bengali Hindus. He well understood of course how shrewd a British political move this was, warning Bengal Muslims from dependence on Calcutta's landlord and money-lending as well as political Hindu leadership, exalting supremacy of the Dacca provincial states with Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras. That first partition ignited Muslim political consciousness throughout the subcontinent, providing a provincial cradle in Dacca for the birth of the Muslim League in 1906.

Curzon's successor, Lord Minto 1845-1914, was also a Tory entrenched in Calcutta, north-west of the British general elections that would depose him from power in London for the next decade. Paradoxically, British India's Liberal secretary of state, John Morley, contributed as much as Minto did to the League's success. He acted from 1906 to 1910 by promising for the nobles of opinions to initiate parliamentary constitutional reforms, soon after a Lord White's scheme for Muslim council reforms intended to liberalize and expand the use of secular representative popular government throughout India, planted the seeds of religious partition in the heart of British India's emerging constitution.

On October 1, 1906, thirty-five Muslims of noble birth, wealth, and power from every province of British India and several princely states gathered in the regal hall-room of the vicereine's Simla palace in the Himalayas. The first of Minto, an avid horseman nicknamed "Mr. Rolls," entered precisely at 10:00 AM. The Aga Khan introduced each of his fellow deputies to the vicereine, and then Lord Minto read aloud the address, which was printed in *The Times* and had either been sent to his secretary, J. R. Durrlop Smith (1858-1921). The address contained a warning that

The Mohamedans of India have always placed implicit reliance on the sense of justice and common fairness, feeling that have characterised their rulers and have in consequence sustained from pressing their claims by methods that might prove at all embarrassing, but earnestly as we desire that the Mohamedans of India should not in the future depart from that excellent and long honoured tradition, recent events have stirred up feelings, especially among the younger generation of Mohamedans, which might lead to the adoption of measures which would not only be a source of weakness to the Government, but also a source of dishonour.⁷¹

As none of the ominous implications of that warning were lost upon the vicereine or his staff,

we hope your Excellency will pardon our stating at the outset that representative institutions of the European type are new to the Indian mind. Many of the most thoughtful members of our community do not consider that the greatest care, forethought and caution will be necessary if they are to be successfully adapted to the social, religious and political conditions obtaining in India, and that in the event of such care and caution, their adoption is likely among other things to place our national interests at the mercy of an uneasy and heterogeneous body.

It was the first use of the words "national interests" by Indian Muslims, and it is to be noted for his pageant the "answari shah" Hindu. The address went on to spell out Muslim hopes for their nation, to be rich if government says so, arguing "We Mohammedans are not content with additional rights of our own which are not to the advantage and there have been no success from the fact that we have not been not quite represented. We therefore pray that we will be generously pleased to provide that both in the Government and in the administration of all Indian provinces we may have a fair share and always find place." Thanks to the efforts of Mohammedan educationists back from the very first of the movement among them been strenuously directed to the development of character and this we venture to think is of great value to the nation in the making of a good public servant. Seats for Muslims were requested to be reserved on all public works, magistracy, magistracy, and municipalities as well as on university seats and syndicates.

The vicereine received a hearty welcome from Minto. He praised the address for its strong and firm tenets of their own religion and its sense of justice and patriotism. He congratulated the deputy for his clear and sound reasoning so eloquently. He said that he had heard the Muslims of Eastern Bengal and Assam "for the moderation and self-restraint they have shown" in the partition, promising them they could rely as firmly as ever on his justice and fair play. Since he shared none of Morley's deep-rooted hostility toward the Muslims, he was not a Muslim, as he mentioned his anti-Muslim audience that "it should be very far from well

1920 and Bengal's fiery Bipin Chandra Pal (1858-1932) competed, however, by then with the moderate "old guard" for control of India's premier national organization. Though Tilak and Gokhale both started as Poona colleagues in public education and national service, they differed fundamentally in many ways, especially with respect to political tactics and philosophy. The Lokamanya and his "new party" had no faith in Morley's promises, refusing reliance on "pleas or petitions" to British officials in favour of a *satyagraha*. *Bhagwati* was their battle cry: first of British machine-made cloth and other manufactured imports, later of all British institutions including schools, courts and council chambers. The other side of their economic plank or *boycott* was *swadeshi*—"of our own country"—stimulating and generous Indian industry, especially cotton cloth woven and spun both by hand and machine. They made *swadeshi* their goal but the "extremists" they denigrated were not that of British citizens but of totally independent Indians. They were best popularized by Tilak in raising the mass following he won among mostly illiterate peasants and urban workers were drawn from their ignorance of Hinduism and regional lore and usually served to alienate Muslim and other minorities as it won Hindu adherents. British officials in the spot vainly tried harsher techniques of repression to stem this mounting opposition. "Fairs of the Earthquake" Morley called that method of dealing with nationalism. The most popular leaders were arrested and deported including a new "martyr" from the Punjab, Lala Lajpat Rai (1865-1928) who became a hero as soon as he was arrested in the spring of 1907 and shipped off to Mandalay prison. The new party immediately proposed Lalpur Rai as their candidate for next president of Congress. Pherozeshah and Gokhale had their own candidate; however, the mild-mannered moderate Calcutta educator Dr. Rash Behari Ghosh.

The factional split that left Congress torn apart for almost a decade exploded at the session in Surat in 1907. Next to Bombay which had so recently hosted the Congress, Surat was the strongest bastion of moderate leadership power. Gujarat's center of mercantile wealth, Sir Pherozeshah was confident that he could keep the peace and control of his organization. The port of Surat had, however, underestimated the passion and stubbornness of Tilak and his followers. As Rash Behari Ghosh moved toward the rostrum inside the Congress pandit to read his presidential address, Tilak rose to shout: "Tomb of our life!" He had indeed earlier his intention of introducing Lalpur Rai's candidature from the Congress floor. Name on the platform was *swadeshi* but he was not to let up. He left *Kamanna* II. He moved the platform himself and headed for the rostrum. Several tough young "guards" moved to intercept Tilak, but Gokhale warned them off, joining in his old colleague's defense and protectively extending his own

around Tilak's body. Most of the delegates were on their feet shouting encouragement. A stiff Maharashtrian shipper was then tossed vigorously onto the floor, both Pherozeshah and Bengal's venerable Surendra Nath Banerjee in 1926. Panic and pandemonium ensued. The tent had to be pulled down and hired guards. For the next nine years Congress refused to accept anything confining moderate and revoltuary parties, insisting to be sole right to hear to India's national movement. In the case of the Swadeshi revolutionary violence and official repression, Tilak was arrested in the summer of 1908, charged with "sedition" for a radical address published in his popular *Pravara*. A son, Tilak represented himself before the high court in Mumbai but after his arrest when he was held without bail the services of Jinnah to plead for his release pending trial. Jinnah's efforts and his own avail for British justice had failed. He had begun his trial began. And although Jinnah's argument was that he was a peace-loving citizen, he was arrested and the national address was postponed. A petition was filed to have found him guilty to stand on behalf of the leader of a political party. Jinnah, however, not only stood up for Tilak but also for the cause of a large of nation's 100 and won, thanking the gratitude as well as affectionate admiration of Hindu India's conservative leader.

The reforms proposed by Morley and Minto initial in 1909 were not elected. Many members on the expanded Council of India by 1911. The India Council's 1911 was 1909, however, no fewer than six such seats were reserved on a basis of 100 more than half of them remained British. The new Council was a point at least two add more. There as nominees of his own but if they were not elected by members such as landlords or municipalities, raising Muslim representation to 100 and 100 members on the vice-presidency, more than the actual ratio of India's Muslim minority to the population of the subcontinent. By 1909 even Minto complained of the representation to the Muslim community. Minto's reform of 1909 was not extra claims that started the Minto reforms. The secretary of state was then convinced that "It is the will of men to frame plans that will please Hindus without offending Muslims and we shall be lucky if we don't offend both." The separate electorate formula, which Jinnah initially rejected on the grounds of Muslim identity, Jinnah was one of the first half dozen Muslim mem-

was specially elected, in his case from Bombay to sit on the viceroy's Central Legislative Council in 1910, three years before he actually joined the Muslim League. At thirty-five, he was one of the youngest members elected to that high council and would have stood no chance but for the fact that two much older knighted Muslim candidates, equally matched and anti-pathetical, ousted one another in preliminary skirmishes to choose the "Muslim candidate." Jinnah's secretary recalled that "Discussions went on for hours and in the end both of them decided that none of them should seek election but should send a third candidate and after careful scrutiny, the choice fell on the young lawyer."²² That singular honor catapulted Jinnah to the side of Gokhale, whose "general Bombay seat had been held before him by Sir Ferozeshah. The legislative center of India's government, first in Calcutta and Simla, later in Delhi, soon became one of Jinnah's most important and powerful stages.

Mohali's rhetoric also introduced Indian participation in British India's powerful executive councils, both at Whitehall and in Calcutta-Simla. Two Muslim members were appointed to the secretary of state's Whitehall Council of India in 1907 and the first Indian to hold the post of law member of the government of India, Sarvendra P. Sinha, 1864-1925, took his seat in 1909. A Hindu Brahmin by birth, Sinha was like Jinnah, a barrister and moderate Congress leader. His legal practice in 1908 was so lucrative that according to government records he had a cut in his annual income of £40,000. Sinha's first indication therefore was to turn down the viceroy's invitation, but Jinnah and Gokhale convinced him to accept the job. His reluctance is matter further attests to Jinnah's strong personal commitment to the principle of finding the candidate best qualified for any job, regardless of race, religion, caste, or creed. Muslim League leaders had lobbied for a Muslim jurist to fill the powerful position in India's central government. The League's president at its 1908 Amritsar session, Syed Anwar Imam (1869-1933) was himself a barrister of London's Middle Temple and would succeed Sinha as law member after the former resigned in November 1910, establishing the precedent of alternating Hindu-Muslim appointees and subsequent contractual parity in a Executive opportunity. Born as the League was out of the separate elections, a demand for affirmative action, that organization remained most firmly committed to its founding principle, proposing names of Muslim candidates for very important official vacancies. Congress in the other hand always viewed as a secular, non-nationalist and undemocratic organization as long as it was headed by Jinnah and Anwar Imam. It was not until the late 1930s that Congress began to take a more serious interest in the Muslim community and its political representation.

Jinnah was to rise in the Allahabad Congress of 1910 to second a resolution that "strongly deprecates the expansion or application of the principle of separate Communal Electorates to Municipalities, District Boards, or other Local Bodies."²⁴

Individually, Jinnah spoke at the end of his first year as the Calcutta Muslim member from Bombay.

3

Calcutta (1910-15)

On January 25 1910 the Honourable Mr M. A. Jinnah took his seat as Member of the Council of the Legislative Council convened in the capital of British India. The day after his arrival in the palace at Wellesley Square more than a century earlier was specially gilded for this historic meeting to be equipped with a new set of visitors as Viceroy Minto personally addressed his government's newly elected advisers in closing Copin Goldie's Motion Nehru Sarvepalli Bhargava and M. A. Jinnah were among the glad to believe that the support of an enlarged Council will go far to assure the Indian people of the soundness of any measures which may seem right to the Council.

Minto's pious hopes were soon shattered. Jinnah clashed with the viceroy the very first time he rose to speak in the Council addressing himself to a resolution that called for an immediate end to the export of indentured Indian labour to South Africa. The violent repression of *Satyagrahis*, "Non-cooperators" led by Gandhi in the Transvaal had ignited feelings of indignation and grief throughout India that year before Congress then resolved to press upon the Government of India the necessity of prohibiting the recruitment of indentured Indian labour for any portion of the South African Union and of dealing with the authorities there in the same manner in which the latter deal with Indian interests.² This resolution before Calcutta's Council on February 25 when Jinnah spoke emphasising "It is a cruel punishment to a man to be sent to a foreign country where he is treated with cruel and cruel treatment that is meted out to Indians in South Africa"³ Minto replied that the Government of India "cannot possibly regard the system as one deemed too harsh to be used for a friendly part of the Empire" within his

Members "My Lord" Jinnah responded "I should feel much inclined to use such stronger language. But I am fully aware of the constitution of this Council, and I do not wish to trespass for one single moment, but I do say that the treatment meted out to Indians is the harshest and the feeling in this country is unanimous."

The first of his exchange reflected Jinnah's courtroom as well as council style. His words were precise and never retracted any once. He was not a lawyer, but he was a judge. Viceroy and pandits usually received him with respect and his words for his bar named at him. He was not known for his sharp tongue, but his razor sharp mind and his sharp words of logic or wit drawn against them.

His first response was struck dumb by it. "Mr Jinnah," the viceroy said, "you are a much sharper lawyer, statesman and politician than I am." Jinnah's first response was to the viceroy's statement that he was a much sharper lawyer, statesman and politician than I am.

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Dacca read in Britain's reversal of partition, the government of India's capitulation to Congress "agitators," and a simple new message to all Indians: "No bombs, no boons!" Together with his announced announcement of partition, King George VI proclaimed his government's decision to shift the capital of British India from Calcutta to Delhi, his historic plan, where a new imperial city was to be built. Delhi had once been the capital of Muslim sultans and Mughal emperors who reigned over most of the subcontinent since the early thirteenth century. Delhi remained at the hub of North India's Muslim population, educational centers and historic monuments within easy reach of Lahore, Agra, Deoband, Aligarh and Lucknow. On December 23, 1947, however, when Lord Hardinge passed through Delhi's Chandni Chowk "Silver Market" atop the elephant riding, a vice-regal procession to the new capital, Delhi, a mob became a riotous graveyard. A bomb hurled into the parade's howdah killed one of his guards and wounded the Viceroy's back, exposing the sultan's blade. The word he uttered as one of India's most powerful viceroys was never again needed.

Jinnah attended the annual meeting of Congress as well as the council meeting the Muslim League had held in Bhopal in December of 1942. He was not as noted a speaker at the League but was permitted to speak to its council at Bhopal supporting a resolution that expanded the League's goals to include "the attainment of a system of self government suitable to India" to be brought about through constitutional means, a steady reform of the existing system of administration, a promoting national unity and fostering a better spirit among the people, Indian and by co-operating with other communities "for the said purposes." A few months later he went to Lucknow joining Mrs. Gandhi on the platform as an honored guest at the larger League meeting where a new more liberal constitution was adopted. President Shafi in presenting the new constitution noted that "I am in entire accord with my friend, the Hon. Mr. Jinnah in thinking that the adoption of any course other than the one proposed by the Council would be absolutely unwarrantable." The League's first resolution congratulated the Hon. Mr. M. A. Jinnah for his skilful promotion of the Wakf Valuating Act through the Imperial Legislative Council. Facet with such acclaim, Jinnah could hardly resist renewed appeals to join the Muslim League pressed upon him that year by its new permanent secretary, Syed Waqar Hussain (1878-1947) and Maqana Mohammad Ali (1875-1932), reversed Lord Hardinge and editor of *Comrade*, both of whom were deputed to London to lobby there for Muslim deputations to the Imperial Conference. He had heeded the call and would in no way and at no time imply even the shadow of disloyalty to the larger national cause to which his life was dedicated.⁷

In April 1913 Jinnah and Gokhale sailed together from Bombay for London to meet with Lord Islington, under secretary of state for India and chairman of their Royal Public Services Commission on which Ramsay MacDonald (1866-1937) also served. That leisurely trip was their longest abroad but no record is preserved by either of the subjects they discussed though the commission agenda, general council, reforms, and among Hindu-Muslim unity and stimulus of achieving Indian careers were surely among them. Gokhale later told Sarojini who came to know him as Secretary of India Society in Poona before he died, "Jinnah has true stuff in him, and that freedom from all sectarian prejudice which will make him the best ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity."⁸ In the quiet, the product of sounds, set in his late thirties Jinnah seems to have been that tragically elusive spirit of communal unity. He returned to India in September 1913 and attended the Karachi Congress where he celebrated his thirty-seventh birthday. He had not completed thirty or over seventeen years, and in new warmth, excitement and feeling a number of personal friends with whom he had been in contact in the last year and a half, and a resolution on reconstruction of the Council that they call first of all for changing the salary of the Council and its departure to the English Home rather than to the Council's working offices. Indian taxpayers the burden of the Council's administrative staff. The new council, Jinnah argued, should not be more than nine members, at least one-third of whom should be non-Muslim Indians chosen by a voting body consisting of the members of the Council and a "representative of the Legislative Councils."⁹ Half of the Council should be public men and half should be men dealing with Indian affairs; the other half, executive men, should be chosen by Indian experience no more than five years. Jinnah was to be purely advisory rather than administrative and tenure of it would be limited to five years. Thanks to his work in the Council, he was a part of his rising position of leadership within the League. Jinnah was chosen to chair a Congress deputation to London in August of 1914 to lobby members of Parliament and Whitehall, on Lord Curzon's Commission of Enquiry into the Bill. Jinnah also seconded a resolution to support the League for adopting "the Council of the League as the only body to represent the Indian people, and express its views on the subject of the League as such explicitly."¹⁰ The Council had a wide field in the League and it was a part of the League's work to bring it to the notice of the public and to bring it to the notice of the public and to bring it to the notice of the public.

From Karachi, Jinnah entertained the Agra, where the Muslim League met

"Great Leader." A number of bearded Pathans in the audience rushed the dais, shouting angrily in Pashto. Hasrat Moham called to the only "proper language" in which he held Muslim League proceedings. Every one in the crowd of several thousands was standing, many shouting at once and wildly waving their arms. Jinnah helped escort the ladies in attendance out of the hall and Bombay's commissioner of police, Mr. Edwardes, nonchalantly standing near the tent keeping his men alert. Jinnah told Edwardes that the crowd inside had become so disorderly the meeting could not proceed and that those causing the disturbance were public visitors who had been admitted out of courtesy and by mistake. He asked the commissioner's help to clear the tent of our members, offering "to refund the money instead of an one who had paid for a ticket. Edwardes refused to be of such sensuous service. However, insisting I would use his force only to clear the tent entirely if I saw that the situation inside was out of control." Jinnah preferred to urge President Haque to adjourn the meeting and he met with the League's leaders later that day in the president's house to discuss the next day's session.

The Muslim League was reconvened on New Years Day, 1916 in Bombay at the Taj Mahal Hotel. Attendance was strictly limited to regular members and the press. President Haque opened the meeting at 10:00 AM and after a lengthy and impassioned discourse the hall fell upon Mr. Jinnah, who was received with loud cheering. "As president of the Bombay Muslim League," Jinnah was the "doer of the youth" and "unwearied savior of Bombay."²⁰ He was hailed with a menstache a most as full as Kitchener's and lean as a rapier in attitude like Roman Caligula, dressed like Anthony Eden, and was adored by most women at first sight and admired or envied by most men. He reported Commissioner Edwardes's pig headed behavior to a series of "his name" to his audience. He moved the unanimously carried resolution to appoint a special committee to formulate and frame a scheme of reforms in consultation with other "political" organizations the two purposes of Congress which would allow them to demand a single platform of reforms in the name of United India.²¹ That resolution was greeted with loud applause. A committee of seventy-one leaders of the Muslim League was appointed, representing every province of British India and chaired by Jinnah's close friend and client Raja Sir Muhammad Ali Mirza Muhammad Khan Bahadur, the Raja of Muzaffargarh. Its members from Bombay were Jinnah, Aga Khan, 1879-1965, and Jinnah's close friend and client Raja Sir Muhammad Ali Mirza Muhammad Khan Bahadur, the Raja of Muzaffargarh. Jinnah (1876-1948) in its ranks. Before that meeting in the Taj

President Haque remarked upon "the great work done for the Muslim League Phoenix-like from the ashes" by his friend Mr. Jinnah." added:

The entire Mohammedan community of India owed him a deep debt for without his exertions they could not have met in Bombay, "to elect a president." The president then turned to Jinnah, saying, "Mr. Jinnah, the Muslims of India thank you." It was the first such tribute Jinnah received from the Muslim League, but would not be his last.

as a friend to Jinnah after that hour of such a bitter and rude awakening to what everyone in Bombay already knew. Nor would he sanction the marriage under any circumstances. First he forbade Ruthe ever to see Jinnah again—at least while she remained married under the paternal roof of his marble. Then he sought legal remedies, filing an application to prevent their marriage once she came of age, based on the Parsi Marriage Act, but he was pitted against a barrister who rarely lost a case and could hardly have died before surrendering in this matter. Predominantly perhaps Ruthe's passionate devotion to her self-chosen husband to be only intensified, thanks to her father's adamant insistence that she never see him again. Just like she would not be deterred by prejudice or the reference of her parents. Sir Dinshaw met his own match in stubbornness or twice over in the long suffering concerned on the couple's behalf. But Ruthe passionately awaited the day when she would attain her majority at night and would marry just a few months after that, as soon as the last legal obstacle could be sloughed aside by Jinnah's formidable court case won.

The career of the latter did not prove as frustratingly difficult and far more arduous than Ruthe's father. The Mesopotamian or Mesard War as the streets of Iraq desert tragically to British troops came down to be called not to assist a grey pastures in Baghdad and long inquiries that revealed water accumulation at the shipment of heavy medical supplies and their vital need from Indian ports to the Persia Gulf. Secretary of State Chamberlain accepted the case "Iraq" through hardly deserved, as his own resignation to command of the India Office in mid '94. Thanks to that sacrifice, however, General Kinnaird Montagu, 1879-1932, was placed in charge of it and raised the House of Commons on August 20, 1917, to announce that the new inspiring policy of His Majesty's Government by which the Government of India are in complete accord. It is that of decreasing association of Indians in even the branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-government institutions with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire. Here at last appeared to be the promise of "dominion status" that political leaders throughout India had awaited since the war began. Nationalist eyes glossed over the "practical development" and "progressive realization" read gleefully the self-governing institutions and "responsible government" maintain a Montagu formula Imperialist Curzon for the Montagu said that these government will power. I never read War that the nation had to have a self-governing institution to a day, very soon in the future. I was to see that Montagu tenure at Whitehall. In the winter of 1917, however, Edw.

Montagu became the first secretary of state for India actually to visit the continent while holding that high office.

The ancient complexity of India, its pluralism and paradox affected him as deeply as it did most visitors from afar, though he had toured the country once before in 1913, and, as a Jew, considered himself "an Oriental." He could never see so many people, so much poverty and so ostentatious of wealth and luxury. India fascinated and terrified him so that by the end of his journey he was thoroughly exhausted, fatigued and depressed. The ignominious Montagu was traumatized by India, flattered by the civility of her welcome, shocked at the magnitude of her problems, pleased and disoriented by the official treatment he received.

For the political readers Montagu talked with a Hindu Jinnah on the first "Young" perfectly mannered, impressive-looking, armed with a dialectic and western upon the whole of his scheme.

J. Chelmsford tried to argue with him, and was tied up into knots. He was a man of great strength and it is of course an outrage that such a man has no chance of running the affairs of his own country. "If Montagu

visit to India means that we are going to do something, and something that will go home and produce a whole lot of nothing, it must be epoch-making, or it is a failure; it must be the keystone of the new India. Nothing is worth going to comfort. I am the stuff to carry this sort of thing off. For the first time in my life I wish I looked like Curzon. . . . I wish Lloyd George were here; I wish the British Cabinet had one I wish Asquith were here. I wish India's misfortunes that I am alone, alone, alone the person that has got to carry this thing through."¹⁰

Curzon's first personal thanks to Jinnah's personal appeal to the minister on her behalf, invited Montagu to attend the Calcutta session which she was to preside that December. "Oh, if only Lloyd George were here," Montagu roared to his diary. "He would dash down to the Congress and make them a great oration. . . . It might save the whole situation. But the Congress have carefully arranged our plans so that we shall be able to attend the Congress, the real Indian political movement, is in the hands of the Congress, the only Englishwoman, to be president of the Congress, her reward for the suffering she expected to undergo for the cause of India. . . . I wish I could see the Congress and if I could I should like to see the whole of it."

bitterness in them which cannot be eradicated and for my part I am not going to attempt the task."²⁰

Governor Willingdon convened his own provincial war conference in Bombay's town hall on June 20, 1925. Jinnah was there and must have felt the blood rush to his face as Willingdon remarked: "There are a certain number of gentlemen, some of whom have considerable influence with the public many of them members of the political organisation called the Home Rule League whose activities have been such of late years that I cannot honestly be sure of the sincerity of their support."²¹ Jinnah tried to amend Willingdon's proposed resolution insisting there could be no Home Defence without Home Rule, but he was ordered to leave the conference. Jinnah then rose to speak and said he was

pained very much and pained that His Excellency should have thought fit to cast doubts on the sincerity of the majority of the Home Rule Party. It was very sorry that with the utmost respect he must enter his emphatic protest against it. They were anxious as any one else to keep the defence of the motherland and the Empire. The difference was only regarding the methods for Government's methods the Home Rule Party did not want. He was making suggestions for the improvement of the scheme. The Government had their own scheme, namely for the recruitment of sepoy, but that was not enough to save them from the German menace. They wanted a national army on their words a citizen army and not a purely mercenary army. I say that if you wish to enable us to help you in the future and stimulate the rest of the Empire and the King's equal subjects. But the Government does not desire to say that we shall be trusted and made real partners in the Empire. When we do it with weapons. We do not want the consideration of the matter is definitely put off. We want action and immediate deeds.²²

Jinnah's public conflict with Willingdon was reflected in their acerbic social relationship. The Jinnahs had been invited to dinner at Bombay's Government House soon after returning from their honeymoon. But the wife of her lowest status Pa is wearing gowns and Lady Willingdon was quick to order her servant to bring a "wrap to cover up Mrs. Jinnah. . . in case she felt cold." Jinnah did not wait for the servant's return, jumping up from time to inform his hostess. "When Mrs. Jinnah felt cold, said a lady and ask for a wrap, wrap!" He also quarrels with her in the room. They did not get foot inside the Government House again till the Willingdons had moved out.

So a week or so after the war conference broke up and it

league celebrated Home Rule Day, on June 18, 1918, with a mass rally in Bombay, at which Jinnah said

Lord Willingdon has said that the support of the Home Rule Party is half-hearted. My answer is this. Your methods and policy are all wrong. I cannot believe that even a bureaucrat is so blind as not to see it . . . they do not trust us and, therefore, are not prepared to allow us to take up arms for the defence of our own motherland and of the Empire. They want us to continue an organisation which they call an army which is no army and nothing else and they then turn round and tell us that we are not helping them. I say what Mr. Montagu in his speech on the Mesopotamia Report has said—that the Government of India is "too wooden, too iron, too antediluvian to be of any use for the modern purpose we have in view."²³

Less than a month later Gandhi wrote to urge Jinnah to "take an emphatic declaration regarding recruitment" arguing

Can you not see that if every Home Rule League becomes a potent recruiting agency whilst at the same time fighting for constitutional rights we should ensure the passing of the Congress League scheme? "Seek ye first the recruiting office and everything will be added unto you."²⁴

One of Gandhi's strangest letters and appears to have left Jinnah too shocked to respond. Gandhi could appreciate the wisdom of Jinnah's vision on recruiting as soon as he started going from village to village in order to the seat of a soldier's brain.

As soon as I set about my task, my eyes were opened. My optimism found a rude shock. We had meetings wherever we went. People would hardly one or two would offer their services as recruits. You are a votary of Ahimsa, how can you ask us to take up arms? What could the Government do for India to deserve our co-operation? These and similar questions used to be put to us.²⁵

W. C. C. wrote Mafex, quoting even tougher common peasant sayings: "How can we who can hardly bear the sight of blood and the sight of bloodshed suddenly show us the courage to join the army? In September we were Gandhi's blood broke down, perished and his mind broke down. I work

I very nearly ruined my constitution during the recruiting campaign in that I was so much in the bed of pain . . . Vallabhbhai

[Patel] brought the news that Germany had been completely de-

Memorial Hall" which still stands in the compound of Bombay's Indian National Congress Building, commemorating the "historic triumph" of the citizens of Bombay "under the brave and brilliant leadership of Mohamunad Ali Jinnah."⁴² After Jinnah left Congress, and especially after the birth of Pakistan, that hall appeared strangely anachronistic and is now anonymously referred to only by its initials as P. J. Hall. Few Indians remember that People's Jinnah Hall was erected to honor the fearless leadership of Bombay's most inspiring ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity.

5

Amritsar to Nagpur (1919-21)

Amritsar brought not peace, but the sword of harsh repression and bitter rule in India. Martial-law "Defence of India Acts" passed in 1915 had suspended civil liberties and all legal due process throughout the war, leaving the government of India to arrest, detain, strip or expel any citizen without trial, warrant or stated cause. The Allied victory was, naturally, expected to restore all such rights and legal safeguards. Such was not the case, however, for a notorious report written by the government's such-and-such a committee chaired by Kings Bench Justice Sir Sidney Rowlatt had been published recommending immediate extension of the Criminal Emergency Powers Act for at least six months. Such was the very recommendation to the postwar Congress Legislative Council, at soon as an Act was introduced throughout India as the "Black" or Rowlatt Act. It was a weapon reserved for the detection and punishment of revolutionary crimes," said Mr. Jinnah, as Rowlatt's Bill was tabled on February 6, 1920.

To substitute the Executive for the Judicial will lead to the abuse of these vast powers. . . . There was no precedent or parallel in the history of any civilized country to the enactment of such laws. This was the most inopportune moment for this legislation as high hopes about momentous reforms had been raised. . . . If these reforms were not carried out, the most serious effect upon the relations between the Government and the people.

Mr. Jinnah's words were not in vain. Rowlatt's Bill did not steam full ahead despite the unanimous opposition of all

twenty-two Indian members on the council. There were thirty-four official members willing to rubber stamp the Black Act that was passed into law on March 1919.

"By passing this Bill," Jinnah wrote Chelmsford a few days later from his Maabar Hall house to which he had returned as soon as the vote was announced,

Your Excellency's Government have actively negated every argument they advanced a year ago when they appealed to India for help at the War Conference and have ruthlessly trampled upon the principles for which Great Britain avowedly fought the war. The fundamental principles of justice have been uprooted and the constitutional rights of the people have been violated at a time when there is no real danger to the State, no anarchy, no incompetent bureaucracy which is neither responsive to the people nor in touch with real public opinion. Therefore, it is a protest against the passing of the Bill and the manner in which it was passed tendering resignation for I feel that under the prevailing conditions it can be of no use to any people and the Council for civil liberty with me at its head is concerned in protesting with a Government that knows such utter disregard for the opinion of the representatives of the people in the Council Chamber and for the feelings and sentiments of the people outside. In my opinion a Government that passes or sanctions such a law in times of peace forfeits its claim to be called a civilised Government and I strongly hope that the Secretary of State for India Mr. Montagu will advise His Majesty to signify his disallowance to this Black Act.²

The resignation, further attesting to Jinnah's courageous national feeling, at this time made no impact on Chelmsford while Montagu's own influence in London continued to deteriorate. Jinnah had no way of knowing how potent a secretary of state he placed his hopes for India's future and he decided to say for London to seek to persuade his fathering friend to override the government of India. But he was pregnant and though their love would never be as strong again and the aftermath of the war proved so politically frustrating, the future never seemed as promising to both of them as it did that winter at the start of 1919.

The Muslim League had appointed Jinnah to lead a delegation to Prime Minister Lloyd George that year to plead for at least one Muslim delegate to the forthcoming Paris Peace Conference. Most Indian Muslims had the League president A. K. Fazlul Haque as their Muslim representative. An array of Indian and British opinion leaders in London and in spite of the recent deceptions of the Versailles Conference and the World War was

being fought for the protection of the rights of the small and defenceless minorities. Sir Satyendra P. Sinha and the Maharaja of Bikaner, 1880-1943 had been appointed to represent India at the Imperial War Conference in 1917 but since neither was Muslim the League feared that Islamic interests were being shortchanged or ignored. With the Anjuman and other popular Khilafat leaders, including Delhi's scholarly devout Maulana Muhammad Azad, 1887-1958 still under detention without specified crimes, Muslims felt more intense than ever a sense of communal alarm and of a second-class subjecthood under British rule. Khilafatists feared that Britain was the pledges and promises to protect Islam's holy places would be broken now that Turkey was a defeated enemy, now at the mercy of Christian victor states, determined to crush it for all time.

The Jinnahs reached London in March and rented a flat near Regent's Park. Jinnah visited them there including Bombay's answer Chaudhary Lala Lajpat Rai and Jinnah's unabashed laughter when telling a funny story circulated in the category of a possible "One evening in mid-August, Jinnah and his wife were at the theatre but they were obliged to leave their box as the lady could find no drug for a cold. Du was born in London. He was born on August 14-15, 1919 and enough precisely twenty-five days and hours before the birth of Jinnah's other offspring. The Jinnahs mission to the League proved so successful, however, that Jinnah stated the Muslim case vigorously to Lord Curzon, the Secretary of State for India, and to the other members of the Council of Ministers, including Montagu and Balfour. A one-time British ally, who had been a friend and ally of the League, assumed the role of a mediator over Iraq, Palestine, Transjordan, Syria and the other territories of the Ottoman Empire. Jinnah must have been taken to attend the peace conference himself especially since he had come so far and was the "delegate" of the Muslim community. He had no hatred or suspicion of him, so readily expressed his sympathy for the League and other leading experts on India. Jinnah's mission was a success. More doors remained closed to him in London but he had overthrown the Muslim League's new governor, George Lloyd.

Jinnah's mission against Jinnah, writing of him that "he was a fair of speech and black of heart," a "real irreconcilable," and "of a kind who has consistently said one thing and done another." The other "There were fewer smiles on those whom London faces he met, as Whitehall, closed ranks behind Simla, Delhi, and Calcutta. He had after all, resigned his "honorable" position. Best not

to let him see the other side of the coin. He had come across the British line in the wake of anti-Bowling Act mass protests and the

British massacre at Jallianwala Bagh Gandhi chose April 6 1919 as the first "sacred" day of a nationwide business strike (hartal) to protest the Black Acts, which he urged his Satyagraha followers to "refuse civilly to obey." It was a totally nonviolent day, but a week later on April 13, 1919, Amritsar "Nectar of Immortality," a city sacred to the Sikhs of the Punjab, was transformed shortly before sundown into India's first national urban strife. Two of Gandhi's lieutenants had been arrested a few days earlier and deported, thus starting up a protest march toward the British commissioner's bungalow in the cantonment. Several soldiers panicked and opened fire, killing a few marchers and turning the peaceful crowd into a raging mob bent on retaliation. They burned British banks and attacked a few Englishmen as well as Englishmen in Amritsar's native British bazaar, and his troops were called in to restore order. The general banned all public meetings. On April 13, when he learned of a meeting of thousands taking place inside Jallianwala Bagh "Garden," he drove to that almost fully enclosed site with some of his troops, ordering them to open fire without further word of warning to the peacefully assembled crowd inside. It was a Sunday, a Hindu festival holiday. The crowd, mostly villagers, had come to the city to celebrate. The soldiers fired 1,650 rounds of live ammunition at a point dark with age for ten minutes at the terror-stricken human targets who found no exit from this nightmare in the garden, leaving some 400 dead and over 1,200 wounded. The general and his troops then hastily retreat as the scene set the bloodiest massacre in British Indian history which Chamberlain afterwards termed an "error of judgment."

"I don't get to keep her head cool" - this was a crucial moment. Jinnah advised his members not to revive the Bombay Chronicle published on his return home in mid December 1918. "Unless at the next session of the Congress in December a thoughtful programme is laid down by our leaders and accepted by the people, a considerable amount of harm would be done to our cause," Jinnah still felt confident that Mr. Montagu will not fail us" but termed Chamberford's administration "a fiasco" and argued that "the sooner he is recalled the better for all concerned." As to the prime minister's "promises" in behalf of "pure Turkei" he called these "a scrap of paper" and did not believe the Allies stood ready to consider "self determination and independence to Arab states. He was, however more optimistic about India, envisaging a true "renaissance" through education, commercial expansion, and becoming progress and growth, and a globalized export policy. Asked if he had any message to the people as the Viceroy's Commission was approaching Jinnah replied "The attitude of the Congress will have to be made known to the public and it will be decided before the ratification of the new pact" Jinnah had returned from London in 1919

...but I was not sure what he thought of Montagu's bill then in Parliament, and Gandhi opposed

I cannot say anything about the Reforms Bill I have hardly studied. My preoccupation is Rowlett legislation. Our Reforms will be practically worthless, if we cannot repeal Rowlett legislation. And as I can imagine no form of resistance to the Government than disobedience I propose God willing, to resume it next week. I take it as certain that are humanly possible to take, against presence of violence.

They analyzed their different approaches to political process. Jinnah still favored moderate legislative change. Gandhi proceeded with civil disobedience. The vectors of their widely divergent paths led them ever

James were to send her real representations, say half a dozen who
try to propagandize work there. It is not long since that a substantial
local fund of public opinion - James's aggressive in his Bombay Chronicle
view - a great deal can be done. But it is not for a conventional and
established institution carried, a by itself, not only was go
as much as his permanently settled. What is he hoping for such
himself. He was now a father after all and had to plan for his
future, as well as his young wife's India was less secure than
a land to raise a family in than it had been since the terrible
war. He still a spouse and some one whom more than six
months and with the frontiers crumbling, the new lead-
ing the rest of the land poured on the verge of Satyagraha, prospects
and a future seemed dismal. No man Butler's future elected,
and of his own knowledge there was the despite the hurt of his
own. So at least if London remained growing more romantic
and more idealized or became less plausible. James's Bombay
of the prosper and demanding and receiving, not any more of
time and attention, evenings as well as days and often seven days a
week. He was now a father and more learned. What little
left to him left a sense of loss. More and more a dashing impul-
sive and young wife had to herself such with more time
she could possibly devise ways to spend

The long-awaited Montagu reforms were passed into law as the Government Act. The Government had to deal with a number of other matters. The Government had to deal with a number of other matters. The Government had to deal with a number of other matters. His Majesty's "earnest desire at this time that so far as possible any

Government should be obliterated," but the new act fell far short of that mark. Had it come a year earlier, perhaps it would have sufficed to satisfy expectations aroused by the war. Though it did provide some measure of provincial responsibility to elected representatives of India by "transferring" certain departments and their revenues to popular control, while "reserving" other more important matters to official hands. This newly devised technique of half and half rule, called diarchy, was Britain's formula for devolving political power "by successive stages" to India. The Central Legislative Council was greatly enlarged into a bicameral parliament with an executive majority lower house to be called the Legislative Assembly. The expense of the secretary of state for India's salary and those of his assistants was taken off India's budget and transferred to Parliament as Congress and the League demanded. A public service commission was to be established in India, thanks to which simultaneous recruitment to the coveted civil services would begin in New Delhi as well as in London by 1923. Finally, the act provided for further statutory improvement into the working of the system of government, the growth of education and the development of representative institutions, in British India. As to whether and to what extent it is desirable to establish the principle of responsible government" after ten years. If these come before the Bill at Act and Amhar such constitutional measures would surely have been generous and have been more widely welcomed throughout India.

Both Congress and the Muslim League held annual meetings in Amritsar in 1919. If the Muslim League was secretly the League to be the secret of success, but just of the new proposed reform, but of all work done by Indians at home and abroad and thanks to the "Congress League Council of 1916" the major political obstacle to such aim had been resolved. The A.I. brothers appeared before the Amritsar League to stand in glorification and "reverberating chorus of ex-Mohammad Ali assured his personal, representative audience that "there was no Government but the Government of God. Jinnah was elected to preside over the League for the following year.

Jinnah called a special meeting of the Muslim League that September in Calcutta, where Congress met as well in emergency session to consider radical change of political posture caused not only by announced All-India peace terms but also by harsh, callous British reactions to the Jallianwalla Bagh massacre and published reports of its atrocious aftermath throughout the Punjab.

We have met on a particular occasion, but the situation of the country owing to the studied and persistent policy of the Government since the Jallianwalla Bagh massacre and the Punjab atrocities—and then came the spoliation of the

Ottoman Empire and the Khilafat. The one attacks our liberty, the other our faith. Now every country has two principal and vital functions to perform—one to assert its voice in international policy and the other to maintain internal order. The largest interests of justice and humanity. But one must have one's own administration in one's own hands to carry it out to one's own satisfaction. As we stand in matters international notwithstanding the League of Nations and the League of Nations, and in breach of the Prime Minister's solemn pledges, various and outrageous terms have been imposed upon Turkey and the Ottoman Empire has served for a ruler and broker up by the Allies under the guise of Mandates. This, thank God, has at last convinced us, one and all, that we can no longer abide our trust either in the Government of India or the Government of His Majesty the King of England to represent India in matters international.

And now let us turn to the Punjab. That Star Chamber Legislature named after the notorious Chairman of the Rowlatt Committee was established by the Government of Lord Curzon and is responsible for those "celebrated crimes" which neither the words of men nor the words of women can wash away. An error of judgment the day after the last would be a disaster with them—an error of judgment it is not this should have a pay for it if you could a then tomorrow. One thing is certain, it is incalculable and that is that this Government will go and give place to a completely responsible Government. The Congress and the Muslim League will not forget this. We are going to think out some course more effective. I am saying this to you, his proposal to be forwarded to the Secretary of State. I shall find a way, even as I have and study it. And the new born Egypt has. We are not going to rest content until we have attained the fullest political freedom in our own country. Mr. Jinnah has paid his programme of non-cooperation support to the Government of the Khilafat. Co-operation before the country. It is now for you to consider whether or not you approve of its principle and its principle whether or not you approve of its details. The operations of this scheme will strike at the individual in each of you, and therefore it rests with you alone to measure your strength and to weigh the pros and the cons of the questions before you. We have decided to march, let there be no retreat under any circumstances.¹⁰

He sat behind him on the platform, a vivid reminder of all that he personally risked from so revolutionary a step. He would, of course, be expected to give up his lucrative legal practice as long as Satyagraha continued, if he endorsed it, which he never did. He must have sensed, now, as

he could accept. Gandhi remarked that anyone was "free" to "resign" from the Sabha who could not accept the majority's decision. Only sixty-one members attended that meeting, which was called at short notice but of those less than one third, eighteen, agreed with Jinnah, including his loyal Bombay Parsi lieutenants, the brothers Jinnabadas and Karsa Dwarakadas. The defeated minority left the meeting and before month's end, Jinnah wrote "with great sorrow" to resign from the League he had joined. Gandhi then wrote to seek to win Jinnah back, asking him to make his "share in the new life that has opened up before the country, and I expect the country in your experience and guidance." Jinnah's reply to that letter indicates how passionately apprehensive he felt on the eve of the Nagpur Congress about the course Gandhi charted for India.

If by "new life" you mean your methods and your programme, I am afraid I cannot accept them for a while. I do not think that I am at all to disagree with the idea of a life that has opened up before the country, but that we are faced with a Government that pays no heed to the grievances, feelings and aspirations of the people, that our own countrymen are divided, that the Moderate Party is doing wrong, that our methods have already caused splits in a nation in almost every way, that you have approached hitherto, and in the public life of the country, not only against Hindus and Muslims but between Hindus and Muslims and Mohammedans and Muslims and even between fathers and sons, people generally are desperate over the results and our extreme programme has forthwith struck the magnanimous majority of the experienced with a blow, he grant and the illiterate & this means completely ignorant and how. What the consequence of this may be I should not contemplate but I fear you are convinced that the present policy of the Government is the primary cause of this and unless that cause is removed the effects must continue. I have no voice or power to remove the cause but at the same time I do not wish my constituents to be dragged to the brink of a precipice in order to be shattered.¹⁸

Was that "shudder" of apprehension in 1920 Jinnah's first ride towards the death knell of his dream of national leadership and unity? Clearly he had no faith in Gandhi or his judgment to save India from being "shattered." Was this possibly his first premonition of partition? The only way for the Nationalists, Jinnah warned, his revealing letter to the moderate works for the programme which is necessary to speak for the country, and to complete responsibility, we must have a programme which is based on the complete responsibility of the Government and the people. The only way to achieve this is to have a programme which is based on the complete responsibility of the Government and the people. The only way to achieve this is to have a programme which is based on the complete responsibility of the Government and the people.

sure my colleagues and myself shall continue to work." While conceding his own weakness, on the one hand Jinnah thus reaffirmed his commitment to the same goal, the same struggle for responsible government through Hindu-Muslim unity to which he had devoted himself since long before Lucknow. His wounded pride was palpable, perhaps more in those concluding remarks even than in his pained confession, "I have no voice or power."

Central India's Nagpur hosted both regular sessions of the Muslim League and Congress after Christmas in 1920. That ancient sacred stronghold of Hindu religious sermons, besieged by Naxalite regional militancy gave birth to a new Congress since Gandhi's revolution, and its ship. Mahatma first moved his credo resolution at a meeting of the subjects of the League on December 31, proposing "the attainment of swaraj by the people of India by all legitimate and peaceful means." Jinnah immediately stated that it was impractical and dangerous to dissolve "the British connection" without greater preparation for independence and Gandhi argued:

I do not for one moment suggest that we wait to end the British connection at all costs unconditionally. If the British connection is for the advancement of India we do not want to destroy it. . . . I know, believe we are done with this great battle on which we have embarked.

We have to go probably possibly through a sea of blood, but it is not to be said of us or any of us that we are guilty of shedding blood, but let it be said by generations yet to be born that we suffered that we shed not somebody's blood but our own; and so I have no hesitation in saying that I do not want to show much sympathy for those who had their heads broken or who were said to be even in danger of losing their lives. What does it matter?¹⁹

Jinnah argued as best he could against the resolution in committee, but his caution, because of a war on courage and was ignored as well as down in next day. As a facetious ear rushed to its end, he new it was placed in Gandhi before the more than 14,500 delegates who met in Nagpur and moved the Congress to meet more than two years in Amritsar a year later. The Mahatma's resolution was greeted with a few pro- and con- and the case. Lord D. but it was seconded and he heard in opposition, striding to the dais. "Mr. Jinnah with the usual smile on his face mounted the platform with an ease suggestive of self-confidence and the conviction of the man, and opposed in an argumentative, calm and logical manner, the resolution of the Congress for India.

He was "howled down with cries of shame, shame and political im-

by Madras Sir Sankaran Nair, 1887-1934, former Congress president, now law member of the viceroy's council, was called upon Jinnah to propose the draft resolutions. These began with a strong condemnation of the government's repressive policy and an equally strong urging of Congress to abandon non-cooperation. A compromise resolution was duly agreed upon called for a Round Table conference to settle outstanding differences between the government and the Congress and Khilafat movements. Gandhi addressed the conference, insisting that before any Round Table meeting could be held government would have to issue "a proper declaration of 'ponte-tence' and 'refrains' those steps."

The Mahatma met with a subjects committee of twenty leaders to help draft the final resolution. Jinnah's proposals enough to drive conservative Sir Sankaran Nair from his chair the next day when the new resolutions were adopted. Sir M. Visvesvaraya, ex-dewan, prime minister of Mysore State, then took the chair. "The resolutions all passed unanimously," he said. Gandhi had not yet shown and hesitated for accelerating the pace of civil disobedience and considered the idea of a Round Table conference "indecisive and a scheme of this kind, in nature, India has not yet reached that stage." Two weeks later, however, the demonstration of twenty-two Indian policemen made their station and United Provinces Governor Chelmsford aware by a mob of "Satyagrahis" convinced Gandhi that his countrymen were not ready for a nonviolent movement. Early in February, of 1922, the Mahatma issued a halt to the campaign. He had to agree with such a decision. "God has been abundantly kind to me," he wrote at this time.

"He has waited the third time that there is not as yet in India that truthful and non-violent atmosphere which and which alone can justify mass disobedience which can be at all described as civil which means gentle and peaceful and knowing without any loving never criminal and hateful. God spoke clearly through Chauri Chaura."²⁰

Soon after this about face by the Mahatma, Jinnah and Javakar met with him. The notion that Jinnah's "strong dislike of Gandhi" grew more "manifest" at each of their meetings. "Immediate following news of the violence at Chauri Chaura, Jinnah and Sir Horne (Sir) Wadia's treatment of Gandhi was most disconcerting."²¹ Little more than a year since Nagpur, then it was Gandhi's turn to swallow the bitter notion of banishment. There was no swiftness in his reaction to Jinnah's views, the greatest loss of temper was the attack on Satyagraha which he had anticipated, the violence was not the fault of the Mahatma, but the fault of the Congress and all that was left of sanctity and the laurel wreath of national leadership

snatched from his brow before it could settle there were ashes. Like those wretched dismembered corpses at Chauri Chaura, his countless hours of patient Bombay negotiation and careful Calcutta formulation of parliamentary schemes confirmed at Lucknow had gone up in the smoke of Nagpur's display of wild enthusiasm for what now it was even too late to bring heading round again to where he had been just a few months before. Why should any victory in his right mind to get into a new constitution after easy and abject surrender? Jinnah's "discourtesy" to Gandhi was hardly surprising.

By mid-1922 Jinnah was trying to organize a new moderate party from which he would have excluded Gandhi entirely speaking out more "strongly" about the Mahatma. He invited Javakar and Motilal Nehru to his house which in this ambitious venture, but both declined, thus leaving Jinnah isolated from his former Congress and Khilafat allies. The old Ambassador's large communal unit broke down. Jinnah's political isolation and frustration at this time were compounded by his alienation from Abul Kalam Azad as well. The Ab brothers and Motilal and Azad considered him a person for the government and viceroy, but for the Congress, he was a friend was Motilal, the guide to Jawahar and Sardar Vallabhbhai. Motilal died in 1931-1934, who continued to visit him in Bombay. They often talked politics atop Motilal's Hill well into the 1930s. Jinnah's former Home and Secretary, P. N. Jinnah, a Desai, and his younger brother Kari were often there too. Kari, who became a Rutledge's closest friend, wrote:

"One night in May (1922) I had a dream in which I saw Rutledge lying peculiarly shaped old fashioned sofa . . . and in that dream Rutledge said: 'Kariji, help me.' Next morning as I woke up I remembered the dream, but . . . I took no notice of it. The next night the dream appeared . . . including Rutledge's call for help. . . . On the next morning at about 5 o'clock, on office and without remembering the dream I called at Jinnah's 'South Court' . . . I had seen Rutledge for some weeks and this was the first time that I went to Jinnah's house without a previous appointment. As I got out of the car, Jinnah's servant met me and told me that Rutledge was ill. I gave him a card. . . . In a minute he came back and said that Rutledge wanted to see me and I was taken to the back verandah [sic] where she was lying. Imagine my surprise when I saw her lying on the sofa at about 7.30, asked me to have a drink with him and to stay on for dinner. I said I was there since 3 o'clock and I did not stay for dinner!"

7

New Delhi (1924-28)

British India's newly elected National Assembly met for the first time in New Delhi on January 21, 1924. Jinnah wasted no time, within twenty-three "independents" to confer with him immediately after the viceroy's opening address. Jinnah's negotiator, practical politician that he was, he managed to define a program of basic reforms that he convinced in his presence many distinguished forces and aark toward achieving. He was then an invitation to Mahatma Nehru and C. R. Das, offering to merge his powerful swing between independent votes with their plurality of forty-two Swadeshi members who could not let the phantasm of thirty-six official appointees whenever they wished. A new Nationalist party was thus born within the assembly's overcast, much to Roundings amazement and dismay. This powerful Indian bloc of elected representatives committed to achieving dominion status and full responsible provincial government at the earliest possible date had been compared into existence miraculously it seemed from the disparate droves of individuals who posed no threat, no political challenge to officialdom, nor troubled by the swirling fire of Jinnah's brilliant alienism. No he repeated in New Delhi, much the same feat of political alchemy he had achieved at Lucknow. Only the vague formula did not extend as far this time, nor last quite as long.

Jinnah's assembly strategy bore fruit in February 1924 when a resolution on constitutional reforms recommended the early summoning of a Round Table Conference "with due regard to the preservation of the rights and interests of representative minorities." Jinnah's extreme liberal constitutionalists, but revised with a view to establish full responsible Government in India. That resolution carried by a vote of 78 to 48, and as a result, Lord Irwin appointed a Round Table Conference in London. Jinnah's strategy was

Alexander Muddunan, Jinnah served on that committee with four other Indians. Madras Sir P. S. Sivaswami Aiyer 1864-1946, president of the National Liberal Federation, Poona educator Dr. R. P. Paranjpye 1877-1969, Allahabad's barrister Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru 1875-1949, and the Punjab's Sir Muhammad Shafi, now member of the government of India. The committee soon came to be referred to among the elected members within the assembly as "the Jinnah Committee." Jinnah drafted a national demand and minority report by the year's end, out of the fears of the growing effectiveness and escalating demands of the a rest of the majority were a then so strong that the viceroy vetoed several attempts to debate the Indian Inquiry Commission reports, thus squelching Jinnah's recommendations.

The Pakistan movement and its singular impact on recent Indian history have tended to obscure Jinnah's positive contributions to the evolution of a parliamentary government in India. Much of his time and talent however were absorbed in debating legislation, arguing for or against bills, convening, and trying to keep offends as well as national colleagues interested. Jinnah's most just as Gokhale has been for the Central Legislative Council of Calcutta. Jinnah charged with interminable speaking in Delhi's assembly speaking to most resolutions, perusing every document and report with the criticism of a lawyer and expressing himself with the precision of a lawyer speaking, for example to a resolution designed to empower the assembly to enter government contracts, strongly opposed it. Jinnah asked, "What is the difficulty? It is only an excuse, it is the same old story, the executive does not wish to, and the secretary of this House is not into engagements of a serious character. I say, there is absolutely no justification. And to be proposed to require passports for entry into India," Jinnah remarked, "Sir, I think that all regulations which impede the free movement of the people are the biggest nuisance and the sooner they are done away with the better."⁶⁴

In 1924 he introduced an important resolution that went to the heart of India's struggle for economic independence, insisting that the government of India be allowed to purchase its vast and valuable "stores" of raw materials, minerals, and land a rather than on a through sterling basis in London. Although this Resolution of mine may not later attract every Member of the House, it being a very dry subject," Jinnah began, "I do not doubt that every honorable Member understands this principle. It is well known that India does most vitally." He then declared that the country's economic independence was a matter of classes that had to be won by the people, not by the government. It was a matter of advantage to the British manufacturers who are on the spot, who get the information first, and invariably it is really for all practical purposes con-

Each flurry led to more retaliatory raids, provoking further fledged riots, leaving countless dead, wounded and embittered.

Motilal Nehru, as head of the Swarajist faction within Congress (Das felt mortally wounded in 1924) was Gandhi's only compeer for leadership of that organization. In August 1924, in a "Very Confidential" letter, the Mahatma wrote Motilal to inform him that he was "prepared to facilitate your securing the Congress machinery actually assisting you to do so, and would 'in the case' be party to veto-vetaling, claiming no interest in anything but promoting a peaceful atmosphere" and adding: "If you are not prepared to take over the whole of the Congress machinery I am quite prepared to facilitate you in taking over those portions where you think you have no difficulty in running it." Almost as an afterthought, however, in the very same letter Gandhi named those who have been assisting that he "can no longer become a resident himself concluding 'The only condition that will make me reconsider my position would be your desire that I should accept.' All you please consult Messrs. Das, Kelkar and others and let me know what you would advise."*

The Mahatma's continued boycott of all councils undermined Motilal's position within the Legislative Assembly and Congress; Gandhi had published a statement of "total moral difference" with the Swarajists that Motilal felt that Congress entry is inconsistent with Non-cooperation as he conceived it.¹²

Motilal was thus faced with the need to choose, by mid-1924, between continuing his party's assembly alliance with Jinnah and risking the loss of Gandhi's confidence and erosion of his Congress position, or moving the other way. It was not an easy decision. The elder Nehru wrestled with it all summer, inviting Gandhi to stay as his guest at the family beach house in Bombay as well as during August trying to convince the Mahatma of the "nation-building utility" of Swarajist work within the assembly. Motilal's son Jawaharlal, who was Congress secretary that year joined them on those vacation summers but recalled that he and his father "did not succeed in winning Gandhi, or even in influencing him to any extent." The Mahatma's only match for stubbornness in recent Indian history was Jinnah. "Behind all the friendly talks and the courteous gestures, the fact remained that there was no compromise," wrote the younger Nehru. "I also retreated from Jinnah, disappointed, for Gandhi did not resolve a single one of my doubts. As is usual with him he refused to look into the future, or lay down any one single principle." Jawaharlal recalled that his father was "too honest to be able to do so."

It is not clear whether Motilal and his family's Swarajist position was ever resolved, or not at all. In the late 1920s, a party

in which the bureaucracy proposes to consolidate its power." While admitting that it is conceivable that some good may incidentally result from a few of its measures, Motilal insisted, "we are clear" of opinion, but in the larger interest of the country, it is better to temporarily sacrifice such other benefits than add an iota to the powers of the bureaucracy. "That 'Swarajist' party presaged the death of the Nationalist party for Jinnah and his supporters refused to engage in 'obstructionist tactics' so that the assembly was unwilling to consider each motion on its merits voting for or against it only because they believed it might advance or retard the economic and social development of India."

During his visit to Bombay, that summer, Gandhi spoke to the "First Congress" in the Theatre to raise funds for Mahatma Jyoti Bapu's Kanji Dwar. He attended the meeting and walked on Jinnah's Nagpur footsteps addressing Gandhi as "Mister" and noting that a great deal of "dirty work" had been done under the name of "Mahatma." Kanji was for a week ad from the Congress but Gandhi rose on this occasion to his critic's defense, stating:

The word "Mahatma" strikes in my nostrils and in addition to that somebody exists and every one may call me "Mahatma" I get annoyed, I do not wish to live. Had I not known that the more I insist on the word Mahatma not being used, the more people use it, the more, I would most certainly have insisted. In the Ashram where I live, my brother and sister has orders not to use the word Mahatma."

When he next he came to a public apology to Jinnah for what had happened in the Congress that year earlier, he must have known that Kanji had reported what he said to Mr. and Mrs. "J."

Little was almost as much of Kanji by now as she did of her busy husband. She had just completed a dramatic play with him. She had turned to mysticism for solace, and Kanji was her guide in the realm of occultism and thought transference. Wrote Kanji: "Ruthie was extremely contented in the non-physical world and she made difficult dangerous experiments to verify her beliefs and convictions. She told me how she was how full of 'magnetic' her 'experiments' and how she was to be 'very taking drugs for' 'the purpose of being better able to control and depress or perhaps on morphine, hashish, and cocaine were, of course, readily available in part of Bombay. She wrote Kanji to November 1924:

I have a matter about which I am most anxious to speak with you, as I think you can help me. Lately I have been very much drawn to

wards the subject of Spirit Communication and I am most anxious to know more and to get at the Truth. It is such an elusive Subject and the more I hear of it the more puzzled do I become, though still more passionately interested. I have some sort of an idea that you must be cognisant of spiritual circles in our City, whose Seneca one may join. I don't profess any creed nor do I subscribe to a belief, but . . . I am too deeply immersed in the matter now to give it up without some personal satisfaction for I cannot content myself with other peoples' experiences . . . I would prefer my identity, however, to remain unknown while you make enquiries. And I sincerely hope that you will be able to assist me.¹⁸

A month later Rutte wrote again to remind him that "What I am after is a Seneca or troubled by some experienced medium" as I am most anxious to get a personal experience of this matter which I so passionately believe in.¹⁹ Her loneliness, her desperation for someone to talk with and discuss questions that interested her so passionately was palpable. "Do come and see me soon so that we may review our last discussion."

"My dear Karji," she wrote the following April, "Yes, I know of the great travails of which you speak. But I am a little dreaming in my waking hours. There is nothing I would welcome with greater longing than a experience of the sort which you describe so better and in such detail. I do sleep there is no evening feature . . . five or at most six hours rest . . . restful mind and a corresponding restless physical state. I don't dream excepting very rarely. She was now twenty-five years old. My soul is so clogged and though I aspire and crave God knows how earnestly my researches remain unproductive. I have a feeling peculiarly restless and wish one with psychic powers could come to my assistance."²⁰

She tied her best to arouse her associate's interest in such things. Writing to report to Kanji, she even thought she had succeeded.

I am slowly but surely drawing his interest into the matter and by alternate bullying and coaxing I got him to read that book "The Spirit of Irene." . . . I had to admit that it was remarkable and unrefutable. . . . The incident dealt with the tracing of a murder . . . it revolves round a poor girl—a crook—who was deceived into London to Boscomb and then done to death, the details of the crime are horrible, it having been a crime of lust. The police being baffled by the cunning of the man, were at their wits end, or you may be sure they would not have consented to hold Seneca. Anyway they got the crook . . . the man was hanged. . . . I was not at all events able to find any law in the crime.²¹

One can hardly imagine Jinnaah devoting much time or attention to "Irene." His legal practice alone remained so demanding that Rutte added in this letter of April 12, 1925, "It doesn't look as if we were going to Kashmir after all, as I am engaged in the Bawa case." Kanji kept her well supplied with books at a kind of his own literary reviews, and plays she specially enjoyed Noel Coward. Throughout 1925 he saw her regularly three or four times a week. Dina was now six, and Kanji tried to convince Rutte to send her to school in Madras, at the headquarters of Mrs. Besant's Theosophical Society. Jinnaah resisted that move, sensing no doubt that it would further alienate his daughter from her own community. He may have feared he would soon "lose" his only daughter as Sir Dinshaw had lost his in June 1925. Rutte was ill again and wrote dear Karji "as it was nearing 2 A.M. I am frightfully tired and sleepy but the thought of you having come to me tonight had to crawl out of bed to write to you—to ease my conscience if nothing else. Will you excuse me and let me get back now?" She told Jinnaah in July that she would go with Kanji to the Theosophical Society's Public Convention in Madras that December. The Madras League, which met in Aligarh, she was to have been introduced as a representative by Mrs. Desai at the pulpit but then Rutte's cut "fever" delayed her departure week. She did, however, meet Anand Besant at Ayrer before she ended and the older woman announced a "perceived how unhappy" she was regarding Kanji's amazement at that verdict with "Don't you see unhappiness in her eyes? Look at her."²²

Despite his rise as a matter of interest, Gandhi himself did preside over the Congress in 1925 but as he insisted "only" as a businesslike presence at business meetings. The 1921 census figures revealed such rapid growth among Muslims in both wings of the United Provinces that they were now a majority in the Province, 54.5 percent, and in Bengal, 52.1 percent. This development stimulated demands for reorganizing the United Provinces with a view to large leaders from both Muslim-majority provinces no longer willing to content themselves with the status of minority council status. The Congress continued its separatist view then, but was preoccupied with devoting the Muslim League from Congress, even as Muslim disillusion with the Congress continued to grow.

Two meetings and a debate. The annual valued Jinnaah's Assembly was held in July 1925. In the month of December in the invited list he was recommending for knighthood, if only Jinnaah would agree to accept that honor. "I prefer to be plain Mr. Jinnaah," he replied, "I have lived as plain Mr. Jinnaah and I hope to die as plain Mr. Jinnaah." He refused to accept the knighthood. He was then called "Mr. Jinnaah" by snapping—"If my husband accepts knighthood I

personnel of the Commission is far more important than any other factor in this matter.²⁰ Had he hoped to be appointed himself? Most probably. He was always generous in helping government with his time and deep understanding of what needed to be done to reform India's constitution, and work was his only solace now. Doubly bitter was the draught of rejection Jinnah was obliged to swallow then with the rest of India's ignored and wasted leadership, which was so publicly rejected, repudiated that November by Lord Birkenhead's reply to the Simon Commission. As few to one impassioned voice, India would respond, "Simon, go back" when the commission reached Bombay's port February next, its years of projected labor doomed, torpedoed before it ever got underway, by the pig-headedness of a narrow-minded coterie of imperial managers who put their selfish interests above the needs, aspirations, and just demands of most of humankind.

The Muslim League divided over the Simon Commission issue. A small group, most from the Punjab, lined up behind ex-Law Minister Shafi and met in Lahore where they voted to welcome and cooperate with the commission. Most members of the League's central committee, however, joined the "Jinnah Group" in Calcutta, meeting on December 30, 1927, and New Year's Day, 1928. Annie Besant and Sarojini Naidu attended as honored guests and the Ag. Khan was to have presided, but he withdrew at the last moment. Masud, Muhammad Yakub took his place and delivered his presidential address, extemporized in Urdu. The most important resolution, carried by acclamation, declared "unmistakably" that "the Statutory Commission and the procedure as announced are unacceptable to the people of India. If the Jinnah League" therefore resolves that the Muslims throughout the country should have nothing to do with the Commission at any stage or in any form."²¹ Jinnah was re-elected permanent president of the League for another three years and thundered:

A constitutional war has been declared on Great Britain. Negotiations for a settlement are not to come from our side. Let the Government sue for peace. We are democratic nationalists. We will resist the new doctrine to the best of our power. Jallianwalla Bagh was a physical butchery; the Simon Commission is a butchery of our souls. By appointing an exclusively white Commission Lord Birkenhead has declared our unfitness for self-government. I welcome Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, leading Congress Hindu in attendance, and I welcome the head of the lowest caste extended to us. He leaves from the platform of the Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha. For, to me, this offer is more valuable than any concession which the British Government can make. Let us then grasp the hand of fellowship. This is indeed a

bright day, and for achieving this unity, thanks are due to Lord Birkenhead.²²

The outgoing Torv secretary of state thus achieved in a single act more than Gandhi and Jinnah alone could accomplish at the peak of their popularity and powers, momentarily at rest, mending a country still bleeding from communal wounds, breathing fresh life into the all but abandoned hopes of boycott and non-cooperation, and bringing Gandhi, Jinnah, the Nehrus, and even old Annie Besant back to harness at the head of a single mass national movement resolved to reject Birkenhead, Simon, and the morally bankrupt company they represented.

Jinnah refused Motilal's invitation. The Muslim League had not as yet had a chance to meet to consider the Nehru proposals, he argued, and "As the President of the League it would not do for me to anticipate their decisions."²² It was one of his most effective negotiating techniques: part of the secret of his singular power for he always magnified himself by the force of his entire party whenever he felt unhappy about the terms of an offer. He was just then emerging for Sind to take charge of the defense of a wealthy and powerful Muslim pir of its northernmost district.

Pir Fagaro had been jailed at Sukkur for "theft and wrongful confinement of some one and for keeping a large number of arms and ammuni- tion in his possession."²³ His trial was held in a special magistrate's court in the Sukkur district. There Jinnah stayed in the government guest house. Sukkur's only decent accommodation for a Lalpur overlooking the Indus and the massive dam that spanned it. He commanded 500 rupees a day, a very high scale fee at the time. Although the magistrate convicted Fagaro, Jinnah appealed two years ago and had his client's sentence reduced.

Two significant things occurred while Jinnah was in Sind. He met young Mohammed Khokha, who later worked for Pir Fagaro and was destined to become independent Pakistan's first minister of Trade. And Miran Sir Hay Haroon, a princely ruler of neighbouring Khairpur State and one of Jinnah's independent party assembly colleagues, held a fête in his honor at the ornate Khairpur House, which Jinnah attended in a most fashionable modern Sindhi style, in black shawl, a floral dhoti, and a pink shawl. Jinnah took this occasion to speak to the Muslim League and several of whom would become his strongest backers and hesitants during the two remaining decades of his life.

Before leaving Sind in November 10, Jinnah had openly discussed his grave concerns and pessimism about Motilal's committee and its report with fellow Muslims. He would be going to Calcutta in December but anticipated quite accurately as a future critic that the committee there might prove "the putting of the wax." Had he decided in fact, prior to December in Calcutta that it was time to abandon the ingenious all parties search for a constitutional solution acceptable to every shade, caste and religious community of India's pluralistic spectrum? Had he concluded that it might be more profitable and less hazardous for the Muslim League to go it alone in negotiating with the British? For what had all the time spent on all parties negotiating accomplished, after all, when he had the leaders of the Hindu Nationalist movement to consider? Had he had any other views, aged and weary, on the subject? He had not had time to think the

some of whom could barely speak the English language, most of whom had never drafted a legal document. Nor was he simply being middle-aged and irritable, though he would soon be at least fifty-one.

At Lucknow, the meeting of Jinnah's League council did not go as he hoped it would, and to his personal disappointment he found many good Muslim colleagues so unimpressed by the Nehru report that he dared not call for a vote on it in early November. Even the maharaja of Mahmudabad, who was elected that year's president of the Muslim League, liked the report and was ready to accept it. Chagla was overjoyed to find so many allies and hoped Jinnah would see the wisdom of his earlier actions, but Jinnah remained set against the Nehru "constitution," viewing it only as a "Hindi" document.

Motilal, Dr. Ansari, and Maulana Azad met with him in Lucknow, urging him to attend a special meeting of the Nehru committee before the League or Congress met in December, and before the All Parties Convention would be convened in Calcutta to try to fashion a common set of principles on communal issues. Jinnah turned them down. He said he visited that first day, argued and argued and ultimately gave up. He asked Motilal to postpone the convention till early next year after a hot autumn session of League and Congress. Then he returned to Bombay and prepared for a provincial League meeting which was held on November 23, holding at least a very a majority in his home town. But Chagla stood up and argued so effectively for the Nehru report that Jinnah adjourned the meeting without putting the question to a vote. Had he sensed once again that on this issue he sided with a minority of his own party? Jinnah was growing a bit temperamental, feeling more isolated and dispirited.

In an earlier "confidential" letter to his own committee, Motilal had requested, after meeting with Jinnah in Lucknow, that Jinnah object to the Convention being held before the meeting of the Muslim League on the ground that the authority to represent the League at the Convention could only be derived from the League itself. I may mention that had the Report of the Committee and the Lucknow decisions been taken into consideration they would have been approved by a greater majority of the Muslim League's Council than that which elected the Maharaja of Mahmudabad as President of the League. It is expected that the result will be the same at the open session of the League.²⁴ Motilal was obviously kept well informed of the political situation in India and he was anxious to see to his own interests, but he had done this. He had exaggerated Jinnah's response, however, by underestimating his powers. It was a fatal error, not only for his report, but for his hopes of retaining India as a united entity. The All India

National Convention started as scheduled in Calcutta on December 22 but no officially appointed representatives of the Muslim League arrived to attend its crowded sessions till December 28.

Following recitations from the *Quran*, Abul Karim, the chairman of the League's reception committee, welcomed its delegates on December 28 at the opening of Jinnah's address at the meeting in Calcutta "on the eve of momentous changes in the Constitution and administration in India." Karim reported that "some forces were at work to divide the political strength of the Muslims of India at a time when vital interests both of the community and the country required that there should be solid unity." On December 27, the League voted to appoint with three delegates to represent them and take part in the deliberations of the Convention called by the Indian National Congress. This delegation led by Mahomed Ali Jinnah, included thirty-two-year-old Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan (1898-1951) who was to become Pakistan's first prime minister, and Chagla who was to be India's minister of external affairs, 1966-67. Chagla recalled that "Jinnah was in favour of outright rejection of the Nehru report. After a long and protracted debate, we ultimately decided three important principles: (a) that the separate electorate system should remain, second that there should be reservation of one-third of the seats in the Central Legislature and the remainderary powers should be vested in the Provinces."²³

Jinnah presented the Muslim case before the national convention on December 28. He stressed it was absolutely essential to our progress that a Hindu-Muslim settlement should be reached and that all communities should receive a friendly and harmonious spirit in this vast country of ours.²⁴

Aliumad's Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, a law member of the viceroy's council, rose to respond to Jinnah's plea.

If you examine the figures, you will find that including nominated members Muslim representation in the Central Legislature is 37 per cent and Mr. Jinnah wants 33. . . . Speaking for myself, I would like you to picture Mr. Jinnah whom I have known intimately for fifteen years. If he is a spoilt child, a naughty child, I am prepared to say, give him what he wants and be finished with it.²⁵

However, Prerna's M. R. Jayakar, then deputy leader of the Nationalist party in the assembly, spoke out for her Indian Muslim friends at the convention as less willing to "pamper" Jinnah than Sapru had been.

I have also known Mr. Jinnah for the last three years at a social association as a colleague in nationalist life and I can assure you that he comes before us today neither as a naughty boy nor as a spoilt

child. . . . One important fact to remember . . . is that well-known Muslims like the esteemed patriots Mir Jinnah, Abul Kalam Azad, Dr. Ansari, Sir Ali Imam, Raja Salub of Mahmudabad and Dr. Kitchew have given their full assent to the compromise embodied in the Nehru Committee Report. It is further to be borne in mind that even in the Muslim League a large odd of members have given their assent to the Nehru Committee Report. Mr. Jinnah has, of course, representatives. If I may say so without offence, a small minority of Muslims."²⁶

He knew, of course, just how offensive a slap that was to Jinnah's ego and sensitivity and there was applause and many a thump of approval as Jayakar sat down.

Jinnah responded softly, yet spoke with an intensity of conviction he had not publicly displayed since Nagpur.

We are engaged to-day in a very serious and solemn transaction. We are here, as I understand, for the purpose of entering into a solemn contract and all parties who enter into it will have to work for it and fight for it together. What we want is that Hindus and Muslims should work together and not be divided. Therefore it is essential that you must get together. The Muslim League is the Muslims of India and hence we are not speaking as a Muslim but as an Indian. . . . Would you be content with a few? Would you be content if I were to say, I am with you? Do you want or do you not want the Muslim India to go along with you? . . . Minorities cannot give anything to the majority. It is, therefore, no use asking me not to touch the small points. I am not asking for these modifications to arise as a "naughty child." If they are small points, you must concede. It is up to the majority, on whom alone we can give. I am asking you for this adjustment because I think it is the best and fair to the Muslims. . . . We are all sons of this land. We are to live together. We have to work together and whatever our differences may be, let us at any rate not create more bad blood. If we cannot agree, let us at any rate agree to differ, but let us part as friends. . . . The process of India until the Muslims and Hindus are united, and let no logic, philosophy or squabble stand in the way of coming to a compromise and nothing will make me more happy than to see a Hindu-Muslim union.²⁷

He must have sensed that the restless jury he addressed had made up their minds against him long before he reached the end of his argument, surely by the time he said "let us part as friends." For that marked a major point in the process of his political evolution.

of Congress and all it represented than Nagpur had been eight years earlier. Jinnah had delivered his swan song to Indian nationalism. The Dream stirred by Laddipath's ringing voice in Westminster's Commons, nurtured by Morley and Therozash's, enriched by Gokhale and Montagu, all those long lost dream-grants was dead. Born the spian that he was, Jinnah spoke his lines in a packed, if not always friendly, house before each curtain fell on a major act of his political life. Nagpur had ended Act One. Calcutta finished Act Two. This time there would be a longer intermission.

9

Simla (1929-30)

Jinnah adjourned his faction of the Muslim League after a starry session that followed the Calcutta convention debate. He left Mahomed Ali Jinnah and the group of Indian Muslims and Bengali and Urdu-speaking for Delhi before the year's end. On New Year's Day, 1929, he entered the All-India Muslim Conference presided over by Aga Khan in the ancient capital of Feroz Afghani's reign. A Muslim emperor, Shah, was there with his Purshah, when Jinnah walked to the silver-painted patches on the parade ground of the Red Fort that Shah Jahan had built. Bearded mullahs and ringed bejewelled princes of Islam sat side by side. Jinnah entered alone and sat alone. He was as yet undecided how long he would remain among his folk, who must have seemed a mass of foreign and alien elements, as the other party grew. I found much to say at last. The mullahs, the princes were there, together with the white and the black, the Muslim state. Was this really his home? Were these truly his people?

"It was a vast gathering representative of all shades of Muslim opinion," wrote the Aga Khan, recalling the conference. "I can claim to be the parent of the movement and the architect of its success. After long and frank discussions we were able to adopt unanimously a series of principles which we set out in a manifesto. The first of these was that the only form of government suitable to Indian conditions is a federal system with complete autonomy and independence for the constituent states." The next principle was that the Muslim League should be a federal system. Further Muslim League members were to be elected from the constituent states as well as for the Muslim League. The League was to be a federal system. The League of his commonwealth a decade and a half earlier, was at the helm

thing that I would ask you to consider is how best to restore that faith and revive the confidence of India in the "bona fides of Great Britain."¹⁸ He warned that "there is a section in India that has already reacted in favour of complete independence, and I may tell you, without exaggeration that the movement for independence is gaining ground as it is supported by the Indian National Congress. To diminish the momentum of such a movement which I must consider no less dangerous a threat to India's security than the necessity has suggested as step one a declaration "without delay" by His Majesty's Government that Great Britain is unequivocally pledged to the policy of granting a full and responsible Government with Dominion status. The effect of such a declaration will be very far-reaching and go a great way to create a different atmosphere in the country." As to practical reasons to implement such a declaration, he urged his friend to "write representative letters to all the States and put it in a position to deliver the goods" because completely inalienable status for India is not possible at present "to London to meet with British officials till they could reach a constitutional 'agreement' which might carry over the wishes of the majority, the willing assent of the Indian States. His proposals thus formulated could then be placed before Parliament."

Late Mr. Irwin reached London at the same time as Jinnah's letter and went directly to the Foreign Office to meet with Woodrow Wilson, suggesting "the ideas of Round Table Conference and for the declaration of Dominion status as the goal of British policy for India."¹⁹ The new secretary of state was anxious to convey his wishes to be satisfied that we were not going behind the backs of Simon and his Commission, who were then preparing their report. Accordingly, this secret both suggestions with Simon and was much interested in his reaction to them," Irwin recalled.

Somewhat to my surprise, he at first saw no objection at all to the declaration about Dominion Status but felt difficult about the Round Table Conference, principally on the ground that it would be likely to affect adversely the status of the Commission's report, when it appeared, by making this only one among other papers that the Conference would presumably have before it. . . . A little later, again to my surprise, his position changed on both points, and I have always supposed that he was much influenced by a Remark. . . . Now, whatever the cause, he finally expressed himself satisfied with the Round Table Conference, and fell in with the plan of an exchange of letters with the President of the Commission to be immediately to appear as an deputy by the Commission to the Government and readily accepted by them, on the very proper ground of the need to take

So much for historic duplicity seeking to salvage Simon's face. Actual credit for both ideas belongs not to Irwin but to his new, unacknowledged adviser Jinnah.

Soothing Simon's ruffled feathers took time. It was not until August 14 that Ramsay MacDonald could reply in a "private letter."

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

I am very sorry, but owing to a mistake [sic] your letter of the 19th of June was not put immediately before me. Let me say at once how much I appreciate the spirit in which it was written and how glad I would be to meet it in any way possible. The report of the Simon Commission you need have no hesitation in assuming was never intended to be anything more than advice given for the guidance of the Government and that the intention of the Government is, as soon as that report is ready, to consider it in the light of all the facts. The suggestions which you make in your letter will be pondered over with a desire to use them in every way that circumstances will allow. But one thing I can say here—because I have said it before repeatedly and still remains the intention of the Government—that we want India to enjoy Dominion status.

There will probably be announcements made very soon regarding future proceedings.²

Jinnah was very pleased and optimistically replied on September 7 "If you carry out my suggestion with which I am glad to find that you are in accord, I will then sign a bright note for India and the name of Great Britain will live down in history as one nation that was true to its decorations."²²

Late Irwin wrote Jinnah from his "Victoria's camp" the following month announcing that:

His Majesty's Government are greatly concerned to find means by which the breaking down of British Indian constitutional advance may be approached in co-operation with all who can speak authoritatively for British Indian opinion. . . . and I am authorized to say that in the judgment of His Majesty's Government it is implicit in the Declaration of 1917 that the natural issue of India's constitutional progress as then contemplated is the attainment of Dominion Status. In the full realization of this policy the States must ultimately have their share in the making of the future of India. . . . and I propose to the British States to meet at a conference in the autumn of 1930 to discuss the question of the future of India.

problems. They hope thus to be able to submit eventually to Parliament proposals commanding a wide measure of general assent.²¹

The first steps that would lead to three major Round Table conferences in London were thus taken, and Jinnaah was not only the prime minister's personal friend and adviser in running that complex process, but had now become the viceroy's key ally as well.

Irwin's historic statement appeared on the front page of every major Indian newspaper on November 1, 1929. Jinnaah was in Bombay that day and met with eighteen others in Sir Chhambhai Setalvad's chambers to issue a joint public statement in response to Irwin's announcement, welcomed as a

fundamental change of procedure whereby the representatives of India will be free to meet His Majesty's Government in conference for the purpose of arriving at the greatest possible measure of agreement regarding the proposals to be submitted to Parliament for the attainment of Dominion Status by India, thereby reaching a solution which might carry the widest assent of public opinion in India.²²

Sir Tej Narain Bhulabhai Desai, Sir H. J. P. Mack Chagla, Kaup Dwarakanath and his friends were among those who signed that statement. In New Delhi, the Congress, headed by Motilal Nehru, including thirty leaders of various parties other than Congress, a political general consultation was called together with the goal of general agreement for political prisoners, and the permanent representation of the Indian National Congress in the forthcoming Round Table conference. This Congress Manifesto, as it soon came to be called, further insisted that "the [Round Table] Conference is to meet not to discuss when Dominion Status is to be established but to discuss how to achieve Dominion Status for India."

Nevertheless, Jawaharlal Nehru wrote that Manifesto than he regretted going so far without ahead of walking. At will Subhas Bose and his comrades, feeling himself "an interloper," Jawaharlal now wanted to "resign" from the presidency of Congress, which he had just accepted. Gandhi responded to Jawaharlal's attacks and charges with warning: "You must not resign . . . it will affect the national cause. There is no hurry and no principle at stake. About the crown, no one else can wear it. It never was to be a personal possession. . . . The Congress now stands behind a fact, and not an idea. . . . It is not a question of resigning. . . . It is not a question of resigning, by the leaders, manifesto as the most they would be willing to do by way of 'accommodating' the viceroy and His Majesty's government. Irwin, however, had secured as much promise of change as himself. The Round Table Conference was to be held in London in 1930, and the

unavoidable, yet not unfamiliar position, of having to try to bridge the gap remaining between both sides.

Jinnaah, Gandhi, Motilal Nehru, Sapru, and Pate, met with Irwin at the viceroy's house in New Delhi at 4:30 p.m. on December 23, 1929. Irwin had just returned from his viceregal tour that morning, and as his train approached Delhi station, a bomb exploded under one of its carriages. Fortunately, neither the viceroy nor his escort was injured. Gandhi was first to speak that afternoon, expressing "the horror he and those who accompanied him felt at the attempt on His Excellency's train," offering "congratulations on Their Excellencies' escape."²³ He then asked Lord Irwin whether the interpretation of his announcement published in the Congress leaders' manifesto "The [Round Table] Conference is to meet not to discuss when Dominion Status is to be established but to frame a scheme of Dominion Constitution for India" was accurate. Gandhi explained that "unless agreement was reached on this point he felt it fruitless to proceed to any other questions." Irwin insisted "he thought that the wording of his announcement made the position plain." The object of the conference "was to throw out the problems which arose out of His Majesty's Government's definite declaration of policy. He then quickly added that here at last was a chance "of doing something big and the danger of losing a great opportunity." It "was impossible to lay it down that the Conference was to draft any particular Constitution. Irwin argued, but it would have the fullest opportunity to discuss any proposals put before it. He emphasized that the Conference would be absolutely free. . . . There would be no closure to the freest discussion, the Conference would not, he took it, proceed to definite voting, but would rather follow the lines of the Imperial Conference, a record being kept of the general sense of the members."

Mr. Gandhi felt that the Imperial Conference was on a different footing. There all the parties to the discussions were more or less of one mind. At the Indian Conference this would not be so. However much they argued they could not reach a policy which would be acceptable to all.²⁴

It was a remarkably prophetic conclusion, coming as it did almost eight years prior to partition, at a time when hundreds of thousands of human beings were engaged in a mad race to get into cabinets, and millions of futile words, whether written down or spoken, were being uttered. There could be no actual change of course until the time when the establishment of dominion status could be "presumed as an immediate result of the Conference," he could not take part in it. He demanded "complete freedom of

ing Jinnah on January 5, 1930. I have today read your interview in the Press. I entirely agree with you. The Congress has gone mad, but the worst of it is that in its madness it is going to involve the country in disaster"²⁵ Sir Tej was ready to start afresh, enthusiastically adding "We must act and act together and with a determination that we will settle our differences. I have no doubt that on this occasion you can be of the greatest possible use to the country." He wanted to organize another all parties conference and assured Jinnah, "I personally think that we should not find it difficult to bring about a settlement of the Hindu Moha-adeen question. But without flattering you I do say that it is impossible to get a settlement effected without your cooperation and guidance." Jinnah agreed to give it a try, as did Shaheed Mahomed Abbas. Hindu Mahasabha leaders were also willing to join such a conference after much persuasion, and cajoling by Sapru. Jinnah selected most of the Muslim representatives to the conference in Delhi that met on February 26, 1930. More than fifty delegates were invited including leading Liberals, Muslims, Christians, Anglo-Indians and Madras Justice party "Unaccountables" as well as Muslim League leaders. Early in February Jinnah met with Madan Mohan Malaviya, the Hindu Mahasabha leader in the assembly to discuss communal problems and felt "the atmosphere has improved" for possible settlement. Yet nothing had really changed since February 1928, except that Congress was not in attendance at the latest futile "all-parties" conference.

Jinnah had not expected much of Sapru's conference; rather he focused his own attention on the London arena and pressed Irwin to announce an opening date of the Round Table conference, urging the viceroy to send out official invitations.

The Mahasabha had almost completed his heroic march from Sabarmati to the sea where he then symbolically made salt in open violation of the British salt monopoly, launching a new nationwide *satyagraha*. Jinnah feared that the rising tides of *satyagraha* and British repression would serve only to destroy the fragile constitutional raft he had launched, even before it could reach Bombay's harbor. Why would Irwin not commit himself to a date? His government sensed the viceroy was trying to back away from signing the contract they had orally agreed upon. Called back to Sukkar for the Pir Pagara appeal, Jinnah wrote from the circuit house there to Lord Irwin in April 26. Two weeks later Irwin replied reporting that the Round Table conference was set to start in October, asking what Jinnah thought of holding the Simla assembly session in July instead of the usual September. Jinnah felt no self purpose will be served with such a session at all. An early list of the assembly's invited members had no room for response to Congress's boycott call. But, he wrote Irwin from Sind, "I think I shall

get back to Bombay about the end of this month and if it would suit you, I can run up to Simla for a few days in the first week of June."²⁶

Gandhi's march from his ashram in Ahmedabad 240 miles south to Dandi on the sea and started March 12 and ended April 5, with the eyes of the world focused upon this latter day Moses leading his "children of Israel" out of bondage. April 6 was the date set by Gandhiji for the "simultaneous beginning" of the nationwide *satyagraha*, when hundreds of thousands of Indians broke the government's salt tax monopoly law by stealing "natural salt for themselves from India's thousands of miles of coastline." There is no alternative but for us to do something about our troubles and sufferings and hence we have thought of this salt tax. Mahatma Gandhi said, "I was up at Surat in April. I was arrested on May 5 and taken to Poona's Yeravda prison, which he remained "palace" and "maiden" ("temple") in his letters.

Less than two weeks after entering prison the Mahatma wrote Lord Irwin, addressing him as "Dear Friend" and began to negotiate with him reiterating the eleven points²⁷ he had communicated to Ramsay MacDonald in January, which he deemed essential prerequisites of all: "off his 'civil disobedience' campaign, before it had started. The first of these was 'Total prohibition' of the form called for by Amulree of the Salt Tax" others demanded "Reduction of land revenue at least by 50% in some making it so near to League's control." "Reduction of Military expenditure at least by 50 per cent" "Cantonment" "Reduction of salaries of high grade services by half or less." "Protective tariff on foreign goods" "Amnesty for political prisoners" abolition of the Criminal Intelligence Division of police, "its particular control, and the institution of 'commissions' for the study of police subject to popular control." In a prison interview he granted, Gandhi insisted

I have taken what has been called a mad risk. But it is a justifiable risk. No great end has been achieved without incurring danger . . . I am an optimist. In forty years of struggle I have frequently been told I was attempting the impossible, but invariably I proved the contrary."²⁸

Soon after that interview appeared in the press, Sapru and Jayakar launched their "peace mission" with the viceroy's private approval. Jinnah hoped it was an ongoing side-line move of the Round Table conference he now viewed as his only ray of political light, guarding it with almost paranoid vigilance. "I am very anxious that some of the representatives who are going to be invited to the Conference should not be published till the end of August or the beginning of September and I may res-

... let me see the list of the invitees before you finally decide upon the terms so that I may be in a position to make such suggestions as it may seem fit. Of course it will be for you ultimately to decide who should be invited. This can be done while I am at Simla.³⁷ The viceroy had insisted on having his assembly meet in Simla that July despite Jinnah's advice to the contrary. Jinnah's relationship with Irwin thus became increasingly strained. He did not always mix smoothly. Both gaunt, elegant, and punctilious, these two men were so alike they must have found one another at once attractive and exasperating.

Sapru and Jinnah came to the Yeravda prison to meet with Gandhi on 11-12-20. In the meantime wrote a note for hand delivery by the vice-regal emissaries to Motilal and Jawaharlal in Nanai prison stating that his

personal opinion is that if the Round Table Conference is restricted to those who can self-govern that it may be necessary in connection with this Government to change the nature of transition I should have no objection being understood that the question of independence should not be ruled out if anybody raises it. I should be satisfied before I endorse the idea of the Congress attending the Conference about its whole composition.³⁸

Gandhi sent a covering letter to Motilal on the same day adding, "My position is somewhat awkward... But at all events Jawaharlal must be the final voice of the Congress... Then Sapru and Jayakar must go to both Narayan Nanai on July 27-28. Motilal's health had deteriorated. His incarceration in jail had run a high fever during the long months and the two main missionaries. The elder Nehru did not live another year.

On July 18 Irwin wrote Jinnah to inform him of the Labour government's invitation to the members of London Liberal and Conservative opposition parties to the Round Table. Jinnah wrote him in reply, stressing, "May I urge upon you not to forget the suggestion I made in the course of our conversation at Simla that Your Excellency should do your utmost to arrange and be present in London at the time of the Conference? I am more than ever convinced that for that it is absolutely essential to the success of the Conference." Jinnah also pressed this offer for the release of more prisoners, giving Khair Abdul Gaffar, Chaffar Khan, one of his two recommended delegates to the conference from the North-West Frontier Province, though as Jinnah noted, he "has no or very little knowledge of English language." That "Lion of the Frontier" was, however the only Muslim to be invited to the "Frontier Gandhi."

Sapru returned to Naini prison on August 8 to inform the Nehrus that Lord Irwin had "no objection" to sending them to Poona to meet with Gandhi in Yeravda. Two days later a special train rushed them to Maharashtra, and from August 19-25 Congress's three leaders met with Sapru and Jayakar inside the Mahatma's "prison temple" cell. Several other members of the Congress party's working committee, including Vallabhbhai Patel and Sarojini Naidu, joined them. On August 15 the Congress prisoners wrote to Sapru and Jayakar concluding that "the time is not yet ripe for securing a settlement here or for our country."³⁹

Jinnah's anxiety over the fate of his conference mounted as he followed news reports of the Yeravda prison "all parties" conference from which he and the Muslim League by his own choice were excluded. He wrote again to Irwin on August 19 what was a most remarkable letter not only for the impatience and irascibility bordering on petulance it revealed, but because it reflected what was actually a reversal of roles, with Jinnah urging the viceroy to be more "firm and definite" in his dealings with Indian nationalists.⁴⁰

Jinnah had taken upon himself as it were, the burdens of viceroy and secretary of state, internalizing those roles in what he truly believed to be the best interests not only of the Muslim minority, but of the entire population of India. Great Britain, and indeed the world, he considered Gandhi quite rightly and wisely by now believed Jawaharlal Nehru a dangerous young radical whose judgment could not be trusted, and knew that Motilal's fever was higher still in Yeravda than at home. He sensed that the older Nehrus would have taken a stage in his sons' move towards revolt towards complete independence. Two test cuts off from the source of his existence, Jinnah saw no ray of hope left in India, only in the distant glow of London's Round Table conference, the thoughts of which sustained him.

Lord Irwin wrote to Sapru and Jayakar from his viceregal lodge at Simla on August 28:

I fear as you will no doubt recognize that the task you had voluntarily undertaken has not been as easy as I felt the letter you have received from the Congress leaders. In view both of the general tone by which that letter is inspired and of its contents, as also of its blank refusal to recognize the grave crisis to which the country has been subjected by the Congress policy, not the least in the economic field, I do not think any useful purpose would be served by my attempting to deal in detail with the suggestions therein contained and I prefer to regard discussion on the basis of the proposals contained in the letter as impossible. I hope if you desire to see the Congress leaders again you will make this plain.⁴¹

He ended Round One of the peace talks. Irwin wrote to notify Jinnah of his firm response on September 1. Jinnah's reply a week later continued to make like a communication from a higher official to his subordinate. "I am in receipt of yours of the 1st September, 1930 and I thank you very much for it. It is just to inform you that I am going to Sind on a professional engagement tonight and shall return to Bombay on the 18th or 19th. I have now booked my passage for the 4th October in view of the fact that the Conference does not meet till the middle of November. More when I return."⁴⁴

He had much to arrange in what was to be his last full month in India in six years. Almost thirty-five years had gone by since his return from London to make Bombay his home. The would-be thespian had reached Bombay as a first successful actor, a viceroi's alter ego, and the prime minister's friend. It was time to go back then to London—not to retire but to settle in and to enjoy an atmosphere less frenzied, less perilous. The Indians had become ever guarded and secretive about his private life. He had no pre-announcement of future plans on the eve of his departure. Those who knew him assumed, of course, that he was merely packing up for the Round Table conference. But he was planning his next step. He intended to transfer his practice entirely to appeals and to become a law lord—the highest court in the empire. In mid-October he invited Dr. M. A. Jinnah, born 1877, 1938, to preside over the Muslim League's annual session, which he would not himself attend. He had placed great faith in his Muslim League as the Hindu Mahasabha grew on rather than on Jinnah was for a wither, pretty confident of its end and engagement. The Round Table would serve as the curtain for his final act on British India's political stage. And should the curtain there descend on a flop, at least that would leave him in London.

10

London (1930-33)

Jinnah had sailed aboard the P&O *Viceroy of India*, leaving Bombay on October 4, 1930. As the first stroke of noon reverberated from Big Ben on November 12, 1930, King Emperor George V, standing before his throne in the Royal Gallery of the House of Lords inaugurated his first Round Table conference on India, with his message being broadcast throughout the world by wireless. Rays of morning sun filtered through the high stained glass windows of that cathedral-like hall filled with the fifty-eight addressed delegates from British India, among whom stood for a while the Aga Khan, Saifur Javakar, and sixteen representatives of the Indian states, including Patiala and Baroda, Bhopal and Alwar. He was a green turban, plus a phylaxy of officialised by Prime Minister MacDonald. Mr. Benn, and Lord Sankley, the chancellor of the lords. Ex viceroi's Hardinge and Reading were there, as were the prime ministers of most dominions of the British Commonwealth. All of whom remained standing during His Majesty's brief address. King George departed as soon as he concluded his speech. The maharaja of Patiala, the chancellor of the Chamber of Princes then proposed that Prime Minister MacDonald take the chair of the conference, and the Aga Khan seconded the motion, which was carried by acclamation. Liberal V. S. Srinivas Sastry spoke first for the British Indian delegation. Then Jinnah, as spokesman for the sixteen Muslim delegates, introduced what the Times reported as "the first suggestion of controversy." "I am glad, Mr. President [MacDonald], that you referred to the fact that the declarations made by British sovereigns and statesmen from time to time that Great Britain's work in India was to prepare her for self government have been plain." . . . But I must emphasize that India now expects translation and fulfilment of these declarations.

Jinnah then stated "the cardinal principle" which he hoped British members of the conference would keep uppermost in mind, that "India wants a stress in her own house" and "I cannot conceive of any constitution which may frame which will not transfer responsibility to the Central Government to a Cabinet responsible to the Legislature." It was, he argued, the least that would now suffice to satisfy political leaders throughout the subcontinent, those who came to London, as well as those who remained in British India crowded prison cells. He reminded Mac Donald that two years earlier, at a Labour conference, the future prime minister said "I hope that within a period of months, rather than years, there will be a new Dominion added to the Commonwealth of our nations, a Dominion of another race, a Dominion that will find self-respect as an equal with the Commonwealth. I refer to India." Trenchantly he added, "since 1928 two years have passed."

Jinnah was assigned to the editorial structure subcommittee chaired by Sir Sayyid Hakeem ul-Din Haider, both of whom feared that "no constitution will work unless it embodied provisions which gave a sense of ownership to Muslims and other minorities." Haider reported to Jinnah after his first visit to London, a month after resigning the Indian Muslim League on December 10 and 15. The last of these meetings was at the latter's country house, Chiswick, to which Hindus and Muslims and Congress leaders "noted buses," wrote Haider on the 15th. "I had a long and pleasant discussion of India at night. So far as one can prophesy, the future of India in the hands of Muslims will give up separate electorates but will continue to demand the Punjab and Bengal and weightage to the other provinces. The Congress present was very premature. The Muslims acting on their own basis from India now refuse to go back on their assistance in separate electorates and demand not only these but also the terms which have been asked—fourteen points. The Hindus led by Moomey went back on their agreement to concede the fourteen points. There was, therefore, a complete deadlock." Ramsay MacDonald was so depressed by the Chiswick fiasco that he decided to turn to Lord Willingdon (1866-1931), his governor-general in Canada, for help in suggesting a new approach to India. Jinnah's term as vice-president in April 1931 and on December 23, 1930, British prime minister wrote to Canada's prime minister, Richard Bennett, asking him to let go of his governor-general, explaining "As you are the member as well as the future overlord of India, and it must now be sought in India itself. I know no man who can understand the situation better than Mr. Jinnah."

Jinnah was invited to return to India and was expected to return to take the helm of India's government at New Delhi from

1931-36. It was not entirely coincidental perhaps that for most of Lord Willingdon's term as viceroy Jinnah remained out of India, though by then he more closely resembled the formidable martyr in temperament as well as appearance than he did that radical young nationalist leader of the 1918 anti Willingdon protest. Willingdon's feelings toward Jinnah sufficed to keep the latter off the joint committee appointed to fashion final Round Table conference proposals into a new government of India bill for Parliament. Jinnah opted to live in London. However, despite Willingdon's presence in India—a "target" who must have tempted him sorely at times to return to the legislative assembly—as much as because of it Jinnah did not hesitate to return periodically, for visits to Simla, Delhi, and Bombay during his half decade of "permanent" residence in London.

Before Ramsay MacDonald's admission of failure to resolve the communal problem could reach Canada, however, a new proposal of the Muslim position was being articulated at a poorly attended meeting of the Muslim League in Allahabad on December 29, 1930. That meeting was presided over by Dr. Mahomed Jafar (1877-1938), a veteran Urdu pamphlet philosopher of the Punjab. Though a supporter of Lincoln's law, educated at Heidelberg and Munich University, and a graduate of Trinity College, Cambridge, Ali Nadwi ("Islamic Scholar") liquid communist, deeply engaged throughout his career with the journal of the Muslim League's British committee when it was first started in London in 1908, served as secretary of Shaikh Saigoo, and was a leading force in the Punjab's legislative council from 1928-30. In Allahabad, Ali was first to articulate the two nation theory of irreconcilable Hindu-Muslim difference. He was not calling for complete national separation as yet but insisted that "The principle of European democracy cannot be applied to India without recognizing the fact of communal groups. The Muslim's demand for the creation of a Muslim India within India is therefore perfectly justified." He then went further, that any previous suggestion of the league had been gone, spelling out his vision of the future "final destiny of the Muslim community of his own Punjab and its neighboring provinces. "I would like to see the Punjab, the North-West Frontier, Baluchistan, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single State. Self-government within the British Empire or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-West India." He had his own end in view, and the Round Table conference and, in the end, the League's 1931 Allahabad speech criticized Ramsay MacDonald for refusing "to see that the problem of India is international."

On January 14, 1931, the Aga Khan, Jinnah, and Shaikh called on Ramsay MacDonald to warn him that "unless his statement of the Government's

policy is accompanied by an announcement of satisfactory safeguards for the minorities. None of the Moslem delegates will disavow themselves from the findings of the Conference.¹³ Kar Dina Sadas reported that Ramsay MacDonald tried, by this means, to win greater cooperation from Jinnah during the conference by "casually" remarking to him in "the course of conversation" that

view of the forthcoming changes in India the British Government would be looking for distinguished Indians for appointment as Provincial Governors. The obvious implication of this suggestion was that "Jinnah would have an excellent chance if he proved to be a good boy" Jinnah at once made it clear to Ramsay MacDonald that his services were not available for such and finally rejected the offer which he believed was nothing less than "an attempt to bribe him."¹⁴

In the foregoing study it will be moreover at least as important a factor by now as Jinnah's reliability in being accepted for the leadership of the Muslim League in London in 1906, later over all of Muslim India. At the end of the first Round Table conference,

Muslim delegation was anxious to learn beforehand what safeguards were to be incorporated for the protection of minorities. . . . After tea was received by the Aga Khan and the delegation met in the dining room. Jinnah was deputed and the letter was discussed and approved of when Mr Jinnah arrived. He went through it and pointed out the flow where some seemed to exist - a flow which would represent the non-Muslims of what had been considered. All were amazed. The result Muslims secured for their part in 12 out of the 14 points.¹⁵

Early in the evening of the concluding plenary session of the conference, Muslims were therefore invited to present their last offer to the Round Table Committee. The proposals, Hindu-Sikh and Muslim and Hindu-Muslim in parts for Bengal but both reasonably acceptable to all, Hindu-Sikh or Bengali-Hindu approval. Significantly, the Hindu-Sikh part of the Aga Khan spoke at the concluding session when most other delegates and King George's lovely daughter, Princess Mary, were present. In his speech of thanks to the British hosts, he expressed a nation's work of the past and a new dawn of a new era.¹⁶ Next day Jinnah, the hope that had buoyed his spirits on arrival at Westminster two months earlier had dissipated in the acid of fermenting disagreements as to the possibility of ever settling the Hindu-Muslim conflict. He had sent for Futuna and a daughter Dina to live with him in London and began looking for a

home for the three of them. He was ready to leave the League to Lybali and his Punjab friends. Jinnah's only remaining political ambition was to enter Parliament through which ever party would have him. Perhaps he thought he could still be of service to Muslim India from there or if not - the Privy Council remained, possibly even its Bench, as the crowning achievement of his career. And the news he read and received from India served only to confirm the wisdom of his withdrawal from that scene of chaos compounded.

Jinnah applied to London's Inner Temple to let chambers that had just fallen vacant to him as work. The Temple's treasurer was none other than Sir John Simon, who wrote to assure a mutual barrister friend Bhagwan Dube that his Inn would "be very glad to have so distinguished a man within our own boundaries. . . . He need not trouble about recommendations, as, if I confess, I know of Jinnah and I think there is, according to our ordinary rule, a sufficient recommendation if he actually comes."¹⁷ Jinnah secured his chambers in King's Bench Walk before any winter was over. It would take several more months of state building to create the appropriate house. "A three-storied building in the confined style of the 1880's with many rooms and gables and a tall tower which gave a splendid view over the surrounding country" set at the mid of eight acres of garden and pasture on Hamstead's West Heath Road. This home was torn down soon after his death, however, and the unobscured view he enjoyed has also long since disappeared.

Lord Milner was sworn in as viceroy of April 28, 1931. Before leaving London he had had so much to meet with Jinnah at his home in Albany Road on the morning of Saturday, March 21.¹⁸ Though no record of their conversation has as yet come to light, I was not a stranger then between old friends. Jinnah, doubtless reiterated the Muslim position, briefing the new viceroy on a lot of the latest demands that had been asked since he first drafted his four-point points. Milner's response can well be imagined, for he was always vocal in support of a common front and encouraging to Muslim leaders. He no longer had pleasure to see how much Jinnah's subsequent course of events had "improved" since their last heated confrontation.

Jinnah hoped initially to enter Parliament as a Labour M.P., desiring "to try the fortune of the ballot box in a party which in the main" agreed with his own "political creed."¹⁹ His uncooperative stance on several key issues of the day in 1931 and prior to 1930, however, left Ramsay MacDonald less than eager to further this erstwhile friend's political ambitions, and by June the prime minister wanted nothing whatsoever to do with Jinnah, actually refusing to see him by pleading "it is absolutely impossible for me to fit in another engagement."²⁰ Jinnah had by then gone so far as to

join the Fabian Society,²⁴ yet even that did not make him sufficiently attractive to Labour's leadership as a Commons candidate. To British workingmen Jinnah hardly looked like a trustworthy representative—one York Daily Labourer was reported having said, after listening to Jinnah talk to a party selection committee, "We don't want a toff like that!" By June, therefore, Jinnah decided to try securing the nod to run for a Tory constituency—he abandoned Labour and turned to the Aga Khan for help. The Conservative party was traditionally opposed to all Indian political aspirations. Jinnah, much like the Aga Khan himself, hoped to appeal to the growing interest in Muslim demands as the only effective internal pressure on Congress reformatories.

With such high-level help, including the Aga Khan's personal backing, however, Jinnah never managed to find a Tory constituency willing to back his candidature. Had he been elected to Parliament, he might never have returned to India as political stage, except for brief visits, such as the one he undertook in August 1931 when he ventured east to defend a legal challenge against a Tanaka case before the chief court of Oudh. In Bombay, Jinnah spoke at Lawrence University's union one evening in 1931, reporting on the Round Table conference and "his disappointment at the attitude of the Hindu leaders." Karachi's former mayor, Nawab Aslam Khan, recalled how he "ruined his forefinger" revolving a spinning wheel. "We will find him and round in London. We are still going to be a people in India without reaching the straight path that would lead us to freedom."²⁵

On his return to India, Jinnah visited Simla, conferring with old Congress leaders who were here for the fall legislative session. Sir's Kewster, a Liberal, had written earlier to report that "There is no coherent scheme of any kind. Needless to say we are all feeling your presence sorely." Sir A. P. Patil, the leader of Madras's Non-Brahmin Justice party, had written Jinnah in much the same vein. "There is no outstanding question among the Moslems. There are many lieutenants but no general. From this point of view I thought you would have been very helpful to find an unity. . . . Intrigue and jealousy rampant on all sides. . . . We feel the absence very much." Jinnah left briefly with W. L. George in Simla.

By the evening of August 27, Gandhi, who had been released from prison by Irwin and made up his mind to go to London for the second Round Table conference as he could not afford to go without representation, had arrived in London. Jinnah, however, did not appear to be at all happy but I am relying upon your repeated assurances that you will give personal attention to everything that is brought to your notice. "We Indians" he discovered, "are not as well as we are."

Gandhi. "You can entirely rely upon my assurance to you."²⁶ To Ramsay MacDonald, the viceroy had recently written of Gandhi, "He is a curious little devil—always working for an advantage. In all his actions I see the bazaar predominating over the samiti." Gandhi embarked for London as sole representative of the Congress. Jawaharlal wanted to accompany him, and many "friends" urged Gandhi to take Nehru along but the Mahatma refused to allow any of his colleagues to share his London sojourn.

Jinnah returned home by early September. The new passport he had taken out in 1931 gave England, not India, as his place of residence.²⁷ Fatima was waiting in Hampstead, and Dina was safely enrolled in her private boarding school nearby. Secretary of State Wedgwood Benn invited Jinnah to sit on the Federal Structure Committee at the second Round Table conference that started on September 7, 1931, but his role was much diminished from what it had been the previous year. All eyes were on Gandhi in 1931 for his was the voice of Congress on every committee as well as at the plenary sessions where he spoke. The Federal Structure Committee met from September 7-27 under Lord Sankey's chairmanship. The next day the Minorities Committee was convened by Ramsay MacDonald, with Gandhi joining its ranks at just 11 November 1931, six weeks after which the entire Conference gathered again in St. James's Palace for plenary session.

The second Round Table conference achieved the greater, even though the first had done for all its strenuous, wordy labor and well-meaning leaders. Sankey, Sir Jinnah, Gandhi, Ambedkar, the leader of the Untouchables, and Jayakar. The ranks of the Muslim delegation were small and firm, being the line of their as yet unmet demands of the previous year. Though Lord Sankey reported that his committee had concluded its lengthy deliberations with the hope that an all-India federation was possible, Jinnah spoke for the entire Muslim delegation when he resisted. "I am still of the opinion that the achievement and completion of the scheme of all India Federation must wait, be it so, until we could take many years. No outstanding vital ingredient of the scheme has yet been agreed upon."²⁸ Sir Shah Nawaz Khan, one of India's wealthiest landowners and the father of Pakistan's future prime minister, said much the same feeling, noting before Ramsay MacDonald's concluding statement, "The Conference has come to an end without achieving a single result."²⁹

Mr. G. D. Birla, one of India's wealthiest millowners and Congress supporters, represented the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry at this second conference and "frankly" stated, "we are not at all satisfied with what has taken place."³⁰ Birla's critique of the Indian budget and financial situation was as brilliantly scathing as any made to the face of a British cabinet minister. Birla suggested a number of ways in which to

the British "mortgage" to 40 or 50 percent of London's annual budget but he voiced the strongest attack of his conference against constitutional safeguards, warning "you should not ignore the Indian investor." The Indian investor, Bha argued, "is one of their readers," "detests these safeguards because these safeguards which are proposed are not in his interest, but in the interests of British financiers."²⁴ Jinnah was last to address the conference, starting his speech after midnight on December 1, 1931. All the other parties at this meeting represent British interests," argued the Mahatma.

Congress alone claims to represent the whole of India, all interests. It is a political organisation, it is a determined enemy of communalism and of the British. And yet here I see that the Congress is treated as one of the Parties. . . . I wish I could convince all the British and even the British Masters, that the Congress is capable of doing the goods. The Congress is the only Indian nationalist organisation, it is the only one which is not divided by communal lines. Believe me, the Moslem problem exists here and I repeat that without the solution of this problem there is no Swara for India. I am not afraid of India. But I do not despair of some day finding a real and living solution in connection with the communal problem. . . . that so long as the wedge in the communal divide divides communities and classes, there is no living solution there will be no living solution. . . . Were Hindus and Muslims and Sikhs always at war with one another when there was no British rule, when there was no English face seen there? This is the acute shame I dare to say it is equal with the British advent.²⁵

Jinnah knew that he did not feel confident about the true strength of the Congress. He was not at all at the Punjab since as he had said, "the Congress is not prepared to go to the police and use the economic power of the British to achieve the mere fact of giving them a majority in the Punjab." Jinnah felt even more so from the second conference and his prospects. He told an audience in Lahore that each in his position. What can you expect from the Congress? . . . But it is not a matter of exclusion of the Congress. . . . He said that the Congress was not a party of the British. . . . The second conference, he said, was a failure for the Congress. . . . When the Congress was

that it represents the Muslims as well? I expect nothing to come out of this conference."

"The discussions . . . during the past two months have been of value in showing us more precisely the problems we have to solve," concluded Prime Minister MacDonald in his closing remarks.²⁶ And as positive and immediate steps, MacDonald announced his government's decision to bring the North-West Frontier province into full governor's status, and to create a new equally advanced province of Sind, two direct concessions to Muslim demands that helped convince the Muslim delegation of the wisdom of its political strategy to date, though the North-West Frontier under the leadership of Frontier Council leader Chaudhry Khuda would align itself with Congress rather than the Muslim League in future elections.

In moving his vote of thanks to Prime Minister on behalf of the conference, Jinnah warned that it was "somewhat likely" that "so far as I am concerned we have come to the parting of the ways," and "soon after reaching India soil he would be earnestly again a Bonhomie on Wednesdays order Jinnah on the other hand, urged British government to give Provincial Autonomy without a simultaneous withdrawal of responsibility at the Centre in British India," recognizing, as he did, the total possibility of getting the provinces to agree to an all-India scheme. He earlier advised his British friends as MacDonald intimated to decide the colour and question provisionally. I say this because if the British Government settle the communal question and make a substantial advance towards real responsibility at the Centre in British India, . . . Hindus and Mahomedans will realise the earnestness in the part of the Government and in bulk of the people will accept their decision.²⁷ The stage was thus set for the next decade of political tug-of-war with Jinnah's constitutional formula pressing in part prophetic of the passing British intentions while Gandhi and his side raced themselves for longer negotiations and stiffer revolutionary resistance.

The next few years in London would be the quietest, least political years of Jinnah's active life. His days routine rarely varied. Breakfast at nine then off to work in the City. He had an English chauffeur, Bradbury, who drove the Bentley. He quickly established a reputation for excellence before the Privy Council. Yet in spite of this, he was never invited to serve as a judge and Jinnah would be the justice which report did. He did not succeed in his practice in the Privy Council as he had expected,²⁸ which "cluttered" Jinnah, predisposing him to return to India in 1934.

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British officials before Parliament's Joint Committee on proposed Constitutional Returns echoed that as yet obscure demand. Sir Michael Oakes, who ruled the Punjab during the Jallianwalla Bagh massacre, is now a law alternative testified before that committee in 1931, opposing an all-India federation since "if the Federal Government with Hindu majority endeavours to force its will on provinces with Muslim majority, what is to prevent a breakaway of the Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan and the N.W.F.s already, orchestrated and their possibility forming a Muslim Federation of their own" [Haines added "Sir Michael Oakes was aware that 'Muslim Federation' was foreshadowed but he appears not to have received one of Rahmat Ali's pamphlets. Or could he perhaps have helped inspire it?"]

Sir George Cadduck, 1888-1937, former Home member of the government and a conservative member of Parliament from 1931, appointed to the Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reforms, discussed the Pakistan demand by August 1, 1933, when he asked Abdul Aziz Ali, D. N. W. Frontier Province, "whether there is a definite indication of Provinces under the name of Pakistan" "Yusuf Ali was very nervous. As far as I know it is only a student's scheme in response to a paper sent out by Mr. [sic] Sir Reginald was more sanguine about its prospects, however, saying "They have not so far but they are advancing rapidly, and it may be when those students grow-up it will be a very real and serious threat to the hands of the people anywhere." Mr. Aziz Ali, 1888-1938, the previous year's president of the League, stated that in his capacity as a minister had never heard of the word Pakistan. Mr. Isaac Foot, a Liberal member of Parliament, who, unlike Cadduck had no prior India experience, asked "What is Pakistan?" To which Aziz Ali was served as a spokesman for the joint five member Muslim League and the All-India Muslim Conference to the Parliamentary committee, replied, "So far as we have considered it, we mean a political and administrative unit. It means the Federation of the Muslims. Yet Cadduck was still not willing to drop this "chimerical" concept, suggesting with "I have received communications about the proposal of forming a Federation of certain Muslim States under the name of Pakistan" "I am not sure if it is Muslim or not. Dr. Khwaja Nazimuddin, perhaps, was enough to say that no such scheme has been considered by any representative gentlemen or association so far."

If I didn't know about the Pakistan scheme at this date, there was no incident in his papers of such knowledge or of any personal interest expressed in it. Nor would he agree to meet with Rahmat Ali the following month, but a few days after the date of his meeting with Sir

in London. Nor was I willing as yet to accept the Muslim League's invitation to return to India to preside over its annual deliberations in Delhi in April of 1933. "I cannot return to India before December next," he replied to that telegraphic invitation from Abdul Matin Choudhury in March.

Besides I don't see what I can do there at present. You very rightly suggest that I should enter the Assembly. But is there much hope in doing anything there. These are questions which still make me feel that there is no room for my services in India, yet I am sorry to repeat but there is no chance of doing anything to save India till the Hindus realise the true position. The Hindus are being fooled . . . by chance any scheme goes through, it will be worse than what is at present. . . . Thank you for your suggestion that I should try and stand for election as Sir Ibrahim [Rahmat Ali] is going to resign. Well I don't say till I come to India as I am due in December at any rate for a few months.⁶⁰

The scheduled December visit was for business, yet the prospect of reelection to the Assembly clearly tempted him. It was not Pakistan that would one day soon it might be. For days he was simply getting bored with Hampstead, Ismael Arkkan and his husband, Begum arrived that summer to add their voices to those seeking to help India home. They had come to London for their honeymoon and met him at a reception where he invited them to dinner in Hampstead. You must come back. I am just urged.

The people need you. You alone can put new life into the League and save it. Begum I repeat such like Begum Shab Nawaz, appeared to him with the same vibrant glowing beauty, idealistic enthusiasm and then we wrap that Ruthe had exploded during their exciting seven years of marriage. It's heart's fire as a soldier began to burn again with the revived brilliance of the twilight glow of fifty-seven years. I repeat in preparation, orders of assistance and flattery were of course added faster for Jinnah always responded to a goals aimed at his ego, his unique capacity to "save" the nation. In London the only reward asked to him was one at which he and Fatima did not share, speaking to one another and never speaking about politics except in their own parlours when a second hand began to appear at the heights of Hampstead Heath Road remained dim. And what a vision after I would not see the prospect of an eagerly awaiting vast audience tempting enough to lure him back home, at least for part of each year?

London - Lucknow (1934-37)

Jinnah returned to Bombay in 1934 but did not close his Hampstead establishment or join in his City chambers. The next few years would be spent sailing back and forth between his two worlds that center here seeking to parcel out his days between his basically incompatible tasks and trying to keep himself attuned to both the *ganges* which were flowing mostly in his bo-

On March 4, 1934 the Muslim League met in New Delhi and resolved to heal the second major split, which was fragmented the party one year earlier when its acting president, Minister Mian Abdur Aziz of Peshawar, "fired" all the secretaries and "attempted to transform the League into a party of his own." The Aziz Group came to be called "the Howrah across the Hoogle from Calcutta." October 1934 it called a new legitimacy, but a month later the Howrah Group named its president Khan Bahadur Habib Hidayat ul ussun, branded Aziz and his followers rebels. Hidayat ul ussun attended the Round Table conferences where he had regularly met with Jinnah, Shafi and the Aga Khan and had supported the unified Muslim consensus. One of the resolutions passed by his group in 1933 authorized the League Council to meet with Jinnah and the Aga Khan to discuss plans for "bringing about unity in the ranks of the League." Aziz readily agreed to bring his group back to the League's fold if Jinnah presided over a unified party. Hidayat was at first reluctant to surrender his post as president but finally agreed to step down for Jinnah, retaining honorary secretary of the League. Jinnah was authorized by the council in March to set the date and place of the 1935 session. He was to be read and book passages to sail for London on April 23, so he could meet with the council only on April 1 and 2 in New Delhi.

of council who attended the proceedings that were closed to the press. After the council meeting ended, Jinnah granted the Associated Press an interview stating "The League is perfectly sound and healthy, and the conclusion I have come to is that Muslims will no longer believe any other community in serving the very best interests of India. To condemn the White Paper one does not require special arguments one has only got to read the White Paper proposals - that is enough." Sir Sumner Hoare had presented his proposals for Indian constitutional reform, known as the White Paper to Parliament in March 1933. The federation of India was to be a union of governments, provinces and Indian states. All of whose "powers" would remain vested in the British Crown. Executive authority over the federation was to be exercised on behalf of a British king or emperor by a governor, a council appointed by His Majesty's "pleasure" whose powers included a prime minister of the federation, and a council in India, and who would personally direct and control the departments of internal, external affairs and executive and financial matters. The powers were to be exercised under a system of government derived from the British and Jinnah was one of their most outspoken critics. A national federal legislature was envisioned consisting of a council of state with not more than 200 members, 150 of whom would be elected from British India and a local assembly with not more than 375 members, 250 of whom would be elected from British India with the rest appointed to represent the princely states. There were to be eleven governors, provinces including Sind and Orissa, with the appointed governor over each representing the British king. The governor would be empowered to appoint ministers to assist him in running his province during his pleasure. He would, however, be "empowered" to seek to select such executive aid in consultation with the person whom a "judgment is likely to command the greatest following in the legislature" and to appoint those best qualified to command the confidence of the legislature. Such was the nature of provincial autonomy envisioned by the White Paper. There were many elaborate safeguards and emergency powers provided for the governors "in the event of a breakdown in the constitution." Winston Churchill led a vigorous Tory opposition to the White Paper in March, 1933 but it passed through Parliament with a comfortable 300 majority. A radical of now secure most Englishmen felt with the new federalism.

Jinnah's strategy at this point was to turn back toward the Congress to see if its leadership might not, in fact, be prepared to concede all that Mac-

ticket, disgusted at the high-handed way in which Willingdon and Hoare were running India, Jinnah hoped the time was ripe for communal peace and was ready to launch a new series of talks aimed at weaning Congress from its dependence upon the Hindu Mahasabha position. "Can we even at this eventful hour bury the hatchet and forget the past in the presence of a moment danger. Jinnah asked Congress in his statement to the Associated Press.

nothing will give me greater happiness than to bring about complete co-operation and friendship between Hindus and Muslims, and in this desire, my impression is that I have the solid support of Muslims.

Muslims are in no way behind any other community in their demand for a national self government. The crux of the whole issue therefore lies in can we completely assure Muslims that the safeguards to which they attach such vital importance will be embodied in the future Constitution.

Jinnah's willingness to continue to work toward a united national platform had been the more pronounced in the League like Sir Fazlur Rahman and Quaid-e-Azam who joined with the sway of Chhatrapati Maharaja of Mysore's authority against Jinnah as soon as his ship disappeared in the Arabian Sea horizon. They started to form a Parliamentary Muslim front was conceived by the maharaja of Chhatrapati but it did not prove effective since they failed despite Jinnah's vigorous exertions to secure an emergency meeting of the Muslim League's Council to validate his own nomination to represent most Muslims. Qaid-e-Azam's strenuous efforts and negotiations were responsible for his death before the war ended. Jinnah's being the missing from that Muslim revolt against Jinnah's own political strategy of swaying the balance of Muslim opinion in Congress to the British and then back again, which thus won him the most concessions for Muslims at every stage of the long, tough struggle and a negotiated transfer of power remained his most effective management technique.

When in London Jinnah was re-elected that October by the Muslims of the United Kingdom to represent them in New Delhi's assembly. There was no contest since he was the only name nominated for the seat he had first taken before World War I, and to which he would return as leader of the Muslim League in the United Kingdom. Jinnah soon thereafter met and entrusted to New Delhi in January 1935. Jinnah soon thereafter met

timed to become India's first president but their "heart-to-heart" talks failed to resolve the communal deadlock. Pandit Madan Malaviya, leader of the Hindu Mahasabha, who had also been president of the Congress, still adamantly refused to accept Jinnah's Muslim demands despite their equity. Thus, once again the fate of helpless millions was sealed by a few stubborn leaders who refused to stretch that extra inch of representational concession to close the gap dividing Indian philosophy surely and keeping the constitutional fragmented. The Jinnah Press talks came to "an unfortunate end," as Prasad put it, alienating the one Muslim leader capable of moving his impatient high-spirited community into harness with Congress's bullock team.

In February 1935 Jinnah stood on the floor of New Delhi's assembly to introduce an amendment in the debate that had just begun on Jinnah's constitutional reform. His three-part proposal was to accept the Communal Award segment of the White Paper but to substitute a agreed upon by the "minority communities concerned" to urge the removal of "objectionable features" from the provincial government section, particularly, the establishment of second chambers, the extraordinary and special powers of the Governors, provisions relating to Police, Public Service, and Intelligence Departments which ended the real control and responsibility of the Executive and Legislature, "reflected" and to reject the federal scheme proposed for the center as "the only rotten, fundamentally bad and totally unacceptable" Mahatma Gandhi (1889-1948) leader of the assembly's Congress party spoke against Jinnah's proposal to support the Communal Award but Congress did not vote against part one-it merely abstained. Jinnah proved himself the most brilliant parliamentarian in British India.

My amendment accepts the Communal Award . . . until a substitute is agreed upon between the communities concerned. Now I must be that our Hindu friends are not satisfied with the Communal Award but at the same time I can also tell the House that my Muslim friends are not satisfied with it either . . . and, again speaking as an individual, my self-respect will never be satisfied until we produce our own scheme. . . . But why do I accept it? . . . I accept it because we have done everything that we could so far to come to a settlement therefore whether I like it or whether I do not like it, I accept it, because unless I accept that no scheme of Constitution is possible.

Sir this is a question of minorities and it is a political issue. Minorities means a combination of things. It may be that a minority has a different religion from the other citizens of a country. Their lan-

...ing to reach any agreement with him appealing instead to Gandhi ... withdrawn from active politics to his Wardha ashram retreat.

Mr. Jinnah sent a message to Gandhi through B. C. Kher, the leader of the Congress in Bombay's legislature and chief minister designate there. ... asked Jinnah to give his two members of his Muslim League to ... Ministry.³⁰ The League had done brilliantly in Bombay, capturing ... twenty-nine Muslim seats, and Kher had the good sense to ... Jinnah's cooperation in his administration would be a powerful ... and ... a hopeless task. As to Jinnah's ... that Gandhi personally enter negotiations to seek some sort of Hindu-Muslim agreement with him as the Mahatma reprie. "I wish I could do ... but I am utterly helpless. My faith in unity is as bright as ever, ... I see no light out of the impenetrable darkness and, in such distress I cry out to God for help."³¹

The ... session of the League was to be held in Lucknow, and ... address must either galvanize his party to ... or would serve as its death knell. He must ... that for a person as well known for the League ... it was always enough. Jinnah recalled "smoke ... I thought of the smokers cough, or bronchitis. None ... it was too late."³² He spent that summer ... and ... Kashmir, the legal ... in his time ... the Muslim League's premier advocate, Feroza ... Kashmir ... in virtually everywhere ... from then on till the end of his life, as sister-confidante, nursemaid, sound- ... the world. He presided before the ... and Kashmir ... to cases ... matters ... that summer. The most famous was the disputed marriage case of ... Jinnah won his ... appeal ... knowledge. M. Lora ... Authority ... as ... His prestige in the community was ... that no one dared deny his claim, and, as usual, he won every case he ... appealed.

After ... went that summer and ... he invited Muslim ... to ... to ... League ... Sir Sikander Hayat Khan (1892-1942) and Fazlul Haq, also came to ... the ... of the League they would agree to join forces in what was about to become a ...

Nehru's attempts to cut the mass base of their constituencies out from under their very feet if they failed to respond with alacrity and unity to that clear and present Hindu atheist challenge.

Jinnah came by rail from Bombay, and as his train steamed into Cawnpore (Kanpur) Central Station "a vast crowd of Muslims mobbed his compartments," Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad recalled.

So exuberant was their enthusiasm and so firm their determination to resist Hindu aggression, but Mr. Jinnah, others said, and unperturbable, was visibly moved. . . . His face wore a look of grim determination coupled with satisfaction that his people were aroused at last. He spoke a few soothing words to pacify their inflamed passions. Many Muslims, overcome by emotion, wept tears of joy to see their leader who they felt sure would deliver them from bondage.³³

He arrived that evening, October 13, 1937, in Lucknow, where twenty-one years before he had forged the pact that brought Congress and the League together in the first time, adding a bright star to Hindu-Muslim unity that lasted little longer than World War I. This new storm clouds of civil darkness darkened the horizon replacing that dawn, even as the color of age gave a sepulchral look to Jinnah's drawn and tired face. Kher, Nazim, and Mahomedabadi had gathered a small group of Lucknow notables to wait him at the station and they led their president and his sister on a twilight orange procession through the winding streets of the former capital of Nawab-Viziers of Oudh where many a Moghul emperor had, mounted on bejewelled elephants. "There was a scuffle at one place between the volunteers and some hot-headed Congressmen," Khal-uz-Zaman reported,³⁴ noting one of the opening salvoes of what was soon to become the Congress-League civil war, India's political prelude to partition.

The Punjab's Sir Sikander met with Jinnah and the League council, next morning, listing his demands for merging his powerful provincial party forces with the League. He essentially insisted upon the retention of his party's total autonomous control over the Punjab, where the League had elected only two out of eighty-six Muslim members to the legislature. Jinnah had no option but to accept rights reserved Sikanders terms, gladly "stooping" to embrace and empower that Punjab baron. The pact concluded that October 14 between British India's two most powerful Muslims was approved "with thunderous cheers" by this council of the Muslim League. And well should it be, for it was the pact which ... the League no real heartland of ... and ... the ... nationhood. The Punjab was more than just a bare Muslim majority province ...

you take any decision but once a decision is taken, stand by it as one man.⁶⁹

As their great leader sat down every Muslim in that pandal rose to their feet. A new League had been born that by some "magic power" Jinnah had taken his most "grave and momentous" decision and knew its consequences would be "far reaching" that there would be no turning back. Not for him. Not for his party. The Jinnah who had come to Lucknow still existed. A new world between two worlds no longer. He left the old capital of British power but was rooted in his Muslim party's soul as its new Qaid-e-Azam.

12

Toward Lahore (1938-40)

Building a mass party became the Qaid-e-Azam's primary occupation during 1938 and 1939. From its winter session at Lucknow in 1937 to the spring League meeting at Lahore in 1940, the Muslim League's membership multiplied from a few thousand to well over half a million. Membership rates were dropped after Lucknow to half the already nominal four annas fee charged by Congress, inviting any Muslim of means with two annas to his name to join the All-India Muslim League. The League's constitution was revised in many other ways as well and modernized into a vehicle of mass national capacity—intent on inspiring new great leaders.

At Lucknow, the League resolved to work toward "establishment in India of full independence in the form of a federation of free democratic States in which the rights and interests of the Mussalmans and other minorities are adequately and effectively safeguarded." Congress was denounced for imposing its own party anthem, "Bande Mataram" ("Hail to Thee, Mother") as the official new anthem of government without Congress members took precedence, "invaluable disregard of the feelings of Muslims." The League considered this "song not merely positively anti-Islamic and blasphemous in its inspiration and ideas, but definitely subversive of the growth of genuine nationalism in India."² The League further resolved to "exert every effort possible to make Urdu, rather than Hindi, 'the universal language of India.' Finally, a comprehensive program of socio-economic and educational reforms was proposed, including the League "to fix working hours for factory workers and other labourers; to fix minimum wages; to improve the housing hygienic condition of the labourers and make provision for their education; to provide a central bank; to grant a moratorium with regard to all debts, whether secured or

otherwise," and ultimately "to devise measures for the attainment of full independence and invite the co-operation of all political bodies working to that end."

The week of demanding meetings at Lucknow took its toll on Jinnah's health. He ran a fever in his way home to Bombay and a hacking cough continued to plague him. It was more than a month before he felt strong enough to respond to letters from his provincial lieutenants, including Muzaffar Ali, the League's only elected member of the Punjab legislature. "I have not been well enough to tackle the various details that are referred to," Jinnah replied in late November 1937, referring to Barkat Ali's many complaints against Sir Sikander and his Unionist cohort.

Sir Sikander and the true nature of the Unionist-League pact would remain Jinnah's thorniest problem for as Barkat, Iqbal and others with potential awareness in Lahore found saw the Unionists remained precisely as they had been before Lucknow. Pledging to join party, Sir Sikander assured his Hindu and Sikh colleagues that Jinnah was now in his pocket, not the other way round. He, Jinnah, in fact, capitulated to the Unionist chief as the price of enhancing his League's status. Was the cost of Sikander's cooperation a self-grievance the League stood to gain from his nominal alliance? Jinnah himself had believed it was not, yet the Punjab commander would not disappear even after Sir Sikander's death in December 1942.

Jinnah decided to shift the venue of his council's April meeting from Lahore to Calcutta, where he had seen a late December 1937 inauguration of the All-India Muslim Students Federation. Born out of a merger of the Lucknow Muslim Students Conference with the Aligarh University Union and Al-Bengal Muslim Students League, this federation was organized by Muhammad Noman, 24, of Aligarh. Noman had gone to Bombay to invite Jinnah to preside over his federation's first annual session. "To my great surprise, Noman recalled, 'I did not have more than a minute to get my consent. I immediately requested him to allow me to release the news to the Press. He got up and said 'Do it just now,' . . . From Calcutta onwards, the Muslim student marched under his guidance." Jinnah and Fatima stayed at Ishpani's home in Calcutta, and some 300 Muslim students from all North-West Frontier provinces assembled to hear him speak on 20 December 1937. He talked softly without dramatic gesture or emotion, expounding that at Lucknow, "I have only rung the alarm bell. The bell is still ringing. But I do not see the fire brigade. I want you to produce the fire brigade. And God willing we shall extinguish the fire." The most memorable of his statements to that newly organized Muslim fire brigade was that "We do not want to be reduced to the position of the Negroes of America." Jinnah now had the youthful muscle and cadre

of energetic volunteers his League required. The older All-India Students' Federation, which identified closely with Congress, branded the new Muslim federation "reactionary and communal." The raja of Mahmudabad was elected president of the All-India Muslim Students' Federation, and Noman served as general secretary. The federation's constitution listed among its objectives "to arouse public consciousness among the Muslim students and to prepare them to take their proper share in the struggle for the freedom of the country, to work for the advancement of the economic and social conditions of the Muslims, and to popularize Islamic culture and studies and to strengthen the Islamic religion and faith by combating anti-Islamic forces."

Soon after returning to Bombay in January 1938, Jinnah returned again for Aligarh, where he received "a high royal reception" from admirer students, who assisted in carrying his carriage the distance from the station to Aligarh campus three miles away. The Quaid-e-Azam delivered a more eloquent than usual speech to his viceroy's viceroying audience in that illustrious cradle of the Muslim League. "You, Mr. President, have said the Muslim is born free," Jinnah began. "When was he free in this country at any rate we have been slaves for 150 years." This was the first time Jinnah used the word "slave" in a public address, and he went on further dramatizing the plight of Muslims since 1758, however, Jinnah asserted his wildly cheering audience the Muslim League had not tied itself and the freed Muslims from the clutches of the British Government. But now there is another power which claims to be the successor to the British Government. Call it by whatever name you like, but it is Hindu, and Hindu Government. He closed with the glowing promise that six weeks' gathering of the piousness, states, tribes, provinces and amongst the scattered energies and talents of the Muslim community, and when you have got an artistic jeweller to set them it will be a jewel which you will be proud of."

In March 1938 Jawaharlal was succeeded as Congress president by Benegal Nihalani Chandra Bose, 40, forty-one years of age and heroically fresh from British detention. On the eve of assuming his mantle of leadership to Bose, Nehru wrote Jinnah: "We are eager to do everything in our power to put our full resources at your disposal and to endeavour to solve every problem that you may face in developing our noble life along right lines and peace and unity and progress of the Indian people." He also asked Jinnah to "let me know what exactly are the points to dispute which require consideration," to which Jinnah replied, "But do you think that this matter will be discussed in detail by the Congress?" Jawaharlal agreed that it was "always helpful to discuss matters and prob-

Muslim members of the multi-racial Assembly, convincing them all to join the League and finally persuading—or so he believed—Allah Bux to join his party as well.

"It was agreed that one solid party of the Muslim members of the Sind Legislative Assembly should be formed as Muslim League Party. Jinnah announced this statement in the Associated Press a few days later. The Muslim members promised to resign," Jinnah explained. "The Muslim League party election was to have been held to choose a new leader. A unanimous vote in its default he should be nominated. The Assembly Muslim party would abide by his choice." Early in the next morning, however, Jinnah learned that Sind's leader of the Congress party had won. Sarfaraz Habibullah Patel, 1875-1950, president of the All-India Congress League, wrote Bux to alert him to the League's intention, and "When we met at 11 o'clock on the 12th of October 1938 much to the surprise of every one Khan Bahadur Allah Bux backed out of the League. Shocked by such gross breach of faith as this," Jinnah wrote Bux, "I went to the League at 11 o'clock and sent his close friend H. S. Akbarulla, H.M. 1873-1942, to appear that night to show him that the League did not care if he was in the League or not. It was a most bitter end for Jinnah to watch a friend of his, who had been a member of the Provincial Council of Sind since 1921, and a member of the League since 1937, being convinced that as a Muslim he had no right to demand a Muslim League government. Next morning Congress started the spread of a rumour that Jinnah had been seen to have sneaked out of the place from behind the door just as he was about to savor its sweetness.

He was never forgotten for having "cheated" the Congress by joining it as a province but from under him at the very moment of the League. "You have a record of triumph, but the dogs of the League have now received the cup of victory," wrote M. K. Durrani in 1963 as he heard the bad news. "I have not the least doubt that Congress will still teach a lesson this traitor Allah Bux." Bux's betrayal was indeed a blow, but it was never caught.

For the Muslim League, the day after the betrayal was November 11, 1938. It was a day when the Muslim League issued a green pamphlet with the title "The Muslim League's Policy on the Government of India." It was a policy that was to be a guide for the Muslim League in the future. "The Muslim League has long defined its mission," it began.

In my humble opinion, however, the problem is a real one and the answer is solved the better we do for the country, the more the

communal problem can only be solved when India is free. India can only be free when the communal problem is solved. Such a circle can lead us nowhere and will only make the country a prey to any foreign exploiter.

The communal problem remains unsettled not because of the communalism of the minorities, but because of the communalism of the majorities."

The report went on to list specific instances of Hindu-Muslim conflict in most of the Congress ruled provinces after late 1937. Official Congress policies were blamed for destruction and harm to Muslim property and lives, though not much detailed evidence could be recorded, a but also a simple.

On December 10, 1938, Maulana Mazharuddin Ahmad, editor of the Muslim Daily Al-Azhar, promised in his newspaper that Jinnah would be called Quaid-e-Azam by all Muslims in recognition of his status as a great leader. At the annual meeting of the League later that month, Jinnah's new title would be enthusiastically shouted for the first time by the thousands who waited to greet him at the Railway Station. The seven-mile journey from the Railway station to the beautiful green silk-checked pond in which the League held its three-day session was lined with cheering Muslims, waving flags and shouting "Quaid-e-Azam Zindabad!" "Victory to our Great Leader!" "Sardar-e-Azam!" the popular leader of Muslims limited party, chaired the reception committee that spared neither money nor time in organizing that most festive gathering of tens of thousands in the heart of one of Hindu India's ancient bastions of culture and power, where for the last six centuries, Buddha had taught his noble truths of the all pervasive nature of sorrow and the law of karma, and several centuries later the Mahayan Emperor Ashoka, a Kuru, carried the message of peace, advocating love (*ahimsa*) and law (*dharma*) as its best antidotes.

"The Congress has now you must be aware killed every hope of Hindu-Muslim settlement in the night royal festival of Eid-ul-Fitr," said Quaid-e-Azam, speaking extemporaneously on the night of December 26, 1938, to his enthusiastic audience.

The Congress High Command makes the preposterous claim that they are entitled to speak on behalf of the whole of India, that they alone are capable of delivering the goods. Others are asked to accept the gift as from a mighty sovereign. The Congress High Command expects the Muslims to accept the declaration. I want to make it plain to all concerned that we Muslims want no gift. The Muslim want no concessions. We, Muslims of India, have made up our mind

new explanation to Krishna Menon while insisting "This is not being argued by the Congress as such. Though Congress Muslims will take a leading part in it." Rather than growing more receptive to admitting "Hindu" Congress had thus become more determined than ever to prove its overwhelmingly national character and was to remain so insisting that religious bias played no role in its deliberations, policies, or programs.

Jinnah and his party were no longer willing to retain mere "minority" status as the capital of the Pakistan had been chosen purposely as the place for the Muslim League's newborn resolve.

It has always been taken for granted and openly that the Muslims are a minority, and of course we have got used to it for such a long time. These sort of notions sometimes are very difficult to remove. The Muslims are not a minority. The Muslims are a nation by definition.

The problem in India is not of an inter-communal but manifestly of a communal character and must be treated as such. So long as this basic and fundamental truth is not realized, any constitutional arrangement will result in disaster and will prove destructive and harmful not only to the Muslims, but also to the British and Hindus. The British Government are really interested and sincere about the peace and happiness of the people of this Subcontinent. The only course open to us all is to allow the major nations separate political systems existing India into autonomous national States.⁷⁰

Jinnah did not use the word "Pakistan" nor would it appear in the forthcoming constitution. He had no excess of ideas, given much thought and study to the political solution for the Hindu-Muslim problem and a set of convincing arguments and explanations of partition. Jinnah no longer stood before a wisdom vault or after with impact of a thunder and could only whisper "Pakistan" but this was the only long word he could find a way out problem.

Jinnah was more relaxed, lowered the final curtain on any prospects for a last-minute reversion. He was understood too well enough to know that once his mind was made up he never reverted to any earlier position. His constituents' representation that Jinnah was had put him in a state of mind which was like a last will and testament to appreciate that he literally meant every word he had uttered that important afternoon in March. There was no turning back. The ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity had been broken. The link of a great leader. All that remained was for his party first, then his echoic nation, and then for the world to accept the new Pakistan. The new nation was born.

Jinnah, Nehru, Azad and the rest, they were advocates of a neighbor state and would be dealt with according to classic canons of diplomacy. The crowd went wild with acclamation as he stepped from the microphone and returned to his throne. He led his sister from the pandit. He had crossed the high wire without falling. His hand trembled as he lit a fresh cigarette, but his lungs had held and his voice had remained and he had been truly a stellar performance worthy of the lead role he alone could command in this company.

would like you to lay down the arms you have as being useless for saving you or humanity. You will invite Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini to take what they want of the countries you call your possessions. Let them take possession of your beautiful island, with your many beautiful buildings. You will give all these but neither your money nor your arms. If these gentlemen choose to occupy your homes, you will vacate them. If they do not give you free passage out, you will allow yourself, man, woman and child, to be slaughtered, but you will refuse to owe allegiance to them. . . . I am telling His Excellency the Viceroy that my services are at the disposal of His Majesty's Government should they consider them of any practical use in advancing the object of my appeal."

There is no doubt, however, that the Mahatmas' "services" in this regard consisted in allowing Jinnah's advice to expand his executive council to include an effective agent of war.

Jinnah joined his Working Committee in Bombay early that September. He once again reaffirmed the League's Pakistan demand and noted with satisfaction the Viceroy's "clear assurance that no future Constitution, either as final or as interim, will be adopted by the British Government without the Muslim League's approval and consent." He did not, however, accept the Viceroy's declaration of the new leadership of the Executive Council, resolving to "continue to remain aloof from the Government of India, and to continue to work for further information and clarification." Sikander Khan, a close confidant of Jinnah, informed his committee colleagues to accept the Viceroy's assurance, "to get away from the League if Jinnah persisted in his refusal." Jinnah, however, was never moved by threats from anyone, and Sikander Khan left the League. Armed with his Working Committee's support, Jinnah stated the Viceroy that a prior condition to the League's acceptance of the expanded executive council or war advisory council was the establishment of the League as one of the four parties (Congress, declining later on to be associated . . .) it should be allowed to participate in the government and consensus to let the Muslim League have a governing role in the new dominion, "otherwise we will not accept and I may want to become an object of contempt." Sikander Khan was told to inform the Viceroy that the League would not accept the Viceroy's proposal.

On September 11, 1940, Jinnah issued a public declaration. Gandhi has to resolve whether it should be a symbolic individual or a political statement. It should be a political statement, for a political statement, of course, under to control and keep nonviolent. On the eve of his new public declaration, the Muslim League had already been in an other campaign and it provided a more forceful statement, the

was launched in mid-October. Gandhi selected his saintly ashram disciple, Vinoba Bhave, to court arrest first by openly speaking out against the war effort. Vinoba was arrested on October 17 and sentenced to three months in jail. Government ordered all newspapers to stop publishing statements against the war effort. Gandhi "protested" by suspending publication of his *Hamir* journal. The Mahatma next considered the "possibility of a fast, prolonged or unto death" and wrote to warn the Viceroy of that possibility, while "waiting on God to find what is to be the case."¹⁴ He is so tired to appeal directly to Hitler to stop the war, but the letter he wrote was never permitted to leave India. Nehru argued vigorously against a fast, insisting it was "unimportant" and offering to court arrest himself. He was arrested on October 30 and tried for breaking British martial law early in November. Jawaharlal was found guilty as charged and sentenced to four years of rigorous imprisonment, most of it spent in solitary at Dehra Dun.

Jinnah took pause at this time to remind the British of how loyal Muslims had been and how worthy of partnership. He launched a threefold attack upon "enemies" within the government of India: the "Hindis" and Muslim Congress. Among the former he included Lord Gowariker, to whose favor he was overheard saying, "You have doubt crossed me."¹⁵ By then Jinnah considered the Viceroy "wooden and anti-democratic" and had concluded that Jinnah's own and his official criteria at Simla merely "want our support or the assurance that we shall be treated as loyal servants after the war and we" even be given a *bakhshesh*!"¹⁶ Hindu leaders of the Mahasabha wanted to "treat" Muslims. Jinnah argued, "Like Jews in Germany." As for Congress Muslims, Jinnah called them "mere show-hops."

Early in February 1941, Shah Nawaz Khan prepared a confidential memorandum for Jinnah on "What is Pakistan," a demographic analysis of each province in the Northwestern and North-eastern Muslim zones of British India, and some strategic advice about "the Indian states. From this date at least it is clear that Jinnah knew it would be "necessary to readjust" the Punjab's territorial boundaries, and Shah Nawaz suggested excluding Ambala, Delhi, on which was the only most vital Hindu and Sikh population, but also a fiscal liability and not an asset.¹⁷ In the North-east, moreover, Jinnah was alerted to the following harsh realities: the Muslim population of Assam was only 31.8 percent—that province's total population, while the Hindu majority of Bengal was "overwhelmingly Hindu" and the overall Muslim percentage of Bengal's total population was 54.8 percent. Shah Nawaz also pointed out that, Bengal's Dyakhs from "Taksyais" Eastern Bengal, were not only a political liability but also a fiscal liability. The rest of Bengal's Muslim population was only 15.9 percent. In fact, according to Shah Nawaz's calculations, so many

real warning to the British Government because after all they are in possession of this land and the Government of this Subcontinent. Please stop your policy of appeasement towards those who are bent upon frustrating your war efforts and doing their best to oppose the prosecution of the war and the defence of India at this critical moment. . . . You are not loyal to those who are willing to stand by you and sincerely desire to support you. you desire to placate those who have the greatest influence in the political and economic fields.

If the Government want the whole-hearted co-operation of Muslim India, they must place their cards on the table.¹⁷

The great enthusiasm of that large gathering had served as a tonic. Fatima remembered, but only I knew that weakness, exhaustion and fever would follow.

Seeking pure air at higher altitudes for his tubercular lungs, Jinnah came to the Band Hills in Mysore State and Coimbatore to try to recover strength after Madras. What respite no tonic would only be temporary as acute illness that drained his energy was by now irreversible. Not only he stop smoking, Jinnah's health remained precarious all the time and indeed by July he was still too weak to accept a telephonic invitation from Bombay's governor Sir Roger Lumley to come visit the Governor of Coimbatore. The governor's messenger heard about Jinnah's illness, he came to learn of Jinnah's plans for constitutional change. Sir Roger wrote "confidentially" to Jinnah on July 20.

He is continuing with the approval of His Majesty's Government a Native Defence Council. This Council will consist of some 40 members, nine of whom will be drawn from Indian States. The Viceroy regards it as essential that the Great Muslim community should be represented in that Council by persons of the highest position and capacity. He has accordingly invited the Premier of Assam, Bengal, the Punjab and Sind to serve as members of it. He has considered whether he should invite you to let him have any suggestions as to possible personnel for this Council, but being aware, as he is, of your general attitude, he has concluded that it would be preferable not to embarrass you by inviting you to make suggestions.¹⁸

Jinnah was not embarrassed, he was interested. He read the viceroy's message and was struck by the fact that the premier of Assam, Sir Mohanlal Saha, the premier of Bengal, Sir Chittaranjan Das and the premier of the Punjab, Sir Gurmukh Singh, were all Hindus. He was particularly struck by the fact that the premier of Assam, Sir Mohanlal Saha, was a Hindu. He was particularly struck by the fact that the premier of Assam, Sir Mohanlal Saha, was a Hindu. He was particularly struck by the fact that the premier of Assam, Sir Mohanlal Saha, was a Hindu.



Muhammad Ali Jinnah
in his Gandhi costume, 1892





Junah c. 1910



Ruthie Junah around the time of her marriage
c. 1918



Junah and Ruthie's home
atop Malaga Hill in Bismarck c. 1920



Junah c. 1927



Jinnah, c. 1932




Jinnah and Fatima, Hampstead, c. 1932



Jinnah ("Quaid-e-Azam"), c. 1939




Addressing the Muslim League in Delhi, 1943



John S. A. 1945



John S. A. 1945
on the way to the school 1945



John S. A. 1945




At home in New Delhi 1945-46



100 Nehru, Simla, 1946



101 1946



Preparing to address India
on the eve of Pakistan, 1947



FIG. 100. Sir Fazlur Rahman and Sir Saadullah Khan, 1947



FIG. 101. Sir Fazlur Rahman and Sir Saadullah Khan, 1947

to deal with it in Jinnah. That August Jinnah called his Working Committee to Bombay to deal with this challenge from Sir Saadullah Khan and Saadullah tried in vain to argue that they had joined the viceroy's defence council as provincial premiers, rather than as representatives of Muslim opinion. Jinnah gave them no option but to quit the council or leave the League. Sikander after a long private talk with Jinnah agreed to abide by the decision of the committee. Sikander's capitulation was followed immediately by his resignation and that of Sir Saadullah from the viceroy's defence council. Fazlur Haq, however, proved insubordinate and though he promised to resign from the viceroy's council he was most difficult about doing so. But he did resign from both the National Defence Council and the Working Committee of the League. "As a mark of protest against the arbitrary use of powers vested in its President" showing the strongest opposition to Jinnah's leadership and articulating what may in retrospect be viewed as a tactical "big game" position against West Pakistan's dominant name. The Muslim premier of Bengal argued that never ever shall we forcibly brought home to me that the principle of minority autonomy is in the All India Muslim League are being subordinated to the arbitrary wishes of a single individual who seeks to rule as an omnipotent authority even over the destiny of 33 millions of Muslims in the province of Bengal who occupy the key position in Indian Muslim politics."²⁰

Begum Shah Nawaz and Sir Sultan Ahmed, not to mention Sir Saadullah Khan, and Aslam's Saadullah, refused to resign from the viceroy's council and were therefore expelled from the Muslim League for five years. For the league it was a particularly bitter pill to swallow since Sir Fazlur Haq, so close to Jinnah during the Round Table conferences in London. He was later to relent and would return to the League's fold but only after her half decade of ostracism. "The Government on the left of our opposition tried to manoeuvre and wean some of our members by associating them with this scheme," Jinnah remarked during his 14 Day message of 1st October

Three of them were provincial Premiers of whom two were members of the Working Committee. Well, you know what happened. I am glad, and we have reason to be proud that the British Government have been taught a lesson. Out of evil cometh good! Muslim India from one end to another demonstrated that it was soundly behind the Muslim League. I hope in future our opponents will learn that it is futile to attempt to create disruptions in our ranks. That chapter is now closed.²¹

For a while now the members of the Central Legislature at this time more forcefully to represent upon the viceroy's council.

the with the government's behavior and he called for a "clear" declaration of British policy toward all Muslim countries, demanding that Great Britain affirm its non-intervention policy with regard to universal Muslim "sovereignty and independence." He appointed Ispahani to Fazlul Haq's seat on the Working Committee.

Ispahani's startling victories in the wake of Pearl Harbor now raised the specter for Axis invasion of India from the East. Since expanding his external front, Luthi had been pressing Churchill's cabinet for permission to release Netaji as well as other key Congress leaders from jail, in exchange of demands from his non-official advisers. The Viceroy was eager to have his new members that they could, in fact "get things done." But Luthi was reluctant, arguing that "fundamentally the release of these prisoners as an act of debility will be perceived as a victory for Gandhi's plan. New recruits will commit fresh offences requiring whole process of trial and conviction to be gone through again. You will get no thanks for it." Still, Luthi gave in, and after a while agreed most of the cabinet's demands, saying that early in December when Churchill would see his War Cabinet to debate the issue he sensed their mood much better than looking "round the corner and said some what sorrowfully I give in," adding some once "when you lose India don't blame me."²⁰

Ispahani was to appear on his birthday to address the All India Muslim Students Association on December 28, 1941. "My young friends, to occupy ourselves with what was the position of the Muslims five years ago," Jinnah told them:

Five years ago it was wretched. Ten years ago you were dead. . . . The Muslims have given a goal which in my judgment is going to lead you to the promised land where we shall establish our Pakistan. People may say what they like and talk as they like. Of course I am not the best of judges.²¹

But Luthi presided over his League reorganization in Calcutta, opting to head a committee of his League members and Under Muhammad Ali Jinnah led by the then Minister of Education, Mr. M. A. Jinnah. He persuaded the members of the Government to his new cabinet which Ispahani called going "over to the enemy."²² By that unexpected coup, Haq proved again his political astuteness and decisiveness. The fact was now established the black shadow of British rule was now passing at one stroke and that is to go to the Government of India. A new era of freedom was dawning.

And so, what was the Congress? It was a party of the British. It was a party of the British. It was a party of the British. And by virtue of it he was able to form a government and continue to

be the Premier. . . . Now I make a Christmas gift of Mr. Haq to Lord Linlithgow! I make another New Year's gift of the Nawab of Dacca to the Governor of Bengal! I am very glad and I am happy that Muslim India is rid of these men who are guilty of the grossest treachery and betrayal of the Muslims.²³

Both Bengali leaders were expelled from the League, "wooded out" as Jinnah put it.

Lithgow urged Sir Roger Lumley, the governor of Bombay, to invite Jinnah "to a meal" and he did so in mid-January 1942 when Oxford professor Reginald Coupland arrived on his unofficial tour in search of a "corrective" constitutional settlement. "I asked Jinnah to lunch and he came today," Lumley reported, and

Jinnah was most friendly throughout, and it there is any effect from this social contact with him I think it would be favourable. After lunch I had a talk with him, which I had intended would be a short one, so that he could then tackle Coupland, but at the first opening he proceeded to give me an exposition of the Muslim League position which lasted for three quarters of an hour. It was at least friendly, very logical, and well argued from the Muslim League point of view, but there seemed to me to be no indication at all of any change in his position. He appeared quite satisfied with our attitude, although he expressed some fears that the British Press and public opinion would be taken in by Congress and other Hindu propaganda.²⁴

Lumley was "considerably impressed" by the logic of Jinnah's arguments, but in the aftermath of their talk saw no prospect for any "solution" to the constitutional "deadlock." India is hopelessly, and I suspect irremediably split by racial and religious divisions which we cannot bridge and which become more acute as any real transfer of power as draws nearer." Luthi reported to Amery before the end of January 1942²⁵ Amery was "distinctly disturbed" by Luthi's "defeatist" position and he informed Amery after reading it, that he had lost considerable "confidence" in the Viceroy's judgment, suggesting that perhaps "someone" from Home should now be sent to India "charged with a mission to try to bring the political leaders together."²⁶ Luthi's candidate for that job was Sir Salford Cripps, who had returned from Moscow where he had served as the British ambassador.

Jinnah left Bombay in February 1942 on his 11-day and overnight train to Calcutta. A jubilant crowd awaited him at Howrah Station and escorted him in gala procession to Mohammad Ali Park, over which he hoisted the Muslim League flag on February 13, 1942. "Up to the present

overnight, and touched down at New Delhi's airport the following day "Pakistan Day" the second anniversary of the Lahore resolution that was celebrated in Delhi by a mile-long procession and a mass public meeting addressed by Jinnah. "I can say without fear of contradiction that the Muslim League stands more firmly for the freedom and independence of this country than any other party," the Quaid-e-Azam told a crowd of 30,000 Muslims in Urdu Park. "We are asking for justice and fairness. We have no designs upon our sister communities. We want to live in this land as a free and independent nation. We are not a minority but a nation."⁶⁰ Referring to Cripps's mission, Jinnah said:

There is the fear that he is a friend of the Congress. He has enjoyed the hospitality of Bhabu Jawaharlal Nehru. That is all true but we should not be afraid of that scorn. Don't get cold feet. We are prepared to face all consequences. Any scheme or solution which is detrimental to the interests of Muslims is forced upon us. We shall not only not accept it but resist it to the utmost of our capacity. If we have to die in the attempt we shall die fighting.⁶¹

Cripps met with Maunana Azad, then out of jail, on March 25. The Congress politician's English, he learned was not as good as his Persian or Arabic. Azad insisted that to nationalize Indians "effectively" it was "necessary" to give them "control of the defence of their country." Cripps pointed out that strategically India had to be regarded as part of "a much greater theatre of war." Azad reiterated his point, however, and Cripps decided that what Congress really wanted was the "appearance and name of an Indian Defence Minister" without actual control over "the movement of troops or other military arrangements."⁶²

Jinnah arrived at the viceroy's palace just as Azad was leaving. Cripps explained that he had not taken the Muslim League or Pakistan "propaganda" very seriously during his last visit two and a half years ago but assured Jinnah that he had "changed" his view because of the "change in the communal feeling in India and the growth of the Pakistan movement." Cripps then handed Jinnah the document he had brought from London, "which I think rather surprised him in the distance it went to meet the Pakistan case," he stated, of course that he was not prepared to give any views on it but we had a long discussion as to its effect especially upon Bhabu and the Prime Minister and the main thing with which he was concerned was whether we could have the effective right to opt out of the constitution in the event of their so desiring.⁶³ Jinnah then "promised to lay the matter before his Working Committee in Delhi and to come back and see me framed shortly afterwards." He was extremely cordial and when we

parted expressed the view to me that the one thing that mattered was to be able to mobilise the whole of India behind her own defence and that he was personally most anxious to achieve this.⁶⁴ Expert negotiator that he was Jinnah wisely refrained at his opening meeting with Cripps from any "peremptory criticism."

Cripps's meeting with Gandhi on March 27 did not begin on a happy note. Gandhi considered it "extremely inadvisable" to publish the document and urged Cripps to refrain from doing so, asking what Jinnah thought.

I told him that he had suggested that, in view of the danger of leakage it would be wise to publish it before too long, and he interpreted this as being an indication that Jinnah was in favour of the scheme. . . . I then asked him how, supposing Jinnah were to accept the scheme and Congress were not to, he would advise me to proceed. He said that in those circumstances the proper course would be for me to throw the responsibility upon Jinnah and to tell him that he must now try to get Congress to either by negotiation, direct with them or by agreement, them in session or without it, to proceed. I thought that I was pushed into a Jinnah whom a very good suggestion this would give him in India if he succeeded, but I might take on the job and that he might succeed.⁶⁵

It was one of Gandhi's most brilliant ideas, turning over the initiative and responsibility to Jinnah, but the British viceroy or cabinet would not take the courage or wisdom to try the idea.

On March 29, Nehru came to breakfast with Cripps, and then later they went to Bina House to see Gandhi. Azad and others of the Viceroy's Committee of the Congress. Cripps listened with a great deal of interest to the attitude of Nehru, who was tired and not well, was a little more to the point, and he left me in complete agreement to whether Congress was or was less decided not to accept it and that it was not worth arguing about for any alteration or modification was not inclined to press his suggestions in view of the general character of the situation and a suggestion of self-government to India.⁶⁶ Less than a week later, on April 4, Cripps left for Bombay, but was never to see the Muslim or Indian communities and gangs and transacted much.

Cripps had been at a great loss to solve the problem of Nehru and Menon as the key to resolving the communal puzzle that had baffled Morley, Shastri, Montagu, and Lord Mountbatten. It was the only way that we destroyed Motilal Nehru, and had all but driven Jinnah into permanent exile. In the end, the British government had to accept the fact that the only way to achieve a united India was to accomplish over the past quarter-century of concentrated effort, and

countless futile hours of intense negotiation. Perhaps it was just that with stakes so high, he could not resist a roll at this fatal game, suspecting as one his confidants put it that "if he brought this settlement off, Cripps would certainly replace Winston." His fate, however, that he believed himself omnipotent. Forgetting what K. P. Singh had written of his well-intentioned forebears, he hoped to "win the First."²⁴

At this juncture President Franklin D. Roosevelt sent his former assistant secretary of war, Colonel Louis Johnson, out to India as his personal representative introducing Johnson to Lantinghow as a man of broad experience with problems relating to other supplies who was selected for "a most important mission because of his outstanding ability and high character." Churchill, Amery and Lantinghow were all anxious about the possible "political implications of a secret agenda for Colonel Johnson's mission. Lantinghow's representative in Washington wrote that Roosevelt seemed to think that the plan concerning immediate federalization did not go far enough and he felt "that complete autonomy, including power to raise armies, should be given as a minimum."²⁵

As soon as Lantinghow, Amery and Churchill learned that Johnson and Roosevelt would not intend to twist their political arms by way of conceding more to a non-cooperating "British shadow," as Johnson put it, Congress, the Cripps game was over. Only Cripps refused to believe he was finished. In a pit meeting with Indian readers, his long press conferences, sitting long and longer next to his grown home and suggested blogging, the home that had now driven him. The once bright and rising star of his political career went to eclipse under Indian burning sun. On April 2, Azad and Nehru handed Cripps the Congress Working Committee's resolution rejecting his offer. Instead of thanking them, and Ryan, home Cripps wrote the text of the resolution to Churchill and set up a meeting with Azad, Nehru, and field marshal Sir Archibald Wavell. 1893-1950. The tight-lipped commander-in-chief, who replaced Lantinghow as viceroy the following year, was then fighting a losing battle in Malaya and Burma, desperately hoping he could keep the Japanese from seeping through India's Eastern wall of ragged mountainous forests. He had no time and less talent for political gamesmanship. With one glass eye and little to smile about, Wavell's was hardly a personality to appeal to Nehru, Azad or Cripps. Nor was he ready voluntarily to release any of the military strings he controlled. Still Cripps was determined to try to bring Nehru and Wavell to a compromise.

Jinnah left Delhi on Thursday, April 2, taking the night train to Allahabad where he was a member of the Muslim League.

Allahabad's Central Railway Station, then deserted, was thronged more than a hundred green-tinted decorated arches of triumph that led to the packed pandal in Mahanadabad's garden. Jinnah presented his brief of Cripps' proposals in a clear, succinct manner, saving, now that the scheme was really dead, how "deeply disappointed" all Muslims were to find that the unity and integrity of the Muslim nation has not been expressed, recognized. Any attempt to solve the problem of India by the process of evading the real issues and by exemplifying the territorial, ethnic, or provincial divisions, which are mere accidents of British policy, and administrative divisions, is a fundamentally wrong. Allahabad will not be satisfied unless the right of national self-determination unequivocally be recognized.²⁶

On Easter Sunday of that year (1942) Johnson met Cripps on the first time at the viceroys' house over lunch and each congratulated a potential ally in the other, for both were liberal legal minds who felt as far removed ideologically from the viceroys and his commanders-in-chief as they were culturally from Nehru, Azad. Both enjoyed mutual confidence at high places in London and Washington, moreover than either in New Delhi or Simla. And each, this way was laid under the spell of Nehru's cosmopolitan charm. So in the spirit of Easter Sunday they joined forces, hoping to resurrect the dream that had truly expired on Good Friday. They moved with great energy, enthusiasm, and top secrecy meeting Nehru, Azad and other leaders of Congress at all hours of day in a secret, convincing themselves that there was adequate light at the end of this constitutional tunnel. They came to believe that if Congress really wanted was control over the Ministry of Defense, so they worked out a compromise, ingenious and naive, was that there was a compromise for the under-Indian, which all of its representatives would remain under the command-in-chief who would retain his status, master of war, and they already thought he would suffer to solve India's problem. Cripps have even drawn parallels of a religious not systems for the new national government. He was going to a talk and Congress freedom. Azad was his choice for home minister, a charge of police. Azad, whom Jinnah was to not speak to and referred to as a "devil in Muslim" (Nehru) suggested to him concerned Nehru of the words of cooperation and of the same that he and the Congress would be together, who was a very close friend. It was all an illusion spun out of India's torrid heat.

Many cables were exchanged between London and India in the next few days, including one that stated that the British would not accept the Cripps proposals. The British government was not prepared to accept the Cripps proposals. All the cables were unnecessary. Congress turned down the proposals.

applied his mind to the problem on April 10, 1942, just as Gandhi had predicted they would be. In the meantime, with Cripps' Explaining his party's rejection of the offer of Congress president Azad wrote Cripps:

We are prepared to assume responsibility provided a truly National Government is formed. . . . But in the present the National Government must be a Cabinet Government with full power and authority to continue the Viceroy's Executive Council. We would point out to you that the suggestions we have put forward are not ours only but may be considered to be the unanimous wish of our people. On these matters there is no difference of opinion among various groups and parties.⁶¹

"The Viceroy's Government for that assertion," Jinnah told the press as soon as he read Azad's circular letter on several days later. "Muslim India has no right to be a part of the Government. We maintain that the Congress does not represent not only the Muslims of India, but even a large body of the Hindus, the Dalits, the Untouchables, the Scheduled Castes and other minorities. He also repudiated the suggestion that Congress had carried on with Cripps' over the head of all other groups. "The Congress would have had no right to take this position for over a year. It is a disgrace to the Muslim demand for Pakistan. It is a disgrace to the Muslim League of which I am a member. It is to be settled after the war. We are prepared to come to any reasonable adjustment with regard to the present."⁶²

On April 11, 1942, Cripps issued the reply. "There is clearly no hope of a settlement of the Indian problem. To Azad he wrote: 'You suggest that the National Government, or some other such body, must be a Cabinet Government. Without constitutional changes of a most complicated and revolutionary kind this would not be possible as a condition for the Viceroy's Government even as far as power is concerned.'"

He also pointed out that the Congress had postponed Cripps' departure report to the United States. The following day most universally held that the Indian situation was a dead end. The British Government was unwilling to entrust technical, military and naval defense to the Indians. The British and Indian public opinion could not tolerate a self-governing India. The British Government was unwilling to permit the component parts of India to secede from the British Empire after the war, it is not willing to permit them to enjoy what is tantamount to self-government during the war.⁶³ Churchill chose to pocket that cable rather than show it to his cabinet or use it to warn Cripps back to New Delhi from Karachi,

where he just landed. Churchill had not after all become prime minister to preside over the dissolution of His Majesty's Empire.

The Working Committee of the Muslim League issued its resolution on the Cripps offer shortly after Congress resolved upon rejection.

The Committee while expressing their gratification that the possibility of Pakistan is recognized by implication in providing for the establishment of two or more independent Unions in India regret that . . . no alternative proposals are invited. In view of the rigidity of the attitude of His Majesty's Government with regard to the fundamentals not being open to any modification, the Committee have no alternative but to say that the proposals in the present form are unacceptable. . . . The Muslims cannot be satisfied by such a Declaration on a vital question affecting their future destiny and demand a clear and precise pronouncement on the subject. Any attempt to solve the future problem of India by the process of evading the real issue is to court disaster.⁶⁴

Once again, Jinnah had raised the minimal terms for negotiating any settlement to the most persistent political problem of recent Indian history. Pakistan was hardly a permanent demand.

14

Dawn in Delhi
(1942-43)

Jinnah's position remained firm throughout the remaining years of World War II. He declined to co-operate with Congress and any council of co-operation that might be set up to the Muslim right in Pakistan. Many of his supporters in the Congress became more hostile and non-cooperative. The government of India and His Majesty's Government looked upon this event. Muslim leaders and Muslim League leaders for the support they required. Jinnah's stock rose to new heights in London as well as in Simla and New Delhi.

Jinnah's political position was rarely mixed at Whitehall. "I don't suppose Jinnah will want to become nationalist than Congress and therefore Congress must be the only institution. A very wrote L. P. H. G. W. thank Jinnah. Cripps was seen as a great history and speculation on possible future reforms.

If he does, I suppose you could give him certain seats, balancing him with Ambedkar and possibly a new Hindu or two. But still retaining the majority of your existing Executive? Or you may simply decide to do away with the political leaders from either of the two main parties? . . . The Muslim League, I suppose, will still be officially non-co-operative, but probably more co-operative than hitherto in practice in view of the definite concession to the possibility of Pakistan that we have made."

In the wake of Cripps, the governor of the Punjab reported that "the Sikh reaction to the Cripps proposals" was "all very good". The nature of the War Cabinet's proposals "Sikhs were afraid that if the Punjab remained a part of India, it would be a disaster for the Muslims."

province once ruled by Sikh Maharajas would be enveloped by "the outer darkness of Pakistan. They regarded themselves as being in danger of ever lasting subject to an unsympathetic and tyrannical Muhammadan Ruler." Sikh Muslims implicitly had roots that went back to seventeenth century Mughal imperial rule. "We are doing what we can to cope with the situation," Governor Glegg assured the viceroy. It was a most important warning passed on to Whitehall. "We are doing what we can to cope with the situation," Governor Glegg assured the viceroy. It was a most important warning passed on to Whitehall. "We are doing what we can to cope with the situation," Governor Glegg assured the viceroy. It was a most important warning passed on to Whitehall.

Blood and tears are going to be our lot whether we like them or not," Nehru predicted at the press conference in Allahabad in mid-April after Cripps flew home. "Our blood and tears will flow, maybe the parched soul of India needs them so that the first flower of freedom may grow again."

Cripps held a press conference in London on April 22 and insisted "The problem now becomes not a political one but the people's choice of defence of India and in that I have had the assurance of a majority of the leaders that they are going to co-operate in their efforts." Asked by the Indian press, Nehru and Jinnah to come to London, he replied negatively, saying "I am sure" that neither of them would want to leave India in "existing circumstances" even if they were invited.

In Madras, Chakravarti Rajagopalachari (C. R.) now dramatically sought to lead Congress in the direction of co-operation both with the British war effort and the Muslim League. He presided over a meeting of forty-six members of Madras Congress Legislature and proposed two resolutions, agreement on which was reached in late April. The first urged that since it was impossible for the people to think in terms of neutrality or passivity during invasion, it was "absolutely and urgently necessary" for Congress to "remove every obstacle toward establishing a National Administration." It therefore urged the All-India Congress Party to "acknowledge the Muslim League's claim for separation," thereby removing all doubts and fears in this regard, and to invite the League for "consultation for the purpose of arriving at agreement and securing of national Government to meet present emergency." The second resolution requested permission to the All-India Congress for the Madras Congress to unite with the Muslim League and "thereby provide a pathway to restore popular government, as a coalition of interests in Madras. Both resolutions passed overwhelmingly. It was the first important break in Congress's non-cooperation policy, a significant move towards the British war effort and a direct challenge to the British war effort.

The All-India Congress met the following week repudiating C. R. and his Madras revolution. On April 30, 1942, he resigned from the Working

Committee Gandhi remained in Wardha, but sent his loving disciple Mahadevi, Madeline Stude to Allahabad with a resolution he drafted for presentation to the Congress, stating

Whereas the British War Cabinet's proposals sponsored by Sir Stafford Cripps have shown up British imperialism in its nakedness as never before . . . The A.I.C.C. is of opinion that Britain is incapable of defending India. It is natural that whatever she does is for her own defence. There is an eternal conflict between Indian and British interests. . . . The Indian army has been maintained up till now mainly to hold India in subjugation. It has been completely segregated from the general population who can in no sense regard it as their own. . . . India's quarrel is not with India. She is warring against the British Empire. India's participation in the war has not been with the consent of the representatives of the Indian people. It was purely a British act. If India were freed her first step would probably be to negotiate with Japan. . . . The A.I.C.C. is, therefore, of opinion that the British should withdraw from India.⁴

Nelson Mandela, Colonel Johnson and Franklin Roosevelt might help India with their Congress were more supportive of the Congress. A resolution was agreed upon by the Working Committee. . . . The Congress, through the resolution passed on May 1, also passed India's first anti-Nazi and Fascist as well as Imperialism. On June 1, however, Gandhi wrote

I see no difference between the Fascist or Nazi powers and the Allies. All are exploiters, all resort to ruthlessness to the extent required to maintain their power. . . . America and England are very great nations but their greatness will count as dust before the bar of dumb humanity, whether African or Asiatic. . . . They have no right to talk of human rights and civil liberties when they have washed their hands clean of the blood of the millions.

American journalists interviewed Gandhi that week in Wardha, and one asked "But what does a free India mean, if, as Mr. Jinnah said, Muslims will not accept Hindu rule?" The Mahatma replied "I have not asked the British to hand over India to the Congress or to the Hindus. Let them entrust India to God or in modern parlance to anarchy. Then all the parties will fight one another like dogs, or wild, when real responsibility will come to a reasonable agreement. I shall respect non-violence to the end." . . . He said that he had always said there could be no *Swaraj* without Hindu-Muslim unity, and then he was asked why he had of late insisted

there would be "no unity until India has achieved independence?" The seventy-three-year-old Mahatma answered

Time is a merciless enemy I have been asking myself why every whole-hearted attempt made by all including myself to reach unity has failed, and failed so completely that I have entirely fallen from grace and am described by some Muslim papers as the greatest enemy of Islam in India. It is a phenomenon I can only account for by the fact that the third power, even without deliberately wishing it, will not allow real unity to take place. Therefore I have come to the resultant conclusion that the two communities will come together almost immediately after the British power comes to a final end in India.⁵

Jinnah immediately responded to this with "I am glad that at last Mr. Gandhi has openly declared that every Hindu, Muslim settler and can only come after the achievement of Indian independence and has merely thrown off the cloak that he had worn for the last 22 years."⁶

The All-India Congress met again in early August as Gandhi told his followers "This is a crucial hour. We shall get our freedom by fighting; it cannot fall from the skies. The Britishers will have to give us freedom when we have made sufficient sacrifices and proved our strength. At a time when I am asked to launch the *Quit India* slogan, I feel here can be no retreat for the British in my heart. The thought that for me they are a difficulty I should give them a push is totally absent from my mind." . . . Sardar Fateh was reported to have said that the British army was ready to abandon India, much the way they had Burma, and that the *Satyagraha* campaign would prove victorious in a week. "If it took a week it will be a miracle and if it happens it would mean striking the British heart," Gandhi said, adding

Maybe wisdom will dawn on the British and they will understand that it will be wrong for them to put in as the very people who want to fight for them. Maybe . . . a change may come in Mr. Jinnah's mind after all. He will think that those who are fighting are the sons of the soil and if he sits quiet of what use would Pakistan be for him . . . God has helped us. . . . When I raised the slogan "Quit India" the people in India who were then feeling despondent felt I had placed before them a new thing. If you want real freedom you will have to come together and stand coming together will create the *Swaraj*.

The Working Committee decided to launch a campaign to arrest Gandhi and the Congress Working Committee at any time he deemed appropriate. . . . The Congress Working Committee decided to launch a campaign to arrest Gandhi and the Congress Working Committee at any time he deemed appropriate.

rebellion" against the government of India. Sikander warned Governor Lancelotti of his suspicion that Gandhi might try to "make terms with Jinnah in an out-and-out offer of Pakistan and then present a united front to Government."¹⁰ Gandhi did, in fact, write on August 8 that

Provided the Muslim League co-operated fully with the Congress demand for immediate independence without the slightest reservation, the Congress will have no objection to the British Government transferring all the powers it today exercises to the Muslim League on behalf of the whole of India. . . . And the Congress will not only not obstruct any Government that the Muslim League may form on behalf of the people, but will even join the Government in running the machinery of the free State. This is meant in all seriousness and sincerity.¹¹

So a offer might have tempted Jinnah if he had believed in or trusted Gandhi, but just a few days later he had to tell the press: "Mr. Gandhi's acceptance of independence is clearly different from ours. Mr. Gandhi is merely a Congress man. I ask Mr. Gandhi to give up the game of playing the Muslims by saying that we depend upon the British for the achievement of our goal of Pakistan. . . . Hands off the Muslims." On August 8, all was in readiness within the vast machine of the government of India. The Aga Khan's selection Poona was chosen as the most secure, comfortable and convenient prison for Gandhi and a number of his family and closest followers including Sanjay Narayan and Ahmad Ali, his daughter Madhuban. The rest of the Congress Working Committee was to be jailed in Ahmednagar Fort.

Very early in the morning of August 9, 1942, the Congress Working Committee was to be arrested. From this moment onwards, consider yourself a free man or woman, and act as if you are free and are no longer under the hood of the "rehabilitation." Gandhi told his Congress colleagues after they passed his "Quit India" resolution on the evening of August 8, 1942: "Here is a mantra, a short one, that I give you. You may imprint it on your hearts and let every breath of yours give expression to it. The mantra is: 'Do or Die.' We shall either free India or die in the attempt."¹²

The Congress Working Committee and the entire Congress Working Committee were arrested next day before dawn. Gandhi's final message to the country was written at 5:00 A.M., shortly before he was taken into custody. "Everyone is free to go the fullest length under ahimsa. Complete non-cooperation and non-violence. No violence, no lawlessness, no disorder. The nation will survive. Kureng ya mareng. We will die." ¹³

I deeply regret that the Congress has finally declared war and has launched a most dangerous mass movement in spite of numerous warnings from various individual parties and organizations," said Jinnah on August 9, 1942. I make Gandhi, he did not expect the war to end swiftly nor did he think the British would lose. He never believed, moreover, that *Satyagraha* could raise non-violent. He summoned his Working Committee to Bombay on August 16 to plan the League's strategy. They met in his house for four days and formally resolved to deplore the decision of the All India Congress Committee to launch an "open rebellion" for the purpose of establishing Congress Hindu domination in India. The result was only lawlessness and considerable destruction of life and property.¹⁴ The League viewed the "Quit India" movement as an attempt to "force the Muslims to submit and surrender to Congress terms and dictation."

The violence started in Bombay a few days after Gandhi's arrest, quickly spread to the United Provinces, Delhi, and Bihar. The speed and secrecy of the government's pre-dawn sweep in Delhi had a deadly ring to it, and where there was the news seemed to report only its urban areas and strikes. By August 17, however, Lushington wrote to A. J. A. "The Delhi situation has been a good deal of trouble. Casualties may be heavy and some damage has been done to property. Here again I am not reporting to you. It is . . . due to millhands on strike, and the Chief Commissioner is quite confident that he can handle the situation."¹⁵

But by mid-August over thirty people were dead in Bombay, where the police had been sweeping up as a regular sign of mass violence. Railway stations and roundabouts in all India were tormented and the British Reserve Police Force troops in the affected area. With Lushington authorizing each man gathering from all of saboteurs.¹⁶ No report of such martial violence reached a Bihar was even permitted to appear in any Indian newspaper. But in India, such news were kept out, keeping secret all movements. Lushington of the Indian army arrived at students and staff as the Congress had Gandhi's *Satyagraha* ading. I am not disturbed by the situation. More disturbing developments are signs of extension of this movement. The situation is very serious. It is very difficult to dispose of effectively in a country of the size of India.¹⁷

A week after Gandhi's arrest, Lord Lushington was pleased to note that the situation in India was "very serious" and was "relieved" that the situation in India was "very serious" and was "relieved" that the capital city of a country is not a very good advertisement.¹⁸ Lushington was not alone in his view. The British government was also very serious. A week after Gandhi's arrest, Lord Lushington was pleased to note that the situation in India was "very serious" and was "relieved" that the capital city of a country is not a very good advertisement.¹⁹

played an ever greater role in showing up Allied defenses preparing the landing pads from which to recapture Western Europe and China as well as Southeast Asia. Harry Hopkins spoke to me last night about his strong pressure now being exerted on the President," Halifax warned Eden. "The Cabinet should realize how strongly public opinion is moving in these directions and I hope to be able to say or do something to counteract it. Otherwise I fear American press, which on the whole has stood by us remarkably well in the past, will rapidly and perhaps completely change its attitude much to the detriment of Anglo-American relations."²⁴

"What have we to be ashamed of in our Government of India?" Churchill asked American London garden party that September. "Why should our biologists or so. We are prepared to go out to the distance of some 6,000 miles? For eighty years we have given it peace and internal stability and prosperity which has never been known in the history of that country. We have looked after all classes, and we have protected the interests of all sections, and we are not going to begin with a policy of self-interest."²⁵

Churchill and his cabinet were most concerned about the rapidly mounting war-bag balance after the British bowed India as a result of war to her war effort and accelerate export of Indian goods to all fronts. All this was India to always have added to Britain for raw materials and other important war works. Inflation soared that war cost millions of sterling. With all the Indian labor troops serving overseas and Indian factories pouring in every variety of products for the war, the balance was reversed. Great Britain finding this mounting burdenage to her own effort for an estimated £400 million Churchill insisted that something must be done quick to wipe the slate clean, arguing "As Arthur Balfour used to say 'This is a singularly ill-conceived war but not so ill-conceived as this.'"²⁶ American ambassador preferred to let sleeping dogs lie, knowing what a destabilizing effect of summer and industrial Indian protest would be raised over an British. Whatever at this point to change the formula of India British payments now that the balance had tipped in India's favor.

In October of 1942, C. R. unveiled his plan for "resolving" India's deadlock suggesting that the Viceroy should act as the Crown would in crisis in England and select the most popular and most responsible leaders of India to assist him in running what would, in effect, be a "national government."²⁷ Five important Congressmen and six currently prominent should first be chosen, and then Jinnah could be invited "to join this Government with as many men of his choice" as he "liked." There might additional to be a provision for a special committee to be formed to deal with the problem of the Muslims in the event of a national government.

the leadership." Jinnah, however, immediately categorized it with a number of other "kiss-biting" schemes and dismissed them all.

Jinnah addressed his party's council in New Delhi on November 9 and warned them of "propaganda to misrepresent the Muslim League as allies of British imperialism in India, obstructing the path of its freedom and independence" which was, he claimed, currently circulating in the United States. "To those who have been correctly following the trend of events in India this allegation about obstructing the path of freedom is not only disgraceful but misleading," he insisted adding, "In these days the vicious methods of propaganda are capable of misleading even intelligent people."²⁸ He knew all the hazards, felt the pressures, and was keenly conscious of the passage of time adding, "The stars are running out. And two days later after C. R. and Jinnah had met Lathigo, whose twice-extended term as viceroy had also had a terminal date of April 1943, wired him to report that Jinnah had conceded nothing leaving C. R. "rather depressed."

C. R. found himself left with so little influence in Churchill's War Cabinet that he resigned on November 22, 1942, and all he was and as minister of a new production but would never return to India's political stage until Attlee came to power. Attlee was America's choice to replace Churchill, as America urged Churchill to yield November to whom Lathigo's deputy premier to New Delhi since "Dick was the Indian problem and no one seemed able to know as to any dramatic short cut to its solution."²⁹ And Churchill accepted America's advice. Attlee's rising domestic popularity followed Cripps into India's ocean deep, but Churchill's assembly mistrusted even the most conservative of Labour leaders too much for an direct personal responsibility, fearing they were all determined to settle India. A None of us was a party, playing was wanted the job. Lathigo decided to press Lathigo to stay on half a year longer but he promised April release.

Late in 1942 Lathigo received what he considered quite definitely reliable secret report of a recent talk with Jinnah when he passed on to America the "clear" expression of Jinnah's views on the "Pakistan issue." Jinnah had stated he would join an interim government only "on an equal footing" with Hindus, since he viewed that "line" as "the only way in which he could safeguard Pakistan. To accept responsibility in a provisional government on any other terms would be to walk into the trap which had been set for him by the British. He would not be a puppet or an unimportant Muslim. It was a deep game, and he, at least, was not prepared to play. The present was a time when Muslims were faced with a 'life and death problem.' He did not say that in an outburst of anger, he meant it all

By Muslims must either choose to assert themselves and win for themselves a place in the comity of nations or go under and accept a position of permanent inferiority. It was for them to say what they wanted. If the former he was prepared to fight for them till the last if the latter he was willing to take leave and concern himself with making money at the bar."⁹⁸

The U.S. victory at Guadalcanal coming so soon after Rommel's defeat North Africa raised Allied spirits the world over, especially in Whitehall where Amery found "nothing but cheerfulness" predicting that "India will be entering upon 1943 in much better mood than she began in 1942." But not so in Bengal. Twin specters of Japanese invasion and famine came another in striking terror among Bengal's population. "The japs are receiving daily attention from enemy aircraft. Ishpahan reported.

"The situation in the province is growing more and more serious each day. In some areas, it is most acute. . . . Tens of thousands of people in the millions have been rendered homeless and are starving. The disaster is really terrible. . . . The japs have been overrunning us. They have visited us four times. Half of Calcutta is in the ring."⁹⁹

It was only the start of India's worst famine of the century, a tragedy that claimed between two and three million Bengal lives during the forthcoming year.

"Every day gouges the people to the point of madness," Gandhi charged writing Mr. Amery in Lalithgow in January 1943. They started famine violence in the shape of the arrests. . . . I must report to you the situation for satyagrahis' names, a fast according to capacity. I read in Amery's letter early morning breakfast of the 9th February the statement of the 2nd March."¹⁰⁰ Lalithgow wired Amery soon after the first of Moharram's letter "I have never witnessed that Gandhi has ever said so. So should be awarded on his own responsibility, to starve himself."¹⁰¹ Amery Lalithgow returned his letter in early February of 1943. "I am sorry that he was amazed to find them unanimously favourable to him as soon as he fast began. So the government of India decided to offer to release Gandhi if the starvation was as proposed last month. I am asking him to remain a detainee. Lalithgow wired this decision to Amery. Amery responded now 'greatly distressed' the War Cabinet felt at the thought of releasing Gandhi, 'on a mere threat to fast.'"¹⁰²

An emergency War Cabinet meeting was held on the next Sunday at which Amery reported

Winston . . . launched out on the Gandhi subject at once. At first . . . muttering away his dissatisfaction, but giving me the impression that he was going to agree with a shrug of the shoulder. Presently, however, he warmed up and worked himself into one of his states of indignation over India. I made efforts to try and bring him to the point that whatever might or might not be the best method of handling so peculiar a situation as the Gandhi one, the issue was not that but whether you were to override a Council and run the risk of resignations. That point he sharply brushed aside by saying that it would not matter if they did all resign, we could carry on just as well without them and this our hour of triumph everywhere in the world was not the time to crawl before a miserable little old man who had always been our enemy."¹⁰³

But Gandhi had already been informed of the government of India's offer to release him and pushed it aside. "I shall be glad to consent to taking as fast as a detainee or prisoner," replied the "little old man" on the eve of his arrest. The impending fast has not been considered to be taken as a threat.¹⁰⁴ The Times beamed a sigh of great relief.

Jinnah felt as adamant about Gandhi's fast as the rebel "showing Ishpahan to urge him to keep Bengal's wavering Muslim League members of the legislature from taking a resolution opposing the Government for the Mahatma's release. After the first week of Gandhi's fast, Lalithgow was pleased to report that "Muslims continue to stand apart and . . . in my paper *Dawn* to right and left. . . . *Dawn's* leader today is critical of Gandhi's suggestion which is not correct. 29th January that he was ready to see Jinnah form a national government which is equivalent, it suggests, to a renunciation of all as a favour."¹⁰⁵

The League remained aloof from the mounting waves of protest and unrest throughout India triggered by Gandhi's fast. In New Delhi the legislative councilist Az Khan reiterated the Muslim League's long-given policy: "We have every sympathy for the sentiments of our Hindu friends and the man who was to be Pakia's first prime minister. But we are unable to join them in this matter." Jinnah was invited by Sapru to a conference of prominent leaders in New Delhi to discuss the "situation arising out of Gandhi's fast" but he declined noting as Lalithgow was delighted to report that "the situation is really a matter for the Hindu leaders to consider."¹⁰⁶

The British doctor who was the surgeon-general who observed the Mahatma, predicted that he would probably not survive another week of the fast. The *London Standard* reported that "the situation is really a matter for the Hindu leaders to consider."

and ovation and cheering" as he entered the packed pandit. "With his majestic majesties now running Bengal, the Punjab, Sind and Assam. Jinnah insisted, "This is only the starting point. . . . In the North-West Frontier Province . . . my information is—and it is based on very reliable sources . . . the Muslim public is entirely with the Muslim League. [That summer League Ministry under Ahrangzeb Khan would come to power in the North-West Frontier Province.] Don't forget the Minor Provinces. It is they who have spread the light when there was darkness in the minority Provinces. It is they who were the open heads that the Congress wanted to crush. We have got a great deal to do. . . . Our goal is clear; our demands are clear."

Jinnah then reviewed the history of Muslim-Muslim conflicts from the 19th century, after which he indulged in a blistering attack upon the British, accusing the Mahatma of wanting to turn the whole of India into a Hindu ashram. He went so far as to suggest a new constitution and a new government, arguing "Nobody would welcome it more than Mr. Gandhi is even now ready willing to come to a settlement with the Muslim League on the basis of Pakistan. Let me tell you that it is a great deal as far as both Hindus and Muslims. If he has made promises what is there to prevent Mr. Gandhi from writing direct to the British?"

Jinnah's speeches both in the meetings of the Working Committee and the Joint Committee, held in camera and in the Open Session have convinced the British that if a Bill for India has been passing through a certain process, change reported a British official attending all the League sessions. He said there is more aggressive more challenging and more audacious than any person appears to be consciousness of power later acquired and certain old injuries which can now be avenged therewith."

He has finally warned the British, he has expressed his profound assent to the fact that he has urged the League now to place themselves on a war footing in preparation for what is to come, he has castigated the Capitalists and pampered the masses (on whose sympathy and goodwill he has to base his future struggle) by his references to "social justice" and "economic reorganisation", he has tried to impress upon the Provincial Premiers the fact that their own future lies only in following his lead and above all he has, in order to show his bona fides to the neutral world, extended an open and a most final invitation to the Congress to approach him for a settlement if it so desires. Inevitably the next stage will be

Jinnah's shrewd appreciation of Indian politics and the ever-shifting interaction among its major parties had never been more clearly revealed. His greatly overrated estimate of British postwar power however reflected his far less sophisticated appreciation of U.S., Russian, and Chinese potential for more rapid expansion. Anticipating that the war could last "another three years," Jinnah wisely urged his followers to "put our house in order" during that interlude. Ingenious strategist that he was, he concluded with this warning: "The fight being inevitable we must make our preparations flawless."

Nor was this shrewdest of India's politicians unaware of how carefully his words were recorded, copied, and cabled the world over, a leap towards the sleep of officialdom. Great Britain's highest echelons of power Open, before the mass audience that listened to his presidential address at Delhi, Jinnah said:

If they have got any honest and capable agents they ought to be kept informed in London. I once more draw the attention of the British Government to this fact. It is a very serious situation indeed, and I inform them from this platform that the British Government are disappointed—not to use any stronger language at the shabby treatment meted out to Muslim India as a danger to them. The Muslim League calls upon the British Government to come forward without any further delay with an unequivocal declaration guaranteeing to the Muslims the right of self-determination, and to pledge themselves that they will abide by the verdict of a plebiscite on the lines of the resolution passed at the Muslim League Session in Lahore in 1940.

I say to the Muslims . . . 100 million Muslims are with us. When I say 100 million Muslims I mean that 99 per cent of them are willing, leaving aside some who are traitors, cranks, supermen or lunatics—an evil from which no society or nation is free. The way to which I see them now is that the phoenix-like rise and regeneration of Muslim India from the very ashes of its ruination . . . is a miracle. The people who had lost everything and who were placed by providence between the two stones of a mill, not only came into the world again but they are now the British, socially the most educated and the most able and so really the most decisive factor in modern India. Now it is time to take up the constructive programme to build up this nation so that it can march on the path of our goal of Pakistan. . . . The goal is near, stand united, persevere and move forward."

Even before he ended his address, loud and prolonged cheers and cries of "Quaid-i-Azam Zindabad" "Pakistan Zindabad" "Muslim League Zindabad" reverberated from thousands of throats that would carry his message to millions of Muslims beyond range of Jinnah's frazzled voice. Soon they would find Jinnah leading their great leader in the pain-filled march to their beloved land.

15

Karachi and Bombay Revisited (1943-44)

Jinnah's challenge to Gandhi in April elicited a letter from the Mahatma who read the challenge in the *Dawn* early in May. "Dear Quaid-e-Azam, I welcome your suggestion. I suggest one meeting face to face rather than talking through correspondence. But I am in your hands. I accept that this letter will be sent to you and, if you agree to my proposal, that the Government will let you visit me."

Jinnah's hurried response was to "raise no objection if Jinnah wants to see Gandhi in a meeting with good reason. I doubt the Mahatma has more going wholly palatable to Jinnah." A reply was less willing to acquiesce, however, reminding the viceroys that he had refused to permit others, including C. R., to visit Gandhi.

Although Jinnah is a different case in some respects, refusal has hitherto been based on Gandhi's past behavior and if we once abandon principle that he is kept incommunicado because of his responsibility, for education and rest remain so our Lie d associates himself from that policy, I feel that we may be driven out of our whole position, which is of course Gandhi's object.⁸

Both were both empowered to deliver Gandhi's letter to Jinnah. The matter was to be decided by the cabinet, but Churchill had just sailed off to Washington on the *Queen Mary* with Wavell for an Anglo-American conference in London. The north Atlantic operation was against Germany, Italy, and Japan. It was during this trip that Churchill felt he got to know Wavell well enough to believe he was the sort of man to replace

⁸ "The Government of India," *The Times*, 10 May 1944, p. 1.

"I from outside at once,"¹⁸ Governor John A. Herbert warned the viceroy. "I wonder how far he is right about the Bengal situation. Lulith-
 ing noted that letters margin. The viceroy remained however less pre-
 occupied with the terrible Bengal famine, which had by then claimed over
 a million lives than with his own fantasy fears of a fast-unto-death that
 Gandhi might launch in August.

He returned to Bombay from his tour of Baluchistan on Friday, July
 24. A few days later on the afternoon of Monday, July 26, a fast-unto-death
 began. A. K. Khan from Lahore, Rafi Sadr Mazangar, entered the Quaid-
 e-Azam's apartment room, house and appealed to Jinnah's secretary. Mr
 Jinnah's secretary for an interview with the great leader. Just then Jinnah en-
 tered his secretary's office and asked who Rafi was and what he wanted.
 Jinnah said: "Jinnah has been asked in Bombay's high court

My whole mind was on my correspondence and I was trying to get
 out of the room. Just as I was about to leave the room, in the twink-
 ling of an eye the accused sprang on me and gave me a blow with
 his clenched fist on my left jaw. I naturally recoiled back a bit when
 he pulled out a knife from his waist. . . . It was an open knife. .
 Instinct of self-defence made me put out my hand and catch his
 wrist with the result that the momentum of the blow was broken
 and it happened that the knife just touched the left side of my jaw. I
 got a cut near my chin, and my coat was cut near the left-shoulder
 . . . a woman came in for . . .

He was taken to hospital where his secretary swore there would be assassin
 within after when police arrived.

The next day Jinnah himself in court, reporting that he had belonged
 to the Muslim League since 1943 but had never resigned
 because "the League was not doing anything for the Muslims or for human-
 ity except talking."¹⁹ He insisted that he had gone to appeal to Jinnah for
 work and help, not to assassinate him, but was found guilty as charged of
 conspiracy to assassinate Jinnah and sentenced to five years' imprisonment.
 On July 28, 1944, the viceroy ordered the release of the accused.
 Jinnah did not die so much in its aftermath that he opted to join him
 in Pakistan. The question of conspiracy was closely studied, but no evidence
 was found to connect Jinnah with the plot. The attack was a surprise
 attack and rather weakened by loss of blood, Jinnah survived the ordeal
 with no diminution of spirit or stamina. "Don't worry," he wired close
 friends like Ispahani. "Thank God I am all right."²⁰ His miraculous escape
 from the hands of his assassin was a miracle. "A Day of Thanksgiving to God for
 intervention. My brother is unharmed." "A Day of Thanksgiving to God for

sparrow the most precious life of the Sub-continent."²¹ Jinnah publicly ap-
 pealed to friends and disciples to "remain calm and cool."

Lord Wavell's "secret" assessment of Jinnah in mid-September 1943 was
 that "It is hardly too much to say that Jinnah is the Muslim League. He is a
 vain, shallow and dishonest man who would probably think the present
 time opportune for any rapprochement with the Hindus."²² The new sec-
 retary of Wavell was not much better. "Gandhi and Jinnah are not
 dictators. . . . Gandhi because he has built himself up as a saint, and Jin-
 nah because there is nobody as his party who approaches him in this way."²³
 Wavell viewed Pakistan as a "sore spot" but "not a danger" about "was
 not a danger" about its boundaries. Jinnah held an "unconquerable" sense of
 mission and was with Khazim T. Wazir. Jinnah's "house" where the British
 clubmaster recounted to his government as "a series of measures from Jinnah
 about the services that he had rendered to the kind."²⁴

Ispahani urged Jinnah to remain in India. He said that if he could sell a League
 owned meeting ground, feeling Nazism was too weak to enter a Hindu
 Mahatma attacks against the League in India, which was of course,
 blamed in part for the famine-raged "Panna Gandhi" and action. Jinnah
 to come within the programme of the Ministry. "Ispahani" Jinnah
 Johnnies have not the guts. . . . It is necessary that . . . you put matters
 in Bengal before could have voice. . . . Jinnah dared not risk to
 come here . . . and set the house in order."²⁵ Jinnah dared not risk to
 discuss and potential dangerous trip, however returning from South
 to India, where he issued a statement in the Bengal famine, late October
 insisting that:

the present Ministry working under the present constitution with its
 limitations cannot be satisfied with the responsibility and further
 the only way to power after the terrible loss and destruction of
 Bengal I am assured that they are doing their very best. But the fact
 remains that they would never, and I earnestly appeal to His Ex-
 cellency the Viceroy Lord Wavell to leave no stone unturned and
 give immediate help and relief to the people of Bengal and I call the
 resources that the Government of India can command. Similarly I
 appeal to Mr Churchill. . . . This muddle, whoever is responsible
 for it, is the greatest blot on the British administration in this coun-
 try, and it must be wiped off without delay.²⁶

Jinnah addressed his "Muslim League" conference in mid-
 November 1943. He said: "The Muslim League is the
 most democratic that could be framed. There is no Muslim to whom the
 word 'Muslim' is not applied. . . . They can remove the
 with the leader, surely the remedy lies in the hand. They can remove the

It is so desire by exercising their rights under the constitution of the country that if they try to settle things by force and violence nothing but bloodshed would ensue."²⁴ He was sensitive to the sort of barbed criticism that Kaulbars and other Pundits as well as Bengalis including chief ministers often directed at him. He defended Nazimuddin's minister in Bengal as "a big game" called to do so just after the signing of the new constitution. Three days later he rose to speak on the "Food Bill" in the Delhi Legislative Assembly and reprimanded Sir Henry Rich, without, the leader of the European party for saying it was "no use" in the "Emergency" against Government for the Bengal disaster.

He dismissed this recrimination when the Government in charge of the disaster are called upon to explain their conduct and that we are entitled to say what we think. We have discharged our duty and responsibility. Who is the real cause has to be found out. Surely the Government of the country is responsible for the lives of the people, and that is a fact which nobody can deny. . . . Suppose you had a few hundred people had died or we were living on the brink of starvation for some time, would it bother the Government business to stand for 24 hours? And here we are calmly and coolly told about not indulging in recrimination. It is our misfortune that we are living under a system of Government which is not valid and responsible and I would add, thoroughly corrupt. It is a disgrace and a disgrace."

It was this speech which attracted against the British government since the 1946-47 massacre of the Bengali Muslims. Not only were Bengali Muslims who were the victims of this massacre but Muslim League members in Bengal as well as Bengal were being widely blamed for the thing and the famine.

On 17-18 December 1946, he gathered in Karachi to attend the thirty-first session of the Muslim League that December. When Jinnah entered the brilliantly lighted tent, he was greeted with thunderous shouts of "Qaid-e-Azam Zindabad" and "Conqueror of Congress Zindabad." He began to speak at 10:50 p.m. on the eve of his sixty-seventh birthday and continued extemporarily for 100 minutes in English. He was forced to stop "four or five times" because of fatigue. He was described as "a touch of cold" in the League's official report of that historic address.²⁵ "When a man is old and almost blind, he has not got the energy either to run plan or to ask for anything. . . . That was the condition of Muslim League leaders. He has acquired consciousness. He is not only conversant but

he is in a position to move about. Now he has got so many suggestions and proposals to make so many disputes and so many quarrels to settle. It is a good sign, provided it is kept within limits."²⁶ Jinnah appears at this point to have forgotten he was talking about "Muslim India" as the "sick man" and to have lapsed into a personal reverie. I get some suggestions which are splendid ones and thoughtful ones and very good, too. I get complaints and petty quarrels which I do not like. But anyhow it is a healthy sign. In one word let me put it in this way: I am thankful to God that Muslim India is awake. I am thankful that Muslim India is regaining consciousness. I am thankful that Muslim India is taking interest in things around it, not only in India, but throughout the world."²⁷

Jinnah then announced his appointment of a three-man Liaquat Ali Khan, Khaliquzzaman, and Hussain Imam, parhar, but heard as the first chair of the League's nationwide committee for election. He also proposed establishing a new Committee of Action to be chaired by Liaquat Ali Khan and composed by Liaquat Ali Khan, Khaliquzzaman, and Hussain Imam. This committee was to include the Nawab of Mamdot, C. M. Syed Hap Sahar Sult and Qazi M. Saad and they were all for nearly appointed in Karachi in December 1943. After the address, the Liaquat Ali Khan was invited to the birthday of Qazi M. Saad and his sister returned to the packed plane that night for the League's second sitting, "seated by two hundred guards" in the evening. Grey military Liaquat Ali Khan and guards followed Jinnah very close after the attempt to kill him and close watch over the crowd in the evening. An estimated 2,000 of these Liaquat Ali Khan's soldiers called Jinnah "Qaid-e-Azam" and led by Nawab Salamat Ali Khan of the Central Province marched toward Karachi. Nazimuddin had arrived from Colombo during the day and joined Jinnah and the members of the Muslim League and the South West Frontier on stage behind the Qazi M. Saad. Those gathering in the front stood apart in front of a full of seats on the day. The Liaquat Ali Khan and Jinnah Khan prophesied that "The day of reckoning is coming" and when the day comes to us to get out and fight for Pakistan, we shall not falter."

The strain of his long address in Karachi left Jinnah "prostrate on his bed" and "unable to get up" for some time. Farman recalled "he has the ability to sleep at will. A good night's rest gave him enough energy to cope with the daily crop of letters, requests and important problems for which solutions had to be found. He kept up this tempo in spite of recurring fevers and other ailments. . . . He was not only conversant but his presence in distant corners of the country like one from Mamdot, by explaining 'how difficult it is for me to go on during owing to my own

pressure of work and therefore it is not possible for me to make any commitment which I may not be able to fulfil.²⁰ By minimizing public appearances, while seeing to it that all his statements received maximum press amplification, Jinnah continued to function, presenting a relatively vigorous façade to the world, while enveloping himself in a cloak of such isolation that he enhanced his charismatic image by adding auras of mystery and perpetuating a measure of work to his persona. He had mastered the team management techniques of delegating responsibility to trusted lieutenants more brilliantly than any of his Indian contemporaries.

By February 1944 Jinnah was back in Bombay. He urged the Muslim Students Federation to erect pillars of hard work, industry and perseverance upon which the edifice of Pakistan could be built. He addressed his colleagues and Muslim League leaders that he should be made the President of the League, being born in a village, more in order to establish a connection with the Muslims.²¹ He returned to New Delhi at the end of the month for the opening session of the assembly where Wavell's sudden speech as viceroy stressed the political homogeneity of India at central to its postwar constitution. Chaudhry Azam was outraged by that homogeneity and viewed it as a challenge to what he attempted to achieve. Cripps's implicit advice to the Congress League, a fresh blow to the assembly upon the government's subject to the Wavell of the League's powers to prevent the government from establishing a Central Legislative Assembly majority. Speaking to the Muslim League that month, Jinnah called the vice roy's address provocative and thoughtless on the Muslim position, adding:

Lord Wavell like his predecessor has started fishing in the Congress waters. Lord Pethick-Rowley happily fished but the water is dry. I think that he would succeed where his predecessor had failed in handling a big fish. . . . member of Congress sufficient for his purposes. This has created deep resentment throughout Muslim India.²²

Wavell sought advice from the governors as how best to proceed and Sir Cyril Radcliffe of Central Provinces wrote to warn the viceroy against "agonizing" Jinnah. "I know that many hard things are said about Jinnah," wrote Radcliffe, "But I often wonder where we should have been had not Jinnah foreseen how fatal it would be to Muslim interests to support Congress. . . . Acting in our interests Muslim League reported that Jinnah was in the fact of Jinnah's demand for a *quid pro quo* to the Hindus. . . . Government should . . .

tance of Pakistan, Jinnah arguing that a premature would be a waste of time and lead only to riots in the Punjab and Bengal."²⁴

Wavell was puzzled by Jinnah and had no appreciation of his complex character or the force of his will or the deep wellsprings of history it drew upon for sustenance. He saw only the surface cosmopolitan appearance he recalled only Leninist dogma's piped and petty criticism of Jinnah's vanity. "I gather that Jinnah regards me as an enemy of the Muslim League and is determined to be as much of a nuisance as he can," the viceroy confessed to his journal early in late March. He does not really represent solid steady Muslim opinion, in fact Jinnah himself is hardly a Muslim. . . . He can sway opinion and no one seems to have the character to oppose him."²⁵ The viceroy was certainly not ready to "concede Pakistan" to such a man.²⁶ Especially while the battle pitted Jinnah along Muslim Eastern front and Bengal remained racked with famine.

One of the things Wavell wanted to do was to talk to Gandhi but by this time Gandhi's health had seriously deteriorated. After his wife died that February, the Mahatma appeared to have lost an will to survive the last of his long detentions. The viceroy who examined him that as well as Indian urged an early release. Wavell recommended unconditional release to America. May warning that "serious difficulties would result if Gandhi died in detention" and agreeing with the new opinion, opinions that Gandhi was unlikely to be an active factor in politics again.²⁷ This assurance helped win Churchill's approval on May 5, 1944. As soon as Gandhi was transported from the Aga Khan's home in Lahore where he had lived in seclusion to the nearby house of his old friend Lady Thackeray, he perked up and received many visitors. The Mahatma's slow recovery prompted America what Lord Burrell had written in one of his letters:

My mother-in-law has been dangerously ill. She is now dangerously well. . . . America can only hope that this is not going to be true of our old friend. . . . Churchill of course, was outraged at the news of Gandhi's signs of recovery and feared his "cocked snook" had outfoxed him.

Within two weeks of his release Gandhi spoke of seeking talks with Jinnah who had, however, gone to Kashmir to rest and breathe the cool, refreshing air of Srinagar. . . . Jinnah's constitutional struggle with Khizar in Lahore. He had returned to Lahore in late April 1944, to pressure Khizar into releasing his ministerial duties but with British support the young premier had him refusing to knuckle under to the Quid-i-Azam. Shaikat Hayat Khan (Sikander's son) was, in fact, the only member of Khizar's provincial cabinet to go along with Jinnah's demand that it proclaim itself a Muslim League party. . . .

Governor Glancy to dismiss Shaukat for some "injustice which had come to pass" most conveniently, thus helping strengthen the Unionist Party. The Muslim League's Committee of Action voted to expel Khizar before the end of May. For the remainder of the war, the Punjab could no longer be counted among the League's provincial administrative assets. The final Shaukat pact was final & dead. Glancy and Wavel felt justly worried about the possible activities of the Muslim League National Guards in the Punjab, and the viceroy wrote "we shall have to take a line with Jinnah to prevent communal trouble." In June, Khizar asked the viceroy to keep "these people out" and "I would not like to keep Jinnah and other prominent Muslim leaders out of the Punjab too." Wavel liked Khizar very much but recognized he was a strong character and would add that these big Jinnah and friends would be so dominated by a down-country lawyer like Jinnah.⁴² Jinnah's refusal at Jinnah's glaringly revealed the viceroy's inability to understand his nature or true power.

The new governor Sir Maurice Hallett, who considered Gandhi a "man of straw" and "a monkey," cautioned Wavel against granting the Muslim League review.⁴³ The viceroy was in no rush to see either Gandhi or Jinnah. Sir Walter Lawrence, the secretary to his old adversary, explained his own reception, but "no progress was possible" and "no progress was possible." But a new round of Gandhi-Jinnah talks was set for early 1945. Jinnah's words were being heard. London or, visible pulses of electric power, C. R. published a political "formula" which he insisted Gandhi was prepared to "accept," if only Jinnah agreed to it. That formula proposed a "plebiscite" for the Muslim-majority provinces of India, with a date of 1946. To decide the issue of separation from Hindustan. If the majority decide in favour of forming a separate state, "Hindustan such decision shall be given effect to, without prejudice to the right of districts on the border to choose to remain in or out of the new Pakistan." Because consider Jinnah's position in the May 1945 new position.

Jinnah was in no rush to believe C. R.'s assurances of Gandhi's "acceptance" however and awaited direct word from his old adversary, who finally wrote (the original was in Gujarati) on July 17, 1944:

Dear Sir,

There was a time when I did not write to you in the same language. I day I take courage to write to you in the same language.

I had invited you to meet me while I was in jail. I have not written to you since my release. But today my heart says that I should write to you. We will meet whenever you choose. Don't regard me as the enemy of Islam or of the Muslims of this country. I am the friend and servant of not only yourself but of the whole world. Do not disappoint me.⁴⁴

Jinnah replied from Simnagar on the eve of his departure from Kashmir, informing "Mr. Gandhi" that he would be glad to receive you at my house in Bombay or by telegram, which was probably by about the middle of August.⁴⁵ The War Cabinet was brought into the picture on "Gandhi's recent moves" with a memo circulated by Amery to his usual colleagues. Churchill was beside himself with fury at Gandhi's suggestion and the invasion of yet another viceroy "negotiating" with the Hindu leader. A few days later, the Hindu Mahasabha and the guru of Gandhi's future assassin was equally upset at the Mahatma's attack upon "warring Armies by warring Hindu-sabhas—an never tolerate breaking up of union of India the fatherland and his land."⁴⁶

The Muslim League council met in Lahore on July 30, 1944. Jinnah presided and reported on the current state of political developments concerning C. R.'s "formula" and the proposed commonwealth. He was prepared to concede nothing, to accept nothing on faith as his forthcoming meetings with his old adversary. The League's council gave him unanimous support and Qaid-e-Azam concluded that brief meeting with the proviso that "Insha Allah, Pakistan is coming."

The talks started in September 1944. Gandhi and Jinnah posed with broad smiles on the veranda of Jinnah's Malabar Hill house before they went inside for three and a quarter hours of private and secret discussion. C. R. was a lawyer that Jinnah kept a record of their talk. Gandhi reported a version of the first days talk to C. R., calling the meeting, "a test of my patience" and noting, "I am amazed at my own patience. However, it was a friendly talk." He then informed C. R. of Jinnah's "contempt or scorn for me" as contempt for you" which Gandhi called "staggering." He says you have accepted his demand and so should I. I said, "I follow him" and you can call it Pakistan if you like. He talked of the Lahore Resolution. Gandhi also reported that Jinnah told him that if he conceded Pakistan he stood ready to "go to jail" or even "face death." It was Pakistan now and free independence. "We will have independence for Pakistan and Hindustan," he said. "We should come to an agreement and then go to the Government and ask them to accept it, force them to accept our solution." The Muslims want Pakistan. The League represents the Muslims and it wants separation.⁴⁷

their second meeting proved no more fruitful than the first though Gandhi, reported to C. R. that Jinnah "drew a very alluring picture of the Government of Pakistan. It would be a perfect democracy."²¹ Gandhi then reminded Jinnah of how often he had said "democracy did not suit Indian conditions," but Jinnah insisted "that was with regard to a republic form of government." The press corps waited for Jinnah and Gandhi as they came for that morning session, asking "Answer for us" Gandhi replied, "I have nothing. . . . Yesterday you read something in our faces. . . . You did not try to read anything in our faces except hope and nothing more. . . . I hastened to ask Jinnah. Am I right? Have you seen the news this morning?" Jinnah's response was "Why bother?"²² Jinnah said in this frame of mind of the talks. He understood the Mahatma's game too well, writing curtly on September 13:

Dear Mr. Gandhi: When you arrived here on the morning of September 12 to resume our talks you were good enough to inform me that you had not had time to attend to my letter of September 11. We met again today without having received your reply, and I am still waiting for it. Please, therefore, let me have your reply as soon as possible with regard to the various points mentioned in my letter. . . . Yours sincerely M. A. Jinnah.²³

On September 14, that letter it was the first time he had written the word Pakistan out of quotation marks, or in any sense of a final decision, and it may have encouraged Jinnah to feel he was making a new impact on the Mahatma's mind. At any rate, he did not wait long for rather cordial replies, appreciative, that afternoon.

Of course, I can quite understand that such a provisional interim government will represent all parties. . . . I can quite understand that when the time comes we shall have to follow out before we can deal with this formula in a satisfactory manner I repeat again that, as to a your formula, you should give me a rough idea of the content of it. . . . I am a government that is contemplating of your concept.²⁴

Gandhi's letter to "Dear Quaid-e-Azam" the following day began by saying, "For the moment I have shunted the Rajaji Formula and with your assistance am applying my mind very seriously to the famous Lahore Resolution." . . . He then went on to say that he was putting apart arguing "the Resolution itself makes no reference to the two nations theory," which was, in any event "wholly untenable. I find no parallel to

history for a body of converts and their descendants claiming to be a nation apart from the parent stock. If India was one nation before the advent of Islam, it must remain one in spite of the change of faith of a very large part of her children."²⁵ So much then for the Mahatma's readiness to recognize Pakistan had lasted just one day. Gandhi's true feelings about that obscure idea now came pouring forth and their audible impact on Jinnah's momentary hope of reaching a settlement may well be imagined.

"It is my duty to explain the Lahore resolution to you today and persuade you to accept it," Jinnah replied two days later. "I have successfully converted non-Muslim Indians into a small number and also a large body of foreigners, and I can convert an exceedingly vast lot of Hindus into Muslims over Hindu India, I will be a small assistance to you." Jinnah noted, however, that much of Gandhi's letter was "a disquisition rather than genuine seeking of solution," and recommended to Gandhi a number of books including one written by the great scale leader Dr. R. R. Ambedkar. . . . We must not and hold that Muslims and Hindus are two distinct nations by a definition or test of a nation. Jinnah said, repeating the arguments he had made in 1940 in his Lahore speech and address to the Congress. He then concluded, "By all canons of international law we are a nation. . . . As regards our final paragraph . . . it is quite clear that you represent not only the Muslims but of the rest of India. . . . The division of India as proposed in the Lahore resolution. It is for you to consider whether it is not your policy and programme in which you have persisted that has been the principle factor of the ruin of the whole of India and of misery and degradation of the people to which you refer and which I feel does no less than any"²⁶

They met again the next day, but the much-touted talks had brought them no closer. Nothing was resolved, and no formula or Jgri, the ever-existing gulf between them. "The more I think about the two-nation thesis the more alarming it appears to be," wrote the Mahatma to his "Dear Quaid-e-Azam." Gandhi feared that once the principle is admitted there would be no end to claims for carving up India into numerous divisions. . . . He could see India's future divided into what he first published. Pakistan was by then understood to be more than ten separate "nations" within the framework of "All-India" as he called India and its oceans "dependent" on Rabban Ali's latest pamphlet, "The Millat and Her Ten Nations" was issued in Karachi on 11 October. . . . "Bengal is a Nation. . . . My next book appears at 18 Montague Road in Cambridge on June 10, 1944, and rests on the basis of the Lahore Resolution. . . . The Millat and Her Ten Nations is the first of a series of books. . . . The next book is 'The Millat and Her Ten Nations'"

... but he never "Mr. Jinnah is sincere but I think he is suffering from hallucination when he imagines that an unnatural division of India could bring either happiness or prosperity to the people concerned."⁶⁶

Wavell confessed to his journal, "I must say I expected something better. . . . The two great mountains have met and not even a ridiculous move has emerged. The sure . . . must blast Gandhi's reputation as a leader. Jinnah had an easy task, he merely had to keep on telling Gandhi he was talking nonsense, which was true, and he did so rather rudely, without the excuse of any of the weaknesses of his own position, or define his own status. . . . It was to suppose that it would increase his prestige with his followers, but it cannot add to his reputation with reasonable men."⁶⁷

16

Simla
(1944-45)

As late as October 1944 Wavell found it "difficult to believe that Jinnah who, whatever his faults, is a highly intelligent and sincere man, and the two nations theory . . . Pakistan seemed so nebulous and unworkable. . . . In a proposal that the viceroy had almost accepted, though as Gandhi was taking Jinnah's advocate it is hardly . . . I take on the exact part," Wavell noted in his letters to Amery: "The notion of a Muslim State would in itself be very undesirable, but Gandhi is so determined a Hindu city. Jinnah . . . seemed . . . was arguing for something which he has not worked out." As for Amery, reflecting Churchill's feelings, he feared any "new attempt to wade into the old bog."⁶⁸

Sir Francis Mudie, Home member of the viceroy's executive council, met with Jinnah in New Delhi on November 24, 1944, with the viceroy's commission, and found him "friendly and talkative. Jinnah said the Muslims would never accept the Cripps procedure for settling the new constitution. . . . He showed no special hostility to a Representative Conference sponsored by Government and said that he was as in 1940, prepared to take part in a Coalition Government at the Centre. . . . He did not go into detail about the relative interests of Hindus and Muslims, but made it clear that it was the Muslims he and the Congress were the same. He was . . . prepared to co-operate even if the Congress refused to do so."⁶⁹ Wavell rightly suspected that "Jinnah may have got more out of Mudie than he gave away in return."

Jinnah met with Wavell in December and the viceroy found him "quite friendly. . . . He said that the Muslims were a united nation and never could be Indian unity was only a British creation and unity of India under one Native Government would have no historical

parallel. It was it possible from a practical point of view, it had been tried for the last 30 years and had completely failed. The viceroys, argued from a practical point of view, "and the unity of India" (or right about 15 British rule ought to be maintained, at least for security and economic purposes.

On 10 December 1944, Bengal's next governor, Richard C. Casey, had taken with enough leaders in Calcutta to conclude that Pakistan was more a matter of political wishful thinking than a potent reality. Casey hoped that "Mr. Jinnah will compromise before Pakistan turns into a tiger that he is riding." He believed it would be easy to "convert" many League Muslims "away from the Pakistan zone" but was sensitive to the risk of any of his being "accused of being a partisan house" wrote Wavell, seeking viceregal approval. "I believe that if the M.L.A.s can do be put to realise that the inclusion of Greater Calcutta in Pakistan is a completely irresponsible idea, the idea of Eastern Pakistan would receive a great boost." Nationalism of Eastern Pakistan was "an artificial thing closer to the picture of a whole autonomous sovereign state" such as would be desired in the Bengalis after 1947. For Nazimuddin and Suhrawardy, as well as most other League Muslims, the only fear for the Bengal situation "is that a state of Casey need not be one in which Muslims and Hindus would live in unity and share the responsibility for the business of Government, and all else is a prophetic prediction to their ruin."

Historians of the 1940s, however, suspicious represented by it is the viceregal policy of constructive thinking. Wavell replied:

I do not believe that Pakistan will work. It creates new minority problems quite as bad as those we have now, and the Pakistan State or States would be economically unsound. On the other hand, like all emotional ideas that have not been properly thought out, it thrives on opposition. Some of the ablest Muslims may regard it as a bargaining counter, but for the mass of the Muslim League it is a real possibility, and has a very strong emotional appeal. We must openly denounce Pakistan until we have something attractive to offer in its place.¹

On 10 December 1944, New Delhi from 10 and December 1944, returned to London a serene and confident man. He had been the "strongest pillar of the city of his birth welcomed him with a banquet on December 27, 1944. There he urged the (Muslim) commercial community to be not at all discouraged by them that "the economic position was one of the strongest pillars of a nation. You have got in the Pakistan areas an

enormous field and enormous scope to you only look around, if only you will see them properly and serve them."² He had gone to Sind to patch up provincial disputes between League premier Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah and Mr. C. M. Syed, disputes which had almost deposed the League's ministers. It was more a question of a personal power struggle than ideological disputes, but Jinnah's presence was required to settle arguments over ministry appointments and candidates for elections. The round of contentious meetings in Sind left an exhausted Jinnah in Bombay early in January. Quaid-e-Azam issued a statement on Sind stating that "it is for the people of Sind now to build up a new organization in harmony, co-operation and unity."³ Jinnah visited Ahmedabad in mid-January and addressed the Gujarat Muslim Education Congress, a body that was elected by thousands of young Muslims from all over the Northwest. I was round in a playgroup and some of us told them, but I thrust myself and force on a stage and what I heard from a student was that we had not now the situation was different. As president of the new Gujarat Muslim League he had come to terms to return and barely gave me to accept invitations. We have returned a stage when we are down and about our forces for the purpose of some constructive scheme for the educational, social and economic uplift of our people. A new school was born that we must noted that Education is a matter of life and death to our nation."

A month's time even in India's best weather left him very feverish, not too weak to attend the scheduled League conference in Far was to have been held in New Delhi later in the year. He was obliged to cancel his commitments throughout February and March, including scheduled meetings with Wavell and retreated behind the walls of his Madani Hall estate seeking to mend and repair his health. The viceroys were told in his final days of illness that he was preparing for some "new" By the end of March he was still dictating short letters such as this:

I regret to inform you that it is not possible for me to undertake any public engagement for some time as I am ordered strictly to have complete rest . . . This breakdown was a serious warning to me and my doctor's advice is that in no circumstances am I to depart from my bed until I am completely recovered.⁴

Candle also suffered a physical relapse in January 1945, and with both of these aging titans on their backs, the younger leaders of Congress and the Muslim League were left to carry on the struggle. The Muslim League was still a party of the future, and its future was uncertain.

nah seemed to be obsessed with Gandhi and his behavior, minutely examining and questioning all facets of his activity.

When it suits him, he represents nobody, he can talk in individual capacity, he is not even a four-anna member of the Congress; he undertakes fast to decide the political issue; he reduces himself to zero and consults his inner voice, yet when it suits him, he is the supreme dictator of the Congress! He thinks he represents whole of India. Mr. Gandhi is an enigma. . . . How can we come to a settlement with him? There was so much venom and bitterness against the Muslims and the Muslim League at that the Congress was prepared to go to any length with its objectives: first to humiliate and humiliate and discourage the Muslim League and every method was adopted to bring it to coercion and to let it realize its true position. The second was to see Muslim League ignored and by-passed and for that purpose, they stopped to the lowest point that they threw up their pink slips to the winds.⁴

Many of the ambivalent fears preoccupying Jinnah's mind then were being shared as well by thoughts of Gandhi, with whom he associated a new kind of dishonesty, and what to Jinnah were the two most heinous objects: "to humiliate and humiliate" and to "coerce and bring to its knees and humiliate him. Whether it was through a deliberate action or a direct contempt, nothing could be more satisfying to his self-image or more painful to his sensitivity on race and religion. He considered it far better to die fighting at the head of his own smaller party nation than to live in the shadow of an insulting an "enigma."

To fill the League's election war chest Jinnah spoke again in August at his home city, warning the Congress of trying "by hook or by crook" to lure Muslims into an "Indian union" and warning that they look to the British to perform the task for them and hence they resort to "harassing and varying methods of coercion and bribing abuses, creating and giving threats to the British Government. But we cannot agree to an arrangement which means freedom for India and establishment of Hind Raj and a slavery for the Muslims."⁵ His listeners donated over 300,000 rupees that day, funds which Jinnah called the League's "over budget."

The Labour Party is, of course, both by its convictions and by its public utterances, committed to do its utmost to bring about a settlement of the Indian problem. . . . I am sure that my colleagues will welcome your proposal to hold elections, which I am supporting to them in a paper which should be considered as a new and important step towards the settlement of the Indian problem. . . . I had an thought and culture; he had visited India with his son

franchise wife in 1926-27 served as a member of the Round Table conference in 1931 and was the most sympathetic master of the India Office to Indian national aspirations since Montagu or Morley.

Glancy did his best to derange the elections, fearing Pakistan yet finding that throughout the Muslim districts of the Punjab since the Simla conference Jinnah's stock had been standing very high. He has been failed as the champion of Islam. . . . I must confess that I am gravely perturbed about the situation because there is a very serious danger of the elections being fought as far as Muslims are concerned, on an entirely false issue. . . . The re-united Muslim will be told that the question he is called on to answer at the polls is: Are you a true believer or an infidel and if not, Pakistan becomes an untenable issue. . . . We shall be heading straight for bloodshed on a wide scale, non-Muslims, especially Sikhs, not believing they will not submit peacefully to a Government that is called Muhammadan Raj. . . . No Englishman so clearly foresaw the racial implications of the partition of the Punjab yet Glancy's view of the situation showed no evidence of the racial corridors of Whitehall.

On August 20, 1945, Wavell was invited to dine or consultation with the new cabinet and authorized to announce that elections could be held in August or in India during the next cold weather. Before leaving India, the vicereine sent Pethick-Lawrence his summary analysis of the Indian problem. First stating that what Glancy had written about the Indian situation was "completely applicable to Bengal," but the Bengalis were "not like the Muslims and the Sikhs who wear the yoke of the Punjab Raj. . . . we are not yet ready to fight rather than see their Home Land pass to a permanent Moslem rule." He pointed out the seeming paradox that "just as the Pakistan idea was much stronger among Muslims in the Government, it was weaker than in the Pakistan Provinces." Wavell recognized that he had always hoped to be able to "avoid" any full-scale political conflict by the feasibility and implications of Pakistan, since he anticipated that Jinnah would not insist on such a conference or commission and it would be a "political fiction." He felt, however, that continuing to ignore the possibility of its birth would not make Pakistan fade away.

On the 21st of August, 1945, Wavell and Pethick-Lawrence who were both so pleasant and amiable, went to welcome him home and motor with him to Clarendon. They conferred in Whitehall the next day for an hour and a half. Two days later Wavell met with the Home Secretary, Lord Halifax, the Attorney General, Lord Glynns, now Lord Glynns, and the Secretary of State for India, Lord Mountbatten. . . . Jinnah would enter into discussions without a guarantee of acceptance of

Pakistan, at least "in principle" Wavel's own judgment was that "Jinnah spoke for 95 per cent of the Muslim population of India in their apprehension of Hindu domination. . . . The real strength of Mr Jinnah's position was the widespread and genuine fear among Indian Muslims of Hindu domination and Hindu rule. There had been a 'very great hardening' in the positions of the Indian parties since 1942, the viceroys argued and he saw no readiness on the part of any party in India at present to accept the Congress offer. As for the Constituent Assembly, Muslims would 'boycott it' unless the Pakistan issue was conceded. Yet to concede that issue might lead to 'a boycott by the Hindus'."

Except for Atlee who had less and less time for India as prime minister, Cripps and Pethick Lawrence were the only cabinet ministers to make themselves at home with Indian affairs at the time and Cripps earned himself friends Hindu and Muslim alike in downgrading Jinnah's power or political role. Like Wavel, however, serious Wavel, on the other hand, trusting from reports of Jinnah's and Nehru's speeches that Congress was pursuing a policy of evolutionary co-operation with the government as a means reasonably toward Jinnah and the Muslim League who might prove its only ally in the coming struggle for power. So despite his greater sympathy for Hindu and its strong states interest in India, Wavel's view is complex political problems that Jinnah like Congressmen saw a storm-brother and the Congress offer of 1942 and ignored it as a mere "straw" which would "three" relieving years self. Wavel was saying that "if the Hindu and Muslim of them were not to get together, the responsibility would be theirs. Wavel and Pethick Lawrence went back to their "ruling" boards to seek a better way to deal with India than Great Britain's new post-war policy was the same old Cripps position. The viceroy met with Churchill on the eve of the "last" session of the War Cabinet and was shocked to learn that "the reason" Churchill had agreed to any political move the first South Conference] was that the India Committee had all told him it was "the only way."

At the time of the election in Karachi on route to Quetta where the dry cool air was thought to be best for his lungs. His "very" was still the same, where he took the Muslim League was the only choice for the Muslims of India, and the sole platform of the League was Pakistan. Jinnah began to act like the head of a separate nation, moreover, he wired Atlee at this time to protest any so coming of Britain's ban on Jewish refugees being added into Palestine, warning the prime minister "It is my duty to inform

deeply resented and vehemently resisted by Muslim world and Muslim India, and its consequences will be most disastrous."

With Jinnah obliged to remain in Baluchistan too weak to travel during the 1945 campaign, Liaquat Ali and other Working Committee members of the Central Parliamentary Board and Committee of Action actually ran the Muslim League from its New Delhi headquarters and ticketed candidates. Much provincial controversy, sickening, and backbiting ensued, especially in Bengal, Sind, and the North-West Frontier. In mid-September, Sir Feroz Khan Noon had resigned his defence seat on the viceroy's executive council to return home to the Punjab. In the Punjab there was a League candidate, but a month later Wavel reported to Pethick Lawrence that Sir Feroz "has not been universally welcomed, and I doubt if the Party there (in the Punjab) is as united and cordial as it might be. The Muslim League have always suffered from lack of organization as compared with the Congress and if they waste their time in personal quarrels, they may suffer at the polls."

"Pakistan is the question of life and death for us," Jinnah told a public meeting in Ahmedabad that found week in October, stopping on his way home to Bombay, to pick up a check for 200,000 rupees collected from Gujarati Muslims. "I had asked for silver bullets to fight the election campaign, and Ahmedabad had responded next to Bombay which was a richer city. . . . All Muslims believed in one God and were one nation. They wanted Pakistan and would attain it. It was their amulet, their charm which would increase their strength and glory. The moon of Pakistan is shining and we shall reach it," he assured the cheering crowd.

On November 2, Jinnah predicted a Muslim League "sweep" at the by announcing a reporter from the Associated Press that he could not agree with reports of his Pakistan van who contend the overwork was the next step will be a demand upon Britain for recognition. "Congress are determined on immediate independence for India as a whole and are determined to elect by the Congress high command Wavel directed his officials and prepared to declare "martial law." Politician Pethick Lawrence, however, reaction of Wavel's anxious reports of Congress campaign rhetoric with great alarm, yet cabled the viceroy to ask "But at Jinnah be induced to accept a modified form of it [Pakistan] which it might be possible to reach."

Cripps now advised the Cabinet committee to send a parliamentary committee to India to report on the Muslim League's position. He said that the Muslim League would be "the majority party" (it would no longer be possible to treat them,

responsively hence Labours Pethick Lawrence and Cripps resolved to let the viceroys in rejoin the rugged political road toward India's independent rule, rather than allowing him to bolt off on any smoother martial highway.

Wavel, however, was losing all patience with Indians growing political complexity, a penchant for debate. His services became more ominous. Boredom and depression settled deep inside the aging marshals' souls, as he had earlier noted in a journal entry of mid-November 1945. "Back this evening from U.P. It was the dulllest tour I have done, tiring, boring, and hot." To Whitehall Wavel wired an "unedited top secret" reply "I do not think it advisable that I should invite Gandhi to see me."

Monks of Wavel's depression, and that of his commander-in-chief General Auchinleck, as well as most of the senior British martial and civil officers in India at this time, was immediately associated with the passivity of the Congress against British rule that November, as some of the leaders of the Indian Forest Guard, the Native Army were brought to the attention of New Delhi's Red Fort. Bose and his plan to create an independent force of volunteers to fight the remnants of the Hindu, one Muslim and one Sikh, and to serve the British army in Singapore. The British, however, envisaged them as national heroes. Netaji Bhaskar Das and J. B. Kari, the Secretary to the Indian Forest officers, were brought home in triumph to be hailed as patriots throughout the subcontinent. Home by the thousands of protesters raged, leaving over ten thousand dead and thousands injured. In August, the British in the South of India, the agent in the way, must British officials realized that they had made a terrible mistake in giving the Indian National Army so much publicity and so prominent a platform.

General Sir Claude Auchinleck in a top secret letter to Wavel on November 2, 1945 wrote:

The evidence reaching us now increasingly goes to show that the general opinion in the Army (as opposed to that of certain units and individuals who have particular reasons for bitterness) is in favour of leniency. If you agree in the case of the present trials, the sentences should be commensurate with the offences committed. It is believed to be their duty."

In a letter to the Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, from the "Alek" conveyed him that the days of the raj were numbered. The world war may have been won, but India was "lost." Jinnah personally

played no part in the great trial of the Indian National Army, though the League associated itself with the defense since, as British Intelligence opined, the rise of Muslims may make their effect increasingly felt on the Muslim Public and League alike."

For the first time since 1938, Jinnah journeyed to the frontier to campaign for a week. He addressed a Muslim League conference in Peshawar on November 24, 1945. "We have no friends. . . . Neither the British, nor the Hindus are our friends. We are clear in our own minds that we have to fight against both of them. If both British and Hindus are combined against us, we shall not be afraid of them. We shall fight them a day, a year and, Insha'Allah, win in the end." When Jinnah spoke in Peshawar, the "warrior" Pandit and not their shaver came a descending shouts of "Allahu-Akbar" echoed in Great Britain. Pakistan, he asserted, they had to do was to vote for the League candidates. Then he became caustic and sarcastic. They should ask: What are the services of Mr. Jinnah and the Muslim League? It is true that I have not seen a . . . Never mind, said a Hindu person, but I ask you: Who made sacrifices in 1920-21? Mr. Gandhi sends the *khuli* (theft) of leniency, peace or skulls. The last statement came closest to revealing Jinnah's deepest grievance: that of the worst kind of a Hindu betrayal, who is actually prepared to have felt Mr. Gandhi's on his "shell" to ascend the throne of Congress national leadership.

In Calcutta, Cases was beside himself with frustration and fear in the face of the pro-Indian National Army riots. He said that, first, Gandhi's wounds, and second, he worked the fact. Bengal's government, with Gandhi in Calcutta, only in the place and reported to Wavel that this political reasoning lacked reality and balance. However, there was no room for doubt. As he could talk, Cases told Gandhi that what was standing in the way of a separate state for India was not the British but the Muslim League, which was "effectively responsible." Cases urged that Congress should make a "substantial amendment" of a substantial part of the independence Bill. First, a separate new constitution for Muslims in the province of Bengal, and second, a separate state. Gandhi responded that he would lead the people of Bengal to a separate state. Jinnah was constantly raised his price" until he reached what in essence was Pakistan, and then he said that he would accept it. Gandhi also told Cases that "he believed Jinnah to be a very ambitious man and that he had vision of linking up the Muslims of India with the Muslims in the Middle East and elsewhere and that he did not believe that he could be able to live his dreams."

The League went all thirty central assembly seats (one of them Jinnah's,

been said he had not been able to get anything which would enable him to say that the Union idea was worth considering. . . . Mr. Jinnah said that no amount of equality provided on paper was going to work. . . . Would there, for example, be equality of each community in the Services?

The Secretary of State said that Mr. Jinnah seemed to be turning to the other alternative and asked Mr. Jinnah's views on that. Mr. Jinnah said that once the principle of Pakistan was conceded the question of the territory of Pakistan could be discussed. His claim was for the provinces but he was willing to discuss the area. . . . He could not possibly accept that Calcutta should go out merely for the sake of 5 or 6 lakhs of Hindus (largely Depressed Classes who would prefer Pakistan) most of whom were imported labour. The Secretary of State said he wished to emphasise that the Delegator did not consider that either of these two alternatives would be readily acceptable to the Congress. . . . Mr. Jinnah said that he thought with respect that the Congress stood to lose nothing. The unity of India was a myth.¹⁷

Jinnah's legal acumenness proved more than Pethack Lawrence, Cripps or Alexander could outwit though all three were British statesmen, the best.

Finally "The Secretary of State suggested that Mr. Jinnah should discuss the matter over further. After the Delegation's return from Kashmir perhaps Mr. Jinnah would let them know his position." Round Four was over. Jinnah knew he could win but only on points before the well-sounded giving him an excellent finish needed rest.

18

Simla Revisited (1946)

Masterful leader that he was, Jinnah marshalled his forces, tightening his grip on the sword-arm of his embryonic nation, brought out the negotiations with the cabinet mission. A newly elected Muslim League legislators from provincial and central assemblies mustered in Delhi during early April 1946. Take and sign solemn pledges "in the name of Allah the Beneficent the Merciful" declare, the constitution that "the safety and security, and the education and guidance of the Muslim Nation inhabiting the Subcontinent of India lies only in the achievement of Pakistan. . . and, believing as I do in the rightness and the justice of my cause, I pledge myself to forego all other material sacrifice which may be demanded of me." That pledge was unanimous, attested by every elected representative of the Muslim League, landlords and chieftains. Armed with those promissory oaths on the life of every Muslim League leader in British India, Quid-i-Azam reminded his followers "We have made a solemn declaration in this regard and before the Convention. Just while we hope for the best we are prepared for the worst."¹⁸

At a secret session at Benegal's Subwardya, moving the pledge resolution that night, "We want to live in peace. We do not intend to start a civil war, but we want a land where we can live in peace. . . . I have long pondered whether the Muslims are prepared to fight. Let me honestly declare that the Muslim League is not only prepared to lay down his life, and turning to Quid-i-Azam he demanded, "I call upon you to test us."¹⁹ His call was answered. Jinnah would not be a man who would kneel before the British. He turned toward his great leader, sitting on the platform in

each party. Jinnah and Nehru—rotating office. It was also possible under this arrangement to have Nehru and Jinnah as Ministers without portfolio.

It was agreed that the viceroys should ask Nehru and Jinnah to come to dinner that evening for a discussion on the position of the Interim Government. "Everyone agreed," was essential to get these two leaders to talk before their party positions froze incompatible.

That night Cripps was personally to persuade Jinnah to meet with Nehru and Wavell the following evening. He spent several hours with Jinnah⁵² alone in his Delhi house recording an "unsigned" note of their conversation which has been incorrectly labelled "Note by Mr. Wya"⁵³ but was clearly the record of this most critical Jinnah-Cripps summit conference that failed.

Mr. Jinnah said that he was not prepared to discuss parity with anyone. He had had great opposition in his own party to accept the Mission's proposal; he did not think the opposition was likely to be put through, in what he had gone through. The only way he had been able to persuade the Muslim League Council and Working Committee to accept the Statement was by promising them that he would not join the Interim Government unless the Muslim League had parity with Congress. He was now pledged to that. He could not go back on that. He was not his own master.⁵⁴

A singular confession for Jinnah, yet one he knew would appeal to Cripps. "It was not proposed to meet Nehru or anyone else from Congress to talk about the Interim Government and Congress had accepted the Mission's proposals. Then any side talk you have to be on the basis of parity. The moment that Congress accepted, he would of course, be willing to meet Nehru and the Viceroy and put before them the names of his nominees with the suggested portfolios."⁵⁵ It was one of Jinnah's key arguments for sparing himself any saving energy to carry out important business by ways insisting upon prior acceptance of a principle he deemed necessary in negotiations before taking on the burden of a face-to-face meeting with the "other side." Especially when he considered the extreme doubtful or had no faith in his opposite number.

Jinnah now reassured Cripps of how sensible and reasonable he was, having just taken so intransigent a stand on this key issue. He expressed "shock" at his not getting a meeting with the Government that it was being reported that the League's nominees for the interim government were "not acceptable" to the Muslim League Working Committee. Jinnah said that the matter was not a very important matter. . . . He was not going to put up as his nominees people who

were popular or well known in the Muslim League if they could not do the job. He had many able men in the civil service and he would put some of those on even though no one had ever heard of them. The problem was to get the right man for the right job. He was quite prepared to take over the portfolios with Nehru and make adjustments with him so that they could get a workable team which was what was needed. "I said anything be more reasonable. Now that barrister Jinnah re-established his image of sensible moderation in management matters, he could return to his party demand, but this time he put the onus of having abandoned "parity" on Congress.

He seemed slightly interested in an idea that had been put to him of an interim cabinet of six with parity for Congress and the Muslim League. Something based on those lines was in the air at the time. The previous day Cripps's note to himself and his Mission colleagues, for Jinnah's ideas coming up with such his final solutions to what everyone else found insoluble problems Cripps had recorded this "partial note" with no indication how much he personally had taken sound and means by Jinnah's close advocates and how open his own mind remained to very small of a variation. "I have now heard" from different sources "part from Mr. Jinnah" that Jinnah did promise the Muslim League Council and Working Committee that he would not go into an Interim Government unless they believe that he would have to then work out a great deal of work with his party.⁵⁶ That coming comment sounds positively uncharacteristic of Jinnah's position and the pressures under which he was working. He had waited as long as he could from Nehru's side without conceding on much from the position to which he was going to be pushed at when Jinnah arrived in his attempt to settle with the issue's most influential Congress member Nehru, Patel, and Gandhi were leaving negotiations a dismal impression on the Muslim League as well as Pakistanis who would then be directly as party and/or partying tag hangers. Nehru brought them letters from the Government. But on a tour were from the Government were sent to Jinnah one non-Congress Hindu one Congress Hindu one Congress one Congress woman. Wavell again informed that this list would be quite unacceptable to Mr. Jinnah. "Next day Mr. Jinnah arrived and gave the viceroys some names for the Government. The League's answer," Nehru related that afternoon and "seemed depressed, worked himself up to one outburst about Jinnah's refusal to accept the Government's nominees." "Later that evening Patel, Gandhi and the other Congress leaders were in a room singing a continuous hymn of hate against Jinnah and the League. He said, 'that no Government formed by the Viceroy would be acceptable,' 'that

ness Moslems being included in provincial governments sufficed to demonstrate the "national character of Congress" but Nehru would not budge. A word of Patel or Azad, Fethack Lawrence quite cogently remarked that

The greatest obstacle to India going forward towards independence was the inability to get started. . . . Suppose that the Congress representatives persuaded the Delegation to agree to the inclusion of a Congress Muslim. If that occurred he did not believe that Mr. Jinnah would accept it, and there would be no Coalition Government. . . . If that was really in the best interests of Congress and of India to act courageously and to begin by accepting the conditions under which a coalition would be possible. A solution of the communal problem in India had to be found, and for the parties to work together on practical problems provided the best hope.⁶⁶

The vision of Fethack Lawrence's final plea made no positive impact however. Nehru replied that the leaders of Congress had been seeking a solution to the communal problem for fifty years but had always been rebuffed. By the time you get a refusal to recognize any "Moslems who speak in the name of Islam" the Congress will not discuss those Moslems who are Muslims. . . . But he added that in capital talks on this point it would be a waste of time to talk of the Congress. But on June 25, 1946 the Congress leaders decided to back Nehru's plan to reject the assumption of the Government of India Act, 1935, reserving its right. The formation of the Central authority, as contained in the proposals, as well as the system of provincial autonomy.⁶⁷

"We are now precluded from trying to form an Interim Government with the participation of the Muslim League but without that of the Congress," said Jinnah after the session of the Muslim League after receiving the Congress response, "and Congress will claim that in any fresh attempt to form a coalition government, the Moslems have been deceived." . . . We are not to be deceived by the Congress and the ability of Congress to twist words and phrases and to take advantage of the Moslems. . . . said Mr. Jinnah. . . . The reason for his difficult attitude, The success of the Congress, which he will feel has been mainly due to their continuous contacts with the Mission. . . . will increase his distrust, both of the Congress and the Mission, one of the Viceroy's. . . . Tempers are frayed, the Muslim League feel that they have been deceived and that they will not be slow to make capital. . . . Wavell would soon be left to form a caretaker government of officials, an alternative for

more congenial to his nature and experience than trying to preside over a coalition cabinet would have been.

That evening the Mission and Wavell met with Jinnah to show him the Congress resolution. That final meeting lasted almost three hours and after 9:00 p.m. Wavell informed Jinnah that he would appoint a "caretaker government" for a "short interval" and they could go ahead with the Constituent Assembly and constitution-making during that period since the cabinet mission was returning, to Eng and Jinnah was "sufficiently shocked" by what he heard, asking "Did he understand that the Delegation did not now wish to form an Interim Government?" He had understood that if one party rejected the offer of June 16th he should go ahead with the offer.

The Muslim League had accepted. Mr. Jinnah said he disliked the suggestion for a postponement of the formation of the Interim Government. He thought it was bad for the prestige of the Delegation and also for his own prestige. It would destroy both. . . . How significant that moment of "truth" must have been for him, how frustrating after all these years all these decades. Once more he told Jinnah yet still not quite ready for you. . . . Next month, perhaps, or next year. Would he say another year? It was "a deplorable interview," Wavell reported noting that by the time we got down to real business. . . . I was in a thoroughly evil mood, accused us of bad faith and of saying we had no Congress and considered that he should be given the opportunity of entering the Government.⁶⁸

Next day Alexander went round to see Jinnah to tell him how anxious he was not to part with his feelings between them. But Jinnah's feeling of friendship, empathy, and trust for the British and all this had always stood for since his first trip to London would never be put back together again—after that fatal fall.

19

Bombay to London (1946)

There was sufficient power created that power of final charge by League Council in Bombay in late July "All efforts of the Muslim League to find a position over negotiation and powers have had no response at the Congress. The Cabinet Mission have played into the hands of the Congress. It has played a game of its own. It had led to the Congress. Then it was that a quarter century later he about to play the British whose postwar problems and pressures are being thrown to "play" into Congress's hands.

"The Congress was against the Cabinet Mission and the Viceroy's proposals and threats of the Congress. It was then that 450 Muslims who were packed into a sweltering hall crowded with members of the press both foreign and domestic as well as delegates from every province.

The Cabinet Delegation and the Viceroy have gone back on the 10th of August and announced that they announced as their final proposals. . . Congress really never accepted the long-term mission by the Congress President on June 25. . . The Cabinet Mission like a drowning man ready to catch hold of a straw treated this conditional acceptance. . . as genuine. . . Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru as the elected President. . . at a Press conference in Bombay on July 10, stated the policy and attitude of the Congress towards the long-term proposals. . . that the Congress was committed to nothing. . . What is the use of dragging things and dreaming?

The Congress was not only the agent of broken Muslim "policy" and of Congress's delinquency of the League

and rejection of the mission's plan. I can tell you this without fear of contradiction that of the three parties throughout the negotiation the Muslim League behaved as an honourable organization." Jinnah assured his backers. "We worked with clean hands. The Muslim League is the only party that has emerged from these negotiations with honour and clean hands."⁹ Clean hands had always been a prime virtue to him, and they seemed then to symbolize a postscript surgeon's final preparation before entering the operating room where the hopeless sick patient lay waiting to be cut. Nothing short of radical surgery would suffice when even he great British mission went back on its words. "Cowed down and paralysed" before a Congress which had neither "decency" nor "any sense of honour and courage."

All these facts have cleared beyond a shadow of doubt. Quaid-Azam continued that the only solution of India's problem is Pakistan. So long as the Congress and Mr. Gandhi insist that they represent the whole of India. . . so long as they deny the truth and the absolute truth that the Muslim League is the only authoritative organization of the Muslims, and so long as they continue in this vicious cycle here and there, there is no compromise or freedom. . . Mr. Gandhi now speaks as a universal adviser. He says that the Congress is the trustee for the people of India. . . We have enough experience of one trustee that has been here for 150 years. We do not want the Congress to become our trustee. We have now grown up. We are the trustee of the Muslims. The Muslim League."¹⁰

Jinnah now accused Cripps of trying to wriggle out of simple definitions in his Committee talk about the mission resorting to "slogans, words and misleading the people. . . and asking in what for him was perhaps the deepest cut of all. "I am sorry to say that Sir Stafford Cripps debased his legal talents. To Patrick Lawrence, who had entered London's House of Lords that he Jinnah could not have a monopoly of Muslim Non-nation. Jinnah shouted "Non-nation trade. I am not asking for succession in the oil money. I beggling and haggling like a *canja*. His fierce rejection of the business of his fathers and his commercial company underscores how bitter he felt about the failure of the negotiations that ended the mission for the day. How Muslims, for whom commerce, trade and interests were not a mere business but a way of life, he had proudly professed himself a "merchant" and a "businessman" in the strictest sense of the word. The words that he had used in London that had made him famous were that he was a "merchant" and a "businessman." It was this that was shattered, swept away by torrents of self-interest that gushed from every Muslim. . . like a flood of blood.

With riots in Bombay, Calcutta smoldering, and Nehru running the show in New Delhi, the prospect of a visit to London must have looked quite appealing to Jinnah through sultry monsoon haze atop Malabar Hill. Or if not London, why not Paris? Rather the extreme of glory, or the other than the limbo of obscure uncertainty, cut off from power, from the glitter of the viceroy's magic circle, where he had once held center stage and from the achievement of Pakistan which hardly anyone mentioned nowadays except with a sadder or shrug.

The viceroy met alone with Jinnah on September 18 for seventy-five minutes, and earlier the same day with Nehru and Patel, both of whom disliked his overtures to Jinnah: Congress leadership, by now mistrusted, Wavell and advisors Patrick Lawrence, Cripps and Attlee, to remove him from power, considering his overtures supportive of Muslim League demands as dangerous, created a background of tension to the resolution of his mission rather than neutral grounds. The contact in the afternoon of 18th was brief, but what was to come was heard, read, to take a word from a famous Urdu poet, "people at Nehru's insistence Wavell agreed 'provisionally' to convene the constituent assembly on December 6, by which time the viceroy hoped a settlement with the League would be reached.

The mission ministers met with Attlee at 10 Downing Street on September 23 to consider the viceroy's breakdown plan. The prime minister pressed "strong objections" to Wavell's proposals, which he considered "far and Crisp" were saying that "the current one withdrawal was important everyone in India would start scrambling for position. Civil war would come upon us at once."²⁰ He favored convening the constituent assembly at once, with or without the Muslim League. Patrick Lawrence felt that "the Viceroy's proposal would make an administrative breakdown a certainty." Attlee could not understand why Wavell wanted to alienate Muslims and Bombay, "two of the best places from which to withdraw Europeans," leaving the British troops to hold "the most difficult part of India" where "an attempt to set up Pakistan . . . would cause civil war."

Wavell spent almost two hours with Jinnah on September 25, reported him "very quiet and reasonable" and "anxious for a settlement if it can be done without loss of prestige."²¹ Jinnah had "convinced me" as a "gesture of good-will" from appointing any Muslim, and he was interested in reaching the constituent assembly on December 6. The next afternoon, September 26, he met with Cripps and Attlee for an hour with the viceroy and he being him. They do not want Jinnah to be a part of the constituent assembly, but they do not want to be a

been more nakedly than ever before. The more I see of that old man," Wavell admitted, "the more I regard him as an unscrupulous old hypocrite."²²

By October 1, Wavell was convinced that "it is no use trying to squeeze the Congress any further on the nationalist Muslim issue." The viceroy then decided his "best tactics would be to 'induce' Jinnah simply to give me five names for the Muslim seats."²³ It was in the "obvious interest of the Muslim League" to come into the government as soon as possible. Wavell now believed.

So Wavell met Jinnah next day and spelled out his strategy for bringing the League into the interim government. Mr. Jinnah said nothing at all on the nationalist Muslim issue and did not attempt to argue it, the viceroy noted, "but he said that if he was to have any chance of success with a Working Committee, it must have some kind of sanction on the other points he had raised." Wavell explained that the constitution of the constituent assembly was to proceed at Cabinet meetings, and absence from that would bring for the leader of the Muslim League, Jinnah, some disavowal of the League, which was not what he wanted. Jinnah understood well how important it was to get into the government and clearly revealed here the unperceivable powers of a man as well as governor general. By the end of their meeting, he "got the impression" that Jinnah was anxious to concede Jinnah's answer, "but he has been at least partly impressed at how much the viceroy would be as the League's current influence, and the influence of Nehru, Patel and the others, inside the viceroy's Council, chairman of Delhi and Simla."

Whether it was Wavell's sudden warning him of Jinnah's secret frustrations at having missed the leadership of the interim government that rebuffed Nehru with so much seeming power and pomp, those October negotiations in New Delhi would accommodate what had ended the absence of the cabinet mission for three months, a brief, a brief, perhaps it

the tragic, sobering reality of the Great Calcutta Killing and the blood-borned reality of the constituent assembly of his own deteriorating health that made him so flexible in reaching a settlement that was ending the League into an interim coalition government with Congress in a record-breaking mere two weeks of negotiation. Nor did Nehru and Congress

count on a moderate, even so-called "signals" from old adversaries may have served only to convince Jinnah that it was, indeed, high

time to catch and a ship's master to welcome him so warmly.

The nawab of Bhopal, Jinnah's old friend and chamberlain of the Chamberlain, "the old friend and chamberlain of the Chamberlain," as Wavell put it,²⁴ inviting Jinnah and Nehru to meet in his

The new members of the government were sworn in October 26, but there would be no harmony or true spirit of unity in that short-lived central government. Jinnah permitted himself to be persuaded by Wavel to perform only as a tactical strategist, to buy time for the League to marshal its forces, gathering strength in his brief period of seeming cooperation with Congress. In the final phase the last charge, the partition of India, was a fundamental mistrust, suspicion, fear and hatred. Too much had been let too many knives buried too many backs too many humiliations had been heaped in their mothers' wombs too many women raped too many men brutalised too many were fired to irrational hatred by the sick reflections of their communal neighbors in the house or village next door.

India's newly elected legislative assembly met on October 29 with Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan seated side by side on the government's front bench. Their talking or singing words to each other all day. They sat the Congress and Muslim Indians equal, as men, silent, except for protesting, tearing, and disasting one another. Next morning Nehru said the Congress was motivated more by a protest than overwork though his own speech on the morning Jinnah spent over an hour with Wavel on October 30, and the viceroy found him "at his most Jinnahish."

"Let me tell you," Jinnah began, "that I hope he would call me a liar at the end of the Statement of May 16. Wavel's reporter did not make a correct statement. It was a coalition of the League and Congress officials. The Congress had been rejected the previous night by the League in the British House."

Wavel flew in to Calcutta on October 31. Sarat Bose was threatening to call a new strike. Governor Burrows warned the viceroy that he could not afford to let the Congress or the League move Nehru and Liaquat and Nishtar flow to Calcutta early in November to see for themselves how the Congress and League were doing. Burrows headed the arrival, pointing out that the army had been directing traffic in the streets. Liaquat and Nishtar were welcomed with a guard of honor. The Congress as well as his presence were conspicuous. Before leaving with 33 million Muslims and 25 million Hindus, desperately needed on the eve of the partition, the viceroy and the British Government's attention was even being discussed. Nehru and Liaquat could hardly agree on the future of India. They were not even able to agree on the future of themselves in New Delhi.

On November 1, Jinnah flew to Calcutta and on November 2, he flew to Bombay. He flew to his residence on November 9, by which time nine bat-

talions of troops had been ordered into the rural regions most seriously affected. "Roving Hindu mobs have sought to exterminate the Moslem population wherever they could find them," wrote the governor. "Almost all casualties have been Moslems and it is estimated that of these 75% have been women and children."

Dawn headlined a mid-November interview given by Jinnah to the foreign press on its front page, ABSOLUTE PAKISTAN THE ONLY SOLUTION," reporting:

Muslim League President Qadeer Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah declared . . . that in his view "the only solution" to India's present communal situation "is Pakistan and Hindustan," . . . anything else would be artificial and unnatural. . . . Of the Interim Government, Mr. Jinnah said . . . the Muslim League Ministers were there "as sentinels" who would watch Muslim interests in the day to day administration. . . . Asked if he favoured abandoning the Interim Government, Mr. Jinnah replied "I have said this. It was forced upon us. The present arrangement I don't approve of."

Congress avoided and Pethick Lawrence agreed, that the constituent assembly must be called on December 9, as planned. Official negotiations were resumed, and soon after, on November 21, Jinnah led off with "The viceroy seems to think that the play of Hamlet can be speeded with only Field Hamlet. He has summoned the Constituent Assembly to meet. Although the Muslim League's decision not to participate in it still stands, there are reasons to believe that he has been moved into this decision by Congress pressure. For some days past all eyes have been turned to him. . . . Whatever his gallantry on the battlefields might have been, he seems to have put that virtue in cold storage along with his Field Marshal's uniform."

Wavel met with all four Muslim League members of the cabinet that afternoon, and Liaquat put to me quite bluntly the question whether I and His Majesty's Government intended to keep order in India and protect minorities while we remained here or not. He said that the responsibility was still ours, but that we were not carrying it out. . . . I felt bound to confess to him that our ability to carry out our responsibility had been greatly weakened. Since the British Government had announced its intention of handing over power in India shortly, we could not expect the same degree of cooperation and support as before. . . . The police had been ordered to maintain order in the many parts of India were affected with communalism and were no longer able to do so. . . .

Jinnah announced to the press on November 22 that "No representative of the Muslim League will participate in the Constituent Assembly." Wavell sent for Liaquat next day and "argued" with him for over an hour, trying to persuade his finance member to get his party to attend the assembly. "I utterly failed to convince him," Wavell wrote Pethick Lawrence. "As I had previously failed . . . with Jinnah."²⁶ It was finally clear to Lord Wavell that his last great push, getting the League into government, was a Pyrrhic victory. Nothing had changed.

The secretary of state invited Wavell to return home at once with two close advisers of the Congress and two from the League to discuss the situation and seek a new settlement formula. The viceroy suggested inviting Sikhs, proposing Baldev Singh, his finance member Nehru, Congress leaders on the Working Committee, and on behalf of Congress representatives the invitation Baldev also received a day later. Jinnah, however, was pleased to accept and agreed to fly to London with Liaquat, and the two officials then were personally appealed to Nehru, pleading with him to consider to help in this way to make rapid and smooth progress towards the goal of Indian freedom.²⁷ Congress met again for a final session and Nehru and Baldev Singh decided to go to London after all. On the eve of their departure, Jinnah changed his mind after learning that Baldev and Baldev were among "What an impossible set of people they are!" Wavell noted. "I sent Ian Scott off to see Liaquat, and by midnight he returned and said we had got it for that Liaquat had agreed to come with us to Karachi tomorrow to see Jinnah and try to persuade him to join."²⁸ The next day, when they flew from Delhi to London, Jinnah was in the plane. Jinnah received a telephone call from Attlee before leaving for London, and though "rather late," he finally climbed aboard the viceroy's plane in Karachi. The crowd that had come to see Liaquat in the airport shouted "Pakistan Zindabad."

20

London—Final Farewell (1946)

London in December was cold, wet, and bleak. How redolent it must have been of his first arrival there, fifty-four years ago, so much had changed, yet so many feelings were the same. Jinnah still felt lost and alone, cut off from all those who once loved him, forced on his fight tremendous battles with hated strangers all of whom wanted to cheat him of the starring role. How different his life would have been had he remained with the company of Shakespeare's despairs with whom he had performed years ago. The company he married with in 1919 was a far less congenial troupe. And how bitter the final act had become. At last he had his black Jinnah cap, but the rest of his emaciated body was clothed in a double-breasted British wool suit. A heavy gray coat.

Wavell had prepared a "top secret" note for discussion with the cabinet during the Attlee-Pethick Lawrence and Alexander visit the start of their first meeting on December 3.

Present situation is that Congress feel that B.M.C. dare not break with them unless they do something quite outrageous. Their aim is power and to get rid of British influence as soon as possible after which they think they can deal with both Muslims and Hindus. The former by bribery, blackmail, propaganda, and if necessary force; the latter by stirring up their people against them as well.²⁹

Wavell wrote Wavell and arranged a luncheon for Jinnah that day with a number of other M.L.A.s. He expected Jinnah was still harping on the issue of betrayal.

[He] feels very bitterly that he should have been allowed to form a government when the Congress had not yet been able to do so.

vehemently sticks to the view that Congress have never accepted the long-term plan, never meant to accept it and never will accept it. . . . He says repeatedly that all they are after is to seize power. . . . He will do all he can to prevent that. He now refers to the Cabinet Mission plan as a fraud and a humbug. . . . He has now returned to the proposition that only the creation of Pakistan can deal with the situation. Any lingering thoughts that he had at Simla of a central government with three subjects appear to have gone for ever. . . . "You don't renege," he said, "how far the situation has gone in India since you were there." His theme song on this issue is what he calls the democratic barbers of Muslims in Bihar. When asked for a constructive proposition, he said that the only thing that could be done immediately was to restore law and order. . . . They must all co-operate, particularly the British, in restoring law and order. . . . Then, for Pakistan. . . . I do not ever remember seeing him before in a worse mood. . . . His last words to me as he got into his car were: "There is no time any more for argument."

The only hope now, I am sure, is to frighten him badly and to say that if he won't accept the Constituent Assembly, then his people must elect the government and he will get no support from the British.

Frank Lawton telephoned Jinnah and Liaquat after lunch and reported that Jinnah was in a bad mood.

The Cabinet met next day with Wavel and Attlee at 10. Jawahar said that he felt that the position had now come to the stage where the course of events would depend on the action taken by the British Government. It looked as if it had got beyond the point where Jinnah was in the frame of mind indicated there would be no chance of an adjustment or of Jinnah accepting one. . . . Jinnah was playing for full Pakistan which he expected to get as the outcome of a breakdown. . . . He [Cripps] thought the vital thing now was for HM Govt. to make a declaration of what they were going to do. He thought that the Opposition would agree that our position in India was now becoming untenable.

Alexander was not sure of this latter point, remarking that at a dinner for Jinnah and Liaquat, "Mr Eden had expressed the view . . . that possibly we might say that we had gone too fast and that, while we adhered to our pledges, it was necessary to give a breathing space for law and order to be restored and for constitution-making to proceed in a calm atmosphere. Otherwise we should be unable to fulfil our obligations to the people." This Conservative party line was, of course, the same as

what Jinnah had used with Fethick Lawrence. Alexander suggested "that this general line might be taken by the Opposition and might command some support in the country. Moreover, the case might be made that we were allowing India to fall into chaos and that this would be a danger to world peace."

Attlee left the cabinet meeting to see Jinnah and Liaquat immediately after which he reported to his colleagues that the burden of Mr. Jinnah's discourse had been that it was a mistake to have tried to introduce self-government into India. . . . Mr. Jinnah seemed convinced that the Congress did not mean business in regard to the Constituent Assembly; his own aim was simply that of Pakistan, within the British Commonwealth. He held out no prospect of coming to an arrangement with the Congress.

When the prime minister met with the Muslim League leaders at 10 Downing Street the next day and the meeting was across Whitehall to convene inside the secretary of state's old office for a meeting with Nehru, Fethick Lawrence opened that meeting by saying how anxious they all were to help to enable India to achieve independence smoothly. The secretary of state confessed that the cabinet was in a "rather a 'solution' seemed to be losing its hold as the thought of India passes." He added dropping something of a bombshell to Nehru and the others: "The question now was whether that broad general basis was any longer sufficiently accepted or at least worth while to proceed upon it." And Nehru said that it might be that that was the basis on which everything was proceeding. Nehru said there was tension.

Here Wavel jumped in to say "that a lot of severe, thousand-bellows indicated something more than tension." But Nehru agreed that the reason for so much dislike was that steps had been taken which encouraged violence. He had the right that the essence of the Cabinet Mission's proposals was that they were to be put through. Was it now suggested that the essence was that one party opposed the proposals and the other would? Fethick Lawrence tried to explain that it was not IMC's policy that one party should have a veto on progress, but clearly if one major party declined to cooperate it created a very difficult situation. Nehru said he would be glad to discuss the matter with the British. He said that his own view was that the British could do much to help India.

Cripps said as a last resort, "the British should not be asked to do more than what the League had 'never been prepared to co-operate,' being totally

or politically if co-operation among Hindus or Muslims was lacking. Nehru answered, however, that the Muslim League was not interested in either social or political "advance." Crapps next asked whether Nehru thought that if the Muslims could "be assured that a three-tier system would eventually" out of a constituent assembly, that might induce them to come in? Nehru said he thought the Muslims would come in anyhow "sooner or later" provided that they felt the assembly was going to be convened. But even if the Muslim League came in, Nehru predicted, it would not be to work harmoniously with Congress, but merely as a step to a conflict, the real danger in the interim government.

After Jinnah's talk, the discussion became to all of them that Nehru and Congress would not be able to work harmoniously with Jinnah and the League, not in the same cabinet and probably not in the same country. Still they tried, for another hour to convince Nehru that it might be possible. Both sides equated the League of one hand in its refusal to let the Congress put words in its mouth that it had said three months ago, than to let Nehru try to lead a coalition without acceptance of its popular principles. But Nehru could not see why the Muslim League should not come in and put any questions of interpretation to the Federal Court. The only other way was to start a battle.

Later in the evening L. K. J. Lawrence, Crapps, and Alexander met with Jinnah and Jinnah asked Crapps if he would join the constituent assembly. He refused to enter down an interpretation favorable to the Muslim League about "procedure in the Sections?" Jinnah replied that his League "could not be a party" to any such judicial appeal, concluding that it would be unwise to plunge India into constitutional problems. Crapps, Alexander, and Jinnah then left. Jinnah said that he would not let me close my session plain for they did not set Jinnah's mind at ease or budge him from his intransigent position.

At this time Crapps favored a public declaration that the British would leave India in a year or, at the most, eighteen months, insisting it would be necessary to hand things over to any government set up by the constituent assembly. L. K. J. Lawrence believed that Nehru was anxious to reach a settlement "fair to the Muslims" but suspected many "more communal elements" within Congress would not let him do so. Wavell agreed, insisting there was "no chance at all" of Congress showing "generosity" toward Muslims. He proposed to pass a resolution about the "Indian problem" to the United Nations, with Attlee suggesting that it might be a good idea to have a meeting of the Congress and the Muslim League in London and have a public statement.

within the Commonwealth and presumably hoped to get British assistance to deal with the Frontier problem."

Friday, December 6, 1946, was the last day of London's India conference, since Nehru had insisted on returning to New Delhi for the opening session of the constituent assembly on December 9. Jinnah and Liaquat, however, were in no rush to get home and opted to remain in London a few more weeks. The Cabinet met by themselves and approved a statement which began "The conversations between His Majesty's Government with Pandit Nehru, Mr. Jinnah, Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, and Sardar Baldev Singh came to an end this evening, concluding that 'Should a Constitution come to be framed by a Constituent Assembly, a large section of the Indian population has not been represented. His Majesty's Government could not of course compel a Congress which have stated they would not contemplate forming such a Constitution upon any ruling parts of the country.' That evening, Prime Minister Attlee invited his Indian guests.

The British Government had done their part. They had secured acceptance of this country from him if only a gain for many years by leading Indians. They were entitled now to ask for India's cooperation in the present series of meetings they had been unable to get acceptance by either side of the view held by the other. They proposed therefore to adjourn the session at 10.

Nehru flew home the next morning. K. J. Dwarkadas who had just arrived in London from New York after six months in the United States studying "labor problems," called on Jinnah at Claridge's.

I found him sick and depressed. . . . I told him that I was away from India for about seven months and I was, therefore, not able to understand what was happening to the country. "Country, what country?" Jinnah asked. "There is no country. There are only Hindus and Mussalmans." I found that Jinnah wanted no settlement except on basis of Pakistan. He wanted to keep the fight on because he was badly and often treated abusively by the Congress leaders. I put it to Jinnah that the Muslim League and the Congress could carry on their quarrels outside the Government . . . but was it not essential that they should work together inside the Government and do as much as they possibly could for the country? Jinnah replied "What do you mean? How can it be possible? Do you mean to say that you and I can kiss each other in this room and go out of the room and slay each other?" I felt that if the Congress leaders had not broken away from him in personal relationship, he would not have been able to do this.

ing of being personally hurt had embittered him and he had created ghosts of suspicion and distrust all round him. At the same time he had kept his shrewdness and he knew the art of not speaking too much as also of upsetting his opponents. He had found in the Muslims and converted Nehru an easy victim.

Black Lawrence's parliamentary undersecretary, Arthur Henderson, met with Kaaq that December, a so-called keel about Jinnah being a "traitor" which must have been couched in knowledge by him in the corridors of the British Raj as well as among the leadership of both Congress and the League. Henderson . . . told me that he had sat next Jinnah at the Kings Linn and was surprised to see that Jinnah did not feel "bitter" at all. "He considers that Jinnah was a sick man," Henderson added. "Don't think that our troubles would be over if Jinnah disappeared. Liaquat and Suhrawardy are worse. . . . I agreed. He said that Jinnah, however forward, would be able to keep the Muslim League together . . . as Jinnah had been able to do."¹⁴

On 10th December the constituent assembly met for the first time in New Delhi, with dignity and decorum, "acting vicereine Sir John Simon presided. . . . W. A. P. was also in attendance. Dr. Sachdev was the convening president of the assembly, elected Dr. Rajendra Prasad, who was to be the Indian republic's first president, to succeed him. The Congress generally asked the "historic occasion" as the culmination of "that popular awakening to a sense of national unity which began in 1930." The Muslim League, however, proved totally ineffective with only 10 seats in that assembly hall remaining empty while almost 300 Congress members took their places as representatives of their national nation.

Mr. Jinnah, Mr. Jinnah, and Mr. Jinnah went to New York to present the League's case to as many delegates of the UN as they could meet, returning to London on 10th December. With Jinnah and I just before the 11th of December, Mr. Jinnah.

Jinnah was a man of the Pope. . . . Mr. Jinnah, the so-called "architect" of Pakistan, who had done nothing to achieve Pakistan. I listened quietly for two or three days and then I could not stand it any more. I said that it was not the rank and file but the leaders who were responsible for it. The Quaid asked at once, "What do you mean by leaders? Today every Muslim League is a leader." I said that that is what I meant. . . .

While in London, Dr. Buchman, founder of the Moral Re-Armament Movement, invited the Quaid, Azam, and Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan to see their play and have supper with him, and wanted me to persuade the Quaid to accept the invitation. [Isfahani] and I had seen the play in New York and liked it immensely. Mr. Jinnah agreed, and after the play when we went to Dr. Buchman's house, I said that I had asked the Quaid to attend the supper because I wanted Londoners to know him. On that one of the guests said, "London knows Mr. Jinnah." How that perked him up. Mr. Jinnah was the life of the party, talked of his grand-children and gave us a number of anecdotes.¹⁵

Jinnah was there with Liaquat Ali Isfahani, and he stayed in December 1946 when the prime minister informed the Congress that the "conversations with Indian leaders which took place during last week have unfortunately ended without agreement. . . . I am sure I am speaking for all parties in this House in making appeal to all concerned in India to co-operate in framing a Constitution." "What a Church House, however, to note that His Majesty's opposition have shown over the last few months great forbearance and restraint not using a Debate upon India but I must give the Leader of the House notice that we feel a Debate is now called for. Matters are becoming so grave in aspect that it is a heavy burden on large Hall here as a nation concentrated upon them."

The India Debate ran for the next two days. On 15th December 1946, moving "That this House . . . expressed its hope that a settlement of the present difficulties between Indian Parties will be effected," at 4.39 p.m. Churchill rose to respond.

I warned the House as long ago as 1931 . . . that if we were to wash our hands of all responsibility, ferocious civil war would speedily break out between the Muslims and Hindus. But this, like other warnings, fell upon deaf and unregarding ears.

Indeed, it is certain that more people have lost their lives or have been wounded in India by violence since the interim Government under Mr. Nehru was installed in office four months ago by the Viceroy, than in the previous 90 years. This is only a foretaste of what may come. It may be only the first few heavy drops before the black clouds which gather above the fighting over wide regions and in obscure uncounted villages have, in the main, fallen upon Muslim lands.

I must add my own belief . . . that any attempt to establish the reign of a Hindu numerical majority in India will never be achieved.

ngs were attended by huge crowds in Lahore and other Punjab cities. But Kh. Jinnah proclaimed that the Muslim League was ready to "put out 15 million Muslims to break [the] law," if Khizar's ministry refused to resign.⁵ At midnight Khizar struck again, arresting all the most powerful Muslim League leaders including the nawab of Mamdot Feroz Khan Noon and Maq. Ahmad. These arrests in every district of the Punjab. On January 31 the League's Working Committee resolved against joining the Council to consider its rejection of the British plan, thus closing any residual possibility of the League opting to enter the constitutional process.

Nehru saw Wavel the next day and vowed that the constituent assembly would carry on, saying he would have to consult his colleagues as to how to deal with Wavel. Jinnah anticipated that Congress can now take the lead and demand the resignation of the League Members in the Cabinet.⁶ Before that request of February 6 came, however, Attlee wrote Wavel to ask him to resign, not being sure that his successor had been chosen. The British cabinet recognized that the danger of civil war in India could not be ruled out⁷ and feared that perhaps "it was Mr. Jinnah's intention to bring it about . . . there was no telling what the consequences of their [Muslim League] actions in the Punjab might be. It seemed that they were developing the technique of civil disobedience . . . in the long run, the extent to which the League would be able to cause disruption would depend on what their activities caused the Indian Army to disintegrate."⁸ In New Delhi, astute observers like V. P. Menon

thought that this situation was stable.⁹

On February 20, 1947 Prime Minister Attlee informed his peers in the House of Commons that:

His Majesty's Government desire to hand over their responsibility to authorities established by a constitution approved by all parties in India . . . but unfortunately there is at present no clear prospect that such a constitution . . . will emerge. . . . His Majesty's Government . . . make it clear that we do not intend to go on to take the necessary steps to effect the transference of power into responsible Indian hands by a date not later than June 1948. . . . It is therefore essential that all parties should sink their differences in order that they may be ready to shoulder the great responsibilities which will come upon them next year.¹⁰

Congress and the League both welcomed the new statement. "The British Government . . . stated that it was not prepared to take any further steps in the direction of a transfer of power to the Indians."

nations," wrote the *Hindustan Times* next day. "The Muslim League and Mr. Jinnah are now face to face with reality. The Indians wish to deny the Muslim community its rightful place in India; it is not possible to do so now that the third party is quitting. There is no alternative to a mutual settlement."¹¹ But Dawood did not agree, arguing in his lead article the same day. Mr. Attlee and his colleagues appear to have realized at last what the Muslim League has repeatedly asserted that the hope of framing an agreed constitution for a united India was an idle dream. All attempts made to that end have failed because they were based on an unreal approach.¹²

Wavel met with Nehru and Liaquat on February 21. Nehru was obviously impressed by the Statement and conscious of the responsibility thrown on the Congress, reported the session. He spoke on the possible partition of the Punjab and danger if agreement was not reached.¹³ Liaquat was not prepared to react for the League, and Wavel suggested it might be best for him to advise Jinnah "to come to Delhi." A week later Liaquat informed Wavel that Jinnah was sick and had gone to Bombay and would not be in Delhi for a while in the month of March.¹⁴

During the last week in February the Punjab erupted with intensified violence. It had a dozen major cities including Lahore in a state of anarchy with mobs of young League followers burning houses and private homes and mob-bombing to destroy Muslim League flag, process of Jinnah's Jack, and the deaths of police as well as civilians and Muslims. Muslims shook at the news and made gun demands to settle with the League by releasing all prisoners, removing the month-long ban on self-help meetings and forming to organize a separate constituent government, which Congress leaders viewed as most undesirable.¹⁵ The League had also begun direct action in the North-West Frontier province under its premier Dr. Khan Sahib's order in Peshawar while police stood by and refused to obey orders to suppress fire.¹⁶

Kh. Jinnah resigned on March 2 after consulting with Zafarullah Khan and other friends he trusted in Lahore. He concluded to Governor Jenkins

that the Muslim League must be brought up against reality without delay. . . . They [League leaders] had no idea of the strength of Hindu and Sikh feeling against them and so long as he and his Muslim League disorganize the better they would not change their fantastic and arrogant ideas. . . . The outlook for Mamdot [Jinnah League leader] was very bleak, and . . . if he failed to secure help from the British Government he would be in my duty to go into Section 35 [Governor's Raj].¹⁷

marked the end of Punjab unity, the political demise of the "Land of Five Rivers." Sikh leader Swaran Singh told the governor that his party had no intention of joining a common government with the League since they had no intention of allowing themselves to be "treated as serfs under Muslim masters, and felt that they were strong enough to defend themselves." And League meetings spread the following week and Congress and the Akali Sikhs announced plans for mass rallies for March 11 and 12, Independence and Pakistan Day, to be held throughout the Punjab. Violence spread and more deaths were reported daily.

The India debate was launched in the Commons on March 5 by Cripps. He criticized the government's policy and noted how "unfortunate" it was that

just at the moment when the Muslim League was about to reconsider the situation with a view, possibly, to coming into the Constituent Assembly at Karachi, events in the Punjab boiled up. . . . We can only hope that tolerance and good sense will bring about some settlement. . . . This is just another one of those factors which make it so difficult to predict the course of events in India today.¹⁸

On the 6th Cripps rose the next day to speak the opposition's mind. He criticized the government's adherence to the 1942 Cripps offer and accused the government of having departed from several basic respects from the 1942 proposal. He launched a bitter attack on the "Government of Mr. Nehru," which he called "a complete disaster," insisting that "It was a mistake to expect the government of India to the caste Hindu Congress or the new Viceroy, Churchill argued

India is to be subjected not merely to partition, but to fragmentation, and to haphazard fragmentation. A time limit is imposed. . . . kind of guideline—which will certainly prevent the full, fair and reasonable discussion of the great complicated issues that are involved. These 14 months will not be used for the melting of hearts and the union of Muslim and Hindu all over India. They will be used to make a case for the Muslims and they will be marked continually by disorders and disturbances as are now going on in the greatest of Lahore."¹⁹

After, in a tepid attempt at rebuttal, admitted that "There is gross injustice in the present situation," he stated that the interim government system was continued carrying all the time of our rule. We did not go in for the revolutionary business of turning out the landlords who do nothing for the people. We did not even touch the money-lenders and the money

We accepted that social and economic system. Why are we told now, at the very end of our rule, that we must clear up all these things before we go, otherwise we shall betray our trust? If that trust is there, it ought to have been fulfilled long ago."²⁰ The House of Commons divided late that night in March strictly along party lines, with a majority of 337 Labourites closing ranks behind their prime minister and 185 Conservatives voting the other way with Churchill. Muslim Britain with its abundant stuff of exports were soon to be launched on the fastest mission of major political surgery ever performed by one nation on the pregnant body-politics of another.

Communal rioting in Muslim left twenty dead and many more injured, as Jinnah took direct control of his Punjab province under Section 93 of the fast-fading Act of 1935. The Muslims of Muslim workers (freelance), so just a Muslim League ministry together but could win the support only of several Scheduled Caste and Indian Christian members of his assembly as well as three non-League Muslims (tied to his neck if they party stalwarts. This left the solid Hindu Sikh opposition almost evenly balanced against him. Meanwhile in New Delhi, interim minister Stanley Crossley Laing accepted official advice and presented a heavy budget designed to secure Indian industrial and commercial enterprises heavy enough to meet skyrocketing demands for currency, raising the salt tax and by paying retiring service pensions to unemployed soldiers. Ward noted to Patrick Lawrence, "The Budget is cleverness in that it drives a wedge between Congress and the rich merchant supporters like Birla."²¹

Ankushar was my main anxiety yesterday," Jenkins wrote. "Wavell on March 1." By the evening the city was completely out of control. The British did not seem to govern a single bit. The figures we have are only for the corpses which have passed through the hospital mortuary. Most of the dead seem to have produced arms. . . . many buildings are in flames. Masses of people . . . running away from the city added to the confusion and rioting. Police reinforcements were despatched by air and by rail and two British Battalions. . . . Bad rioting is reported from Rawalpindi with 25 dead and perhaps 100 injured. Rioting has continued in Sialkot and Jhelum. There is a wave going through here, stage-panic, funk and recrimination. . . .²² The frenzy was to continue all year. Congress Working Committee met in emergency session on March 15 and resolved that

The transfer of power in order to be smooth, should be preceded by the recognition in practice of the interim Government as a Dominion Government. . . . The Government should be asked to do this and

Cabinet with full authority and responsibility. Any other arrangement is incompatible with good government and is peculiarly dangerous.

In this hour when final decisions have to be taken . . . the Working Committee earnestly call upon all parties and groups . . . to discard violent and coercive methods, and co-operate peacefully. . . The end of an era is at hand and a new age will soon begin. Let this dawn of the new age be ushered in bravely, leaving hates and discords in the dead past.¹⁵

When forwarding these Congress resolutions to the viceroy the next day Nehru expressed our intention to urge the Muslim League to join Congress in the assembly and to work together amicably toward reaching a final settlement. He ended with an almost audible sigh of resignation.

If unfortunately this is not possible, we . . . have also suggested the division of the Punjab into two parts. This people would of course apply to Bengal also . . . not pleasant for us to contemplate, but such a course is preferable to an attempt by either party to impose its will upon the other, for it events of the Punjab have demonstrated . . . that it is not possible to coerce the non-Muslim minority in the Province, just as it is not possible or desirable to coerce the others. . . In the event of the Muslim League not accepting the Cabinet Delegation's scheme, we are not coming into the Constituent Assembly. If a division of Bengal and Punjab becomes inevitable.¹⁶

Congress was now ready to concede Pakistan including only Muslim-majority districts, but Pakistan nonetheless. It was early March of 1947. The Punjab had won. We have got to stand on our own legs. Quaid-Azam told Muslim journalists in Bombay on March 12, saying that "our ideology, our goal, our basic and fundamental principles . . . are not only different from the Hindu organisations but are in conflict. . . There is no common ground for co-operation. . . There was a time when the idea of Pakistan was laughed at, but let me tell you this there is no other solution which will do credit and bring honour to our people. . . Insha Allah God willing we shall have Pakistan."¹⁷

Communal tension, Jenkins reported, was "at its height" in almost all districts of the Punjab with the major cities Lahore, Amritsar, Multan and Rawalpindi as "danger points." But the trouble was particularly serious in Lahore, because of the presence of a large number of Muslims and a large number of fanatics. Hatred cut loose and growing at an alarming rate there seemed

In Amritsar Master Tara Singh was reported to have told his Sikhs that

lowers that the "Civil War" had "already begun."¹⁸ Sikh defence minister Baldev Singh wrote Wavell, "I make no secret of my conviction that Muslim League onslaught on the Constituent Ministry had been engineered in the way it was because the League had despaired of bringing about a defeat by constitutional methods."¹⁹ There were 15 or 20 firm casualties in the Punjab; the rank and file estimated that about 1,000 persons had been killed in the last month of rioting and many more Muslims of that figure wounded. The rains would be late that year, but the Punjab's fields were to be watered with blood.

Eleven-thirteen over almost daily with the cabinet in London, seeking answers to thorny problems from those who had grown out of solving them. His search was to discover the proper line of Indian politics for the future. He thought as he reviewed the calendar in early March "that the Indian leaders themselves would sooner or later realise that the retention of the Indian Army under central control was vital both to the external defence of India and to the maintenance of internal law and order."²⁰ He decided to warn the interim Government that he would not allow them to force British payments to keep law and order solely to protect British lives. That evening they met at 10 Downing Street. The viceroy resigned his office giving orders, and there were still many "amendments" to be considered.

Nehru's old friend, rising ambassador V. K. Krishna Menon, also met the Ministry after that March 3 morning for a further statement on the interim Government suggested solutions. On the question of Muslim demands Krishna Menon proposed two "Pakistan" one in the Northwest partitioning the Punjab as well as Sindh, the other in the North

including the districts of Eastern Bengal which are predominantly Muslim, and certain areas of Assam, thus partitioning Bengal. . . I believe that partition is the price that will have to be paid for any stability in Bengal. Any solution which hands over Calcutta to Pakistan will be unstable and impractical. . . On the other hand, the League has to be given a port on the East, and the solution is that it is not of our nature to see settlement and a should build a large port. . . I port on the East, and it is provide the money for it however many millions it may cost.²¹

Tens of thousands of refugees began pouring into Rawalpindi from

Tens of thousands of refugees began pouring into Rawalpindi from

The new viceroy next met with Liaquat Ali Khan, whose attempt to solve India's economic problem had met with such strong Congress opposition that he had finally agreed to cut his proposed excess profits tax from 25 to 16 percent. But Mountbatten did not find Liaquat as intellectually stimulating or personally appealing as Nehru, and no hour of real intimacy ever developed between them.

Mountbatten spent over ten hours talking as private with Gandhi at five separate meetings from March 31 through April 4, during which the Mahatma proposed that

Mr Jinnah . . . be given the option of forming a Cabinet . . . If Mr Jinnah accepted this offer the Congress would guarantee to co-operate fully and sincerely so long as all the measures that Mr Jinnah's Cabinet bring forward are in the interests of the Indian people as a whole . . . asks referee of what is or is not in the interests of India as a whole will be Lord Mountbatten. . . . Mr Jinnah must stipulate, on behalf of the League . . . that, so far as he or they are concerned, they will do their utmost to preserve peace throughout India. . . . There shall be no National Guards or any other form of private army. . . . Within the framework hereof Mr Jinnah will be forthwith free to present for consideration a scheme of Pakistan, even before the transfer of power provided however that his successfulness as a speaker rests on a claim to the effect of some which he believes or claims for this purpose. Thus there will be no compulsion in this matter over a Province or part thereof. . . . If Mr Jinnah rejects this offer, the same offer to be made immediately to Congress.¹²

When Gandhi initially proposed this ingenious formula, Mountbatten admitted it staggered him. I asked what would Mr Jinnah say to such a proposal? The reply was: If you believe I am the author, he will reply "Why Gandhi?" Mountbatten then remarked: And I presume Mr Jinnah will be right? To which he replied with great fervour: No, I am entirely sincere in my suggestion.¹³ Gandhi's offer would never be conveyed to Jinnah. Mountbatten opted first to discuss the matter with Nehru, whose reaction was totally negative. Nehru was shocked to learn that his Mahatma was quite ready to replace him as premier with the Qaid-i-Azam. After telling Mountbatten how unrealistic this was, he was Jawaharlal said he was anxious for Mr Gandhi to see a few more things in Delhi, as he had been away for a long time, and was probably out of touch with the situation in India. Nehru did not want to risk to bring the unpredictable old man back into "touch" with their conclusions

on how best to handle Jinnah and the Muslim League. Perhaps even if Jinnah were offered the centre of the government on a platter with the whole cake of order his personal control, he might have dismissed it with a negative wave of his long-fingered hand. Yet it was an exquisite temptation to place before him. It was a tempting solution to India's political troubles, the greatest political problem. The Mahatma alone was capable of such a subtle negation, such instant reversal of political position. Gandhi understood Jinnah well enough, moreover, to know just how potent an appeal it was that sort of singularly generous offer would make. It might not have worked, since this was a King Solomon solution. But Nehru had not had the cup of power too long to offer its seductive and one-eyed last of a drink that seduced Jawahar. The "great ones" of Muslim India had not seen many good Congress leaders thought of Jinnah. Nehru notified Mountbatten, but the scheme was quite impractical, even less realistic now than a year ago, when Gandhi had suggested the same idea to the cabinet mission.

Mountbatten met Jinnah for the first time on April 5 (finding him "most charming and confident"). The only problem that came before discussion started when the airman's stop paid a bad walk and had to take Mountbatten into a garden, and Mountbatten, recalling, "I had obviously misplaced his map on the desk expecting Edwina to pose between them, so that when we started on being the stand-in he pulled his hand away quite fast enough to shift gears so he said what he'd remarked. A line between two thorns!"¹⁴ Was Jinnah's mind perhaps working but faster than Mountbatten suspected? The Mountbatten said he had no fat man to dinner the next evening and the Jinnahs obviously spent a staying till well after midnight, by which time "the ice was really broken."

Mr Jinnah claimed that there was only one solution—a "surgical operation" on India, otherwise India would perish altogether. I replied that reiterating that I had not yet made up my mind, and pointed out that the Mahatma's last precedent was "surgical operation." He gave me an account of his previous negotiations with Mr. Gandhi. . . . He emphasized, and tried to prove from this account that on the Muslim side there was only one man to deal with, namely himself. But the same was not true of the representatives of Congress—there was no one man to deal with. . . . Mr. Gandhi had a great deal to say, but I represented nobody. . . . I had enormous authority with no responsibility.

gress: neither could give a categorical answer on behalf of the party as a whole. He also spoke of the emotionalism of the Congress leaders. He accused Congress leaders of constantly shifting their front. They would stoop to anything. . . . At the end of our interview, after he had told me a succession of long stories about how appallingly the Muslims had been treated, I informed him that what fascinated me was the way that all the Indian leaders spoke with such conviction.⁴²

The conviviality of that intimate dinner party, which obviously loosened Jinnah's tongue and "worried" Mountbatten "a great deal" seems to have so diminished his confidence in Jinnah that he decided provisionally against transferring Gandhi's offer that whatever his last hope of preserving Indian unity Jinnah's own negative assessment of Gandhi's powers to "deliver" Congress Congressmen, a doubt to that most tragic decision yet dramatically shown when Mountbatten's personal judgment of Jinnah's state of mind and body, both of which he considered dangerous and independently "defiant" for that first marathon meeting. It was not simply that he and not Jinnah as much as he had Nehru. It went deeper. He realised that Jinnah's subject and appears to have found him "long from a symptom in observation."

They met again on April 7 with Lord Ismael joining the discussion that afternoon. Mountbatten tried by every means to get Jinnah to say "would accept the Cabinet Mission plan and enter the Constituent Assembly," which remained adamant, however.

Next evening they met for two more hours, and Mountbatten explained his resolve to recommend to the British government how best to transfer British power after hearing the views of all major parties. Jinnah's comment was: he did not wait for the parties to reach agreement, as the terminal date had been set.

I then asked him what, if he were in my place, his solution would be; and he repeated once more the demand for Pakistan. . . . I invited Mr Jinnah to put forward his arguments for partition. He recited the classic ones. I then pointed out that his remarks applied also to the partition of the Punjab and Bengal, and that by sheer logic if I accepted his arguments in the case of India as a whole, I had also to apply them in the case of these two Provinces. . . . he expressed himself most upset at my trying to give him a "moth eaten Pakistan. He said that he would not accept a partition of Punjab and Bengal was a bluff on the part of Congress to try and frighten him off Pakistan. He was not to be frightened off so easily, and he would be sorry if I were taken in by the Congress bluff.⁴³

On April 9, Mountbatten and Jinnah talked again for over an hour. Jinnah insisted that the "Begin and end all" of Pakistan was to have its own army.

I told him that I regarded it as a very great tragedy that he should be trying to force me to give up the idea of a united India. I painted a picture of the greatness that India could achieve. I finally said that I found that the present Interim Constitution Government was every day working better and in a more co-operative spirit, and that it was a day-dream of mine to be able to put the Central Government under the Prime Ministership of Mr Jinnah himself. . . . Some 35 minutes later, Mr Jinnah, who had not referred previously to my personal remark about him, suddenly made a reference out of the blue to the fact that I had wanted him to be the Prime Minister. There is no doubt that this did greatly irritate his vanity, and that he had kept turning over the proposition in his mind.

Mr Gandhi's famous scheme may yet go through or the pure vanity of Mr Jinnah! Nevertheless he gives me the impression of a man who has not thought out one single piece of the mechanics of his own great scheme, and he will have the shock of his life when he realises that he has come down to earth and try and make his vague idealistic proposals work on a concrete basis.⁴⁴

And after three more hours alone with Jinnah on April 10 Mountbatten reported to his staff that he considered "Mr Jinnah was a pathological liar." "The Secretary had

brought all possible arguments to bear on Mr Jinnah but it seemed that appeals to his reason did not prevail. . . . Mr Jinnah had not been able in his presence to adduce one single feasible argument in favour of Pakistan. In fact he had offered no counter arguments. He gave the impression that he was not listening. He was 'impossible to argue with. . . . He was, whatever was said, intent on his Pakistan—which could surely only result in losing the Muslim vote for the campaign. . . . until he had met Mr Jinnah he [Mountbatten] had not thought it possible to quarrel with such a complete lack of sense of responsibility which could be power which he did not."

Lord Ismael also noted that "the dominating feature in Mr Jinnah's mind was the demand for a separate Muslim state in the Punjab and Bengal. . . . It was impossible for the Muslim to live."⁴⁵

All the while communal rioting had continued to rack the Punjab. By mid-April, official estimates of some 3,500 dead in 1947 were more than a month

them counted approximately six Hindus and Sikhs for every Muslim. He said "One of my troubles has been the extreme complacency of the League leaders in the Punjab who say in effect that 'boys will be boys,'" remarked Jenkins, who estimated by then that "Every British official in the I.L.S. in the Punjab including myself would be very glad to leave tomorrow morning and we are dealing with people who are out to destroy themselves." The North-West Frontier was also ablaze with at least ten of Dera Ismail Khan razed by "thieves" that blood-drenched Sukkur Highway was placed under dusk-to-dawn curfew, as was Benares. Calcutta too simmered at the heat of communal violence which daily grew more intense, fired by rumors of imminent partition.

Chakrabarti bravely hoped to save Bengal the agony of a second partition, as has the century by proposing a coalition government of Congress and Forward Bloc opponents, advocating independent national status for the Bengalis. With designs on saving the virtual world monopoly of job and buying privileges highly developed, Chakrabarti met S. to a friendly social hour as well as American capital to develop his notions of economic potential. "We Bengalis have a common mother tongue and common economic interests," S. bravely agreed. "Bengal has been identified with the Punjab Bengal will be an independent state and a candidate for membership of the world. I don't think we will ask for Pakistan." S. would have welcomed the emergence of an independent United Bengal with open arms. But Noor and Pabla considered it a anathema to Congress and Indian interests and feared that a nominal "Bangladesh" led by a Muslim Premier would be a closer ally to Pakistan than India.

Mountbatten and Liaquat Ali Khan much easier to deal with than Jinnah in that he was more reasonable in his demands and a relative reasonableness. He met with Liaquat for two hours on the evening of April 1, talking him into confidence, as to

how my mind was beginning to work towards a solution. . . I started off with Pakistan and complete partition of the Punjab and Bengal and Assam. I told him that I had no doubt that the Indian leaders and their peoples were in such an hysterical condition that they would gladly agree to my arrangement. He nodded his head, and said "I am afraid everybody will agree to such a plan, we are all in such a state." I told him that the worst service I could do to India, if I were her enemy or completely indifferent to her fate, would be to take advantage of this extraordinary

That talk with Liaquat sealed India's tragic fate. Mountbatten was completely sincere in what he said after Liaquat mountbatten admitted that even Jinnah would accept the triple partition plan, for Mountbatten was wise enough to anticipate the horrors of slashing a supercontinent so tormented by religious divisions into competing national fragments. He understood, indeed too well, the pitfalls and dangers of dividing the area of withdrawing the foreign troops and impartial observers and of leaving the unlettered, pre-judiced fearful superstitious masses to battle it out to fall onto one another venting their fears and spleen on neighboring village and urban ward. He sensed, in fact, that "the worst service I could do to India, if I were her enemy or completely indifferent to her fate" was precisely what he would do—ask a few months after voting those dire words. He did not want to do this. Quite the contrary, of course. He had gone on to save India to heal its wounds to offer peace not the sword of partition. He and Lady Mountbatten loved India and the Indians. They were ready to risk their lives and those of their family in the service of these impassioned, emotional, most unconverted people. But there was no other solution.

Chakrabarti's road plan, the only exception would have been to let the very land and all the people Mountbatten loved must go to India or to Noor, over to Jinnah who he considered "psychopathic." Menon alone understood the situation, but Liaquat decided that the sheer logic of a promise partition of the Punjab and Bengal was so. "The best servant" Jinnah ever sent out to India would soon find himself obliged to partition the worst service I could do to India. And that night after Liaquat left, Mountbatten sought some consolation in hope writing, "I have an impression that Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan intends to help me find a more reasonable solution than this mad Pakistan."

A British journalist who saw Jinnah at this time reported to the vice-private secretary as "most disturbed state of mind" which made General Aitchison advise Mountbatten, "It was possible that Mr. Jinnah was, I think, probably that he was bewildered by the impact of events." The private secretary Ian Scott also got the impression that Mr. Jinnah was becoming seriously troubled by the prospect opening out before him. He felt that this process should be allowed to take its course here and there a psychological moment which to his advantage of it.

At the time of the 1947-48 "Jinnah's" never strategies worked.

Krishna Menon continued to keep in touch with Mountbatten, who was also a friend of Jinnah's. Menon was working Mountbatten against America's "object in India . . . to capture all the markets, to step in and take the place of the British, and finally to get bases in India . . . to use as a base for the attack on the Soviet Union."

chance that 'Sikistan might join up with Pakistan and that the Muslim League would offer them very generous terms.' Jinnah had several secret meetings with Sikh leaders including the maharaja of Patiala and Baldev Singh, and tried to induce them to join Pakistan. Nehru and Patel were in position to offer more, however, keeping Baldev and his troops was as Master Tara Singh, loyal to India, and Baldev was to retain control over Indian affairs in the province. Nehru's cabinet Jinnah this tried his utmost and actually believed till the bitter end that he might be able to avert the bloody disaster of a civil war in Bengal and the Punjab while averting Pakistan's North-western provinces from the Indian Union, thus leaving a unified Eastern Bangladesh on its own.

"Then one I look at the problem in India the more I realise that all this partition business is just a madness and is going to reduce the economic efficiency of the whole country enormously." Mountbatten wrote him on May 1. "No-one would ever induce me to agree to it were it not for this fantastic communal madness that has seized everybody and leaves no other course open . . . one small horrifying example my wife had Miss Jinnah to tea again. She told us Jinnah that she had spent last evening at the Lady Irwin College and was delighted to find how happy that institution was working and on what excellent terms the Hindu and Muslim girls were. . . . To this Miss Jinnah replied 'Don't be misled by the apparent contentment of the Muslim girls there - we haven't been able to get our propaganda in that college yet'. . . . The Hindus are nearly as bad. . . . The most we can do . . . is to put responsibility for any of these bad decisions fairly and squarely on the Indian shoulders in the eyes of the world for one day they will bitterly regret the decision they are about to make."⁸⁰

The Mountbatten's flew up to Simla for a week's holiday, taking Nehru and his daughter Indira, as house guests. "Having made real friends with Nehru during his stay here," Mountbatten wired his chief of staff, Lord Islay, "I asked him whether he would look at the Lord of Draft of the plan for voting on partition, as an act of friendship and on the understanding that he would not utilise his prior knowledge or opinion to his disadvantage that he had seen it. He readily gave this undertaking and took a draft to bed."⁸¹ Next morning Nehru wrote Mountbatten that the plan he had previewed "frightened me . . . much that we had done so far as undermined and the Cabinet Muslim scheme and subsequent decisions were set aside and an entirely new picture presented—a picture of a federal union in which the provinces would be free to join or not to join as they saw fit. I can well imagine what my colleagues and others will think and feel

It will be a disaster."⁸² Mountbatten reported Nehru's "bombshell" to Islay suggesting that in view of the reaction some "rebutting" of the "plan" would be required. At this point Atlee asked Mountbatten to fly home unless he preferred having Cripps, Alexander, or the new secretary of state, Lord Eastwood fly out to New Delhi to consult with him on the spot. Mountbatten chose to go to London.

Before flying from New Delhi in mid-May Mountbatten showed his revised proposed plan to Lord Atlee. He then asked him whether the Muslim League was going to accept partition of the Punjab and Bengal, to which he replied: "We shall never agree to it but you may make us say so if it is inevitable." I told him it was essential that if it did become inevitable, all parties should give their public agreement to avoid bloodshed, and that I proposed to raise this with Mr. Jinnah."⁸³

Jinnah's reaction to the Mountbatten plan was even more negative than Nehru's. "The Muslim League cannot agree to the partition of Bengal and the Punjab," Jinnah wrote. "It cannot be justified historically, economically, ethnically, politically or morally. These provinces have built up their respective lives for nearly a century . . . and the only ground which is put forward for the partition is that the areas where the Hindus and Sikhs are in majority should be separated from the rest of the provinces . . . he said it will be disastrous for the Hindus in the two provinces and the communities concerned . . . if you take this decision—which in my opinion is a fatal one—Calcutta should not be torn away from the Eastern Bengal . . . if worst comes to worst, Calcutta should be made a free city."⁸⁴

At 10 Downing Street on the evening of May 19, 1947 Mountbatten cleared Prime Minister Atlee and his Cabinet colleagues so that "It was made clear that the Muslim League would resort to arms if Pakistan's demands were not conceded."⁸⁵ Jinnah was interviewed by Reuters the next day and demanded an 800-mile long "corridor" of land West and East between promising a "small, beneficial" relationship between Pakistan and India and offering Hindustan a "friendly and reciprocal" alliance.⁸⁶ Congress reactions to the "corridor" demand proved so strongly negative that it never became a serious issue, receiving even less attention than the fact that Calcutta should emerge as the port. Then Jinnah wired the Mountbatten's that before Bengal and the Punjab were partitioned, a referendum should be held in each province to determine the will of its people. This time Mountbatten never spoke against the proposal. The imperial steamroller moved ahead in high gear.

Arishan Memon flew to London to inform Mountbatten on May 21 that

Nehru and Patel were "ready to accept" Dominion status if it were offered to India in 1947. "As I am anxious that there should be no misunderstanding I am writing to you even though I have seen you this morning," Nehru's confident wrote Mountbatten from India House that same day. "If Mr. Jinnah wants a total separation and that straight away, and if we agree to it for the sake of peace and dismember our country, we want to be rid of him so far as the affairs of what is left to us of our country are concerned. I feel sure you will appreciate this, and also that it is not a matter of detail but is fundamental."¹⁰¹ Congress has begun to fear that in another six months they would lose the Eastern Punjab and Sikh support, as well as Cochin and Western Bengal, possibly some of the princely states and, especially, Hyderabad and Bhopal, for the anger Jinnah argued the stronger and greater his demands became. Nehru was sick and tired of arguing reality, as he put it privately to Churchill in Pakistan, in the theory that if "cutting off the head we will get rid of the headache."¹⁰²

After a few hours' respite, Congress and the Conservative opposition in Parliament who could easily have led to the Indian independence of India in a prolonged and acrimonious Commons debate that would have made transfer of power in 1947 impossible. Mountbatten went round vs. "Mr. Churchill" and "asked him to experience the atmosphere and the conditions, fatal" Chamberlain had said. The British powers of Congress would not allow who asked so perceptively that he was back here. I then asked him if he would advise me how I should proceed if Jinnah's intentions were to "Mountbatten reported. He thought about it for a long time and finally said: 'To begin with, you must take away all British officers, Government officials, without British officers. Make it clear to them how impossible it would be to run Pakistan without British help.' Mountbatten agreed to try and follow some such plan. He more important I actually managed to get Churchill to give Lord 'personal' message for Jinnah, stating "This is a matter of life and death for Pakistan. If we do not accept this offer within 14 days," Churchill's words were given weight with Jinnah, than those of any other living person, as Mountbatten well knew. The final obstacle was now removed from the path to partition. With Churchill on board, it was far ahead for the Mountbatten, which was to bring two "moderate" and less extreme and more after new dominions into the British Commonwealth.

On Monday morning, June 2, 1947, India's leaders drove into the New Court of the viceroy's house in New Delhi. Liaquat and Nishtar, arriving from the East and West, and Krishna Rao, the Indian Minister in London, were briefed on the plan brought back from London, listed only two hours

"The atmosphere was tense," reported Mountbatten, "and I got the feeling that the less the leaders talked the less the chance of friction and perhaps the ultimate breakdown of the meeting. . . I reported on the most helpful attitude of His Majesty's Government and the Opposition. . . I asked the leaders to let me have their replies before midnight. . . Jinnah said he would come in person at 11 p.m. after they had seen their Working Committee. I kept back Jinnah after the meeting. . . to impress on him that there could not be any question of a 'No' from the League."¹⁰³ That must have been when Mountbatten delivered Churchill's message. The viceroy, by now thoroughly disenchanted with Congress, possibly took to an undelivered "message" from Churchill, wrote: "He may be a saint but he seems also to be a disciple of Tolstoy." The Mahatma arrived at Mountbatten's study door half an hour after the others had gone off to read their copies of the plan. It was Churchill's desire of success, so I took his comments on bits of paper. Jinnah had also done some doodling, but nothing as good as a scrap behind that seemed to show rocks, trees, packets, and had some questions and had "Governor" written with a question across the corner page. The Guards' Army apparently enjoying the sight of its future title.¹⁰⁴

At 11 o'clock that night Jinnah came round the open half an hour, conveying the protest of his Working Committee against the partition of the Provinces. . . I then asked him straight out whether his Working Committee were going to accept the plan. He replied that they were "hopeful." I then asked him whether he intended to accept it himself, to which he replied that he would sign a personal and undertook to use his very best endeavours to get the All-India Muslim League Council to accept. . . He had called an urgent meeting next Monday. . . I finally asked him whether he felt I would be justified in advising the Prime Minister to go ahead and make the announcement, to which he replied very firmly "Yes."¹⁰⁵

Mountbatten met to confer with his staff the next morning and reported to the Chiefs of Staff that Jinnah had accepted the plan, writing out the amount of resources would make him agree prior to his Council's meeting.

Mountbatten has reminded Jinnah that the Congress Party were terribly suspicious of this particular tactic, which he always used, when he was told that the Congress Party had made a firm decision not to accept the plan and had left himself the right to make a later decision suited the Muslim League. . . Nothing Mountbatten could say would move him. . . "If that is your attitude, then the leaders of the Congress Party and Sikhs will refuse final acceptance at the meeting in the morning, chaos will follow, and you will lose your Pakistan, probably for good." "What could he, mount him," was his

and hotel guests in the orange "ran helter-skelter" while those in the "dining hall" sat down for their dinner with tearful eyes as the tear gas spread in it. Had Mr. Jinnah, however, continued the proceedings of the meeting untrammelled by the disturbances on the ground floor. A few demonstrators, who found their way into the meeting hall, were soon ejected. On the 1st floor of the Hotel, Muslim League National Guards and Khaksar demonstrators clashed . . . broke furniture and smashed glass panes . . . & a few persons sustained injuries." Morning news reported.

Inside the grand ballroom, Jinnah was hailed as "*Shahenshah-e-Pakistan*" literally, "Emperor of Pakistan") in the Persian style of Iran's monarch, but he was quick to disclaim that title, urging his supporters not to exult and insisting, "I am a soldier of Pakistan, not its Emperor." Then, the learned orator, Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah, later sent a transcript of short-hand notes on the proceedings, presumably taken by a Congress spy¹⁰ to Mountbatten soon after the meeting ended. The League's council gave full authority to President Quaid-e-Azam M. A. Jinnah, to accept the fundamental principles of the Plan as a compromise and to leave it to him, with full authority to work out, "the details of the Plan in an equitable and just manner. . . ." [Its locs added].¹¹

That League resolution caused a howl of indignation from the Congress press and even a letter of protest from Nehru and Patel "who were Mountbatten's express fears that they would not be able to manage the All India Congress Committee in view of the failure of the League to make a definite announcement that they accepted the plan as a *settlement*." [It is a fact]¹² Many zealots were, however, even more outraged at how far from the original Pakistan ideal Jinnah had gone toward accepting the plan and Rahmat Ali's Pakistan National Movement in Canada, by now denounced it as "The Greatest Betrayal" to the "whole Millat (Muslim Community)" writing:

It has now been completely betrayed, bartered and dismembered by Mr. Jinnah, whose act of accepting the British Plan shatters the foundations of all its nations and countries and sabotages the future of all its 100 million members living in the Continent of Dinia . . . unless notified it will forever cripple the life of the Pakistan, blight the existence of the Millat in Dinia, and compromise the freedom of the Fraternity throughout the world. . . . We will carry on the fight to the end. . . . We will never quit or capitulate. . . . It shall never be said of us that, when the time came to choose between the great offer of the All India Muslim League and the British we too followed the quislings and chose betrayal. *Long Live The Millat!*¹³

The first meeting of the interim government's cabinet following the announced plan almost led to a fight between Nehru and Liaquat over Jawaharlal's appointment of his sister Madam Pandit to be an ambassador, at which point Mountbatten shouted, "Gentlemen, what hopes have we of getting a peaceable partition if the first discussion leads to such a disgraceful scene as this?"¹⁴ The answer, of course, was "None!"

Indian affairs. . . . This Bill will launch . . . a new and, let us hope, a happier era." Attlee concluded the debate that passed this historic measure, thus setting up two "Independent Dominions" of India and Pakistan on August 15, 1947. On Friday, July 9, King George VI added his talismanic seal of assent to the new act.

Jinnah held a press conference in mid-July and "assured" minorities in the proposed dominion that they would have "protection with regard to their religion in the new property and culture. They would, in all respects, be citizens of Pakistan without any discrimination. . . . The same principle . . . would apply to the minorities in India as well. . . . Mr. Jinnah sincerely hoped that the relations between Pakistan and India would be friendly and cordial."

"I imagine myself fatalistically to our coming disaster," Penderel Moon wrote that July. "It was easy to predict disaster but what was the cure for it and what to take?" A senior representative of the British asked for his opinion as to what would happen. "I replied, 'I think that there is a three-line of division: down in the Punjab Sikhs to the west of it and all Muslims to the east of it will have their—' chopped off." "On August 14 thousands of Sikhs and Hindus continued to believe that Lahore would be free from so-called 'harmful' elements—that is, that caste Hindus of the Punjab—any—element of what they regard as a man he found. The war was a . . . public meeting last night and several . . . to save their lives. Mountbatten flew to Lahore on Sunday, July 20 and met with the Premier of Punjab, Mr. Asaf-ud-Din Khan, and the . . . of east Punjab's "unessential personnel" all be moved out to Sialkot by August 10, but Radcliffe's final award would remain top secret till the eve of partition and independence.

In New Delhi the interim coalition government virtually ceased to function. Nehru and Liaquat were hardly speaking to one another. Separate provisional administrations for India and Pakistan functioned virtually independently during those last critical weeks when the assets of a partitioned state were divided in the most hasty and disorderly fashion. In a way, a hostile divorcing couple might of an evening sort out their possessions. Governor-general Desai's journal was busy selling his house out of the mansion in New Delhi bringing a handsome profit from a Marwari merchant, and the estate atop Maabari Hill in Bombay going to a Western European consulate. Fatima supervised the packing for all had to be sent. August 7, when the Jinnahs flew off to Karachi to prepare their new nation or set out to work out with the British. Mountbatten also preoccupied himself with matters of vital interest to an admiral of the

I got both Jinnah and Nehru to agree that the Navies would fly the white ensign at the ensign staff and the Dominion Flag at the jack staff and that the Governor General would fly the royal Dominion Governor General's Flag with the King's crest and the name of the Dominion. When I showed Jinnah the design of his new flag he announced that he had changed his mind and he intended to design his own flag with his own monogram on it, and he regretted that he could not allow his ships to fly the white ensign. He was only saved from being struck by the arrival of the other members of the Partition Council at this moment. However, I sent Ismay round to hear him as soon as possible and Jinnah claimed that I must have mis understood him as of course he was keen that the Pakistan Navy should fly the white ensign and talked glibly about the "broomhood of the seas."

The Mountbattens invited Jinnah and Fatima to dine with them on Friday, July 25, and as Campbell Johnson recalled: "It was quite a small party, around a table comprising only House guests and some of Mountbatten's staff. Jinnah once detained and polished his conversation by cracking a series of very lengthy and generally unfunny jokes. When Mountbatten chafed ever out the weary novelty of talking to the guests' ears, he said and said, 'Jinnah is the least of his worries to Lord Mountbatten. I said, 'I am off' and interrupted across the table with a tank. Mountbatten would hear this one. It is certainly for the Army, representing the King to provide his guests waited from the dining room but he reluctantly his doctor was over the Jinnahs got up at the same time as The Excellencies and walked out with them." Jinnah of course considered himself no less than Lord Mountbatten at this point, the governor-general of his own dominion, the first person of Asian birth ever to achieve so exalted a rank of Commonwealth power.

The rulers of the princely states all knew that by August 15 they had to go on to the other dominions. Since British paramountcy and its protective umbrella would disappear from their affairs on that day, not only a maharaja, nawab, and razzam found it almost impossible to decide which way to jump. Bhopal, in Central India, chafed at the bit of integration into a dominion toward which its nawab felt the strongest personal loyalty. The Hindu maharaja of Kashmir, Hari Singh, refused to join either dominion, fearing he would be dethroned by Jinnah for religious reasons. Hyderabad, a Muslim state, also refused to join Pakistan, and democratic demands. The Nizam of Hyderabad preferred to join Pakistan, if he was not allowed to remain and spend it but surrounded as in

was by Indian territory and with 85 percent of his state's population Hindu, he was forced the following September by "Operation Polo" to integrate his kingdom with the Indian union.

Mahatma Gandhi trekked off to Noakhali in Bengal to seek to calm communal passions there on the eve of partition, and much to Mountbatten's delight.

Gandhi has announced his decision to spend the rest of his life in Pakistan, looking after the Muslims. This will make him rich, but will be a great relief to Congress for, as I have said before, his influence is largely negative or even destructive and directed against the only man who has his feet firmly on the ground, Vallabhbhai Patel.*

Jinnah picked Lieutenant-General Sir Frank W. Messervy, the commander of the northern army of British India, to serve as Pakistan's first commander-in-chief and Messervy submitted a most disturbing report to Mountbatten, warning that the North-West Frontier Province had won 150,000 more votes than Muslims in forty-five a number of which were only by a few's strength." Immediately after August 15, 1947, "the gates of hell were wide open," Messervy suggested, "and within a few days 100,000 of our soldiers, Messervy had no other choice but to withdraw to a ghastly and most shocking and disorderly scene."

Jinnah and his sister flew out of New Delhi to see vicerey's Dargah on the morning of August 7. The masses of refugees were waiting at the airport, Karachi, and others of Pakistan Zindagi posterate across the sands of Sind and ebbed over the Arabian Sea. Refugees kept pouring into Karachi along every road as the provincial port grew overnight into a national capital with a population doubling within a matter of months. Thousands of cheering or howling men lined the road from the provincial government house to the residence of the governor of Sind and near about to become Jinnah's last bungalow. Walking up the steps of a white Victorian mansion, Jinnah turned to naval Lieutenant S. M. Akbar, transferred from Mountbatten's staff to the Quaid Azam's command. "Do you know, I never expected to see Pakistan in my lifetime. We have to be very grateful to God for what we have achieved."

Two days after Sind's governor-elect Sir Ghulam Durrani, Lal Bahadur Shastri, and his old Bombay companion, gave a push party in honor of his new leader at the elegant Karachi Club, where Jinnah said "Yes, I am Karachi-born, and it was on the sands of Karachi that I played marbles in my childhood. I was schooled at Karachi. . . . Let us trust each other. . . . Let us build a new Pakistan. . . . We are not going to be a part of the British Empire."

every class is represented in this huge gathering—let us work in double shift if necessary to make the Sovereign State of Pakistan really happy, really united and really powerful."

Pakistan's constituent assembly met in Karachi for the first time on August 11, and Jinnah immediately elected Jinnah to preside over its meetings, and Jinnah's appearance as its first business Jinnah took the chair thinking he assembled delegates for

the greatest honour that is possible for this Sovereign Assembly to confer—by electing me as your first President. . . . I sincerely hope that . . . we shall make this Constituent Assembly an example to the world. The Constituent Assembly has got two main functions to perform. The first is to give directions and responsibility of framing our future Constitution of Pakistan, and the second of electing as a full and complete Sovereign body as the Federal Legislature of Pakistan. We have to do the best we can. . . ."

Then he seemed suddenly to awaken from a dream, looking around at the packed and standing hall filled with eager, perspiring faces all turned on for inspiration or criticism. "Attention, my friends! Attention of how to build a new state. You know really that not only we ourselves are wondering what I think the new state is, but also the world is wondering at this new state which has been created which has brought about the creation of a new state by uniting two separate Sovereign Dominions in his own right. As far as it has been unprecedented there is no parallel in the history of the world. His right to build it and with all kinds of handicaps has been put under a new which is quite unknown and painful." He said it with a sense of awe. He had won. The highest court had returned another verdict in his favor—Pakistan was to be born in just a few days. He had said it was it. And here was it going to work? Then he never lost time to consider details, after all never strength enough, nor help. Not a minute to write or a single speech in advance.

Dealing with our first function in this Assembly, I cannot make any well-considered pronouncement at this moment, but I shall say a few things as they occur to me. The first and the foremost thing that I would like to emphasize is this—remember that you are now a Sovereign Legislative body and you have got all the powers. It therefore, places on you the gravest responsibility as to how you should take your decisions. The first consideration that I would like to make is this . . . You will no doubt agree with me that the first duty of a Government is to protect the life, property, and religious beliefs of its subjects are fully protected by the State.

The Government of the State is fully protected by the State.

courses from which India is suffering . . . is bribery and corruption. That really is a poison. We must put that down with an iron hand and I hope that you will take adequate measures as soon as it is possible. . . . Black-marketing is another curse. . . . I know that black-marketeers are frequent to aught and punished. Judicial sentences are passed or sometimes fines only are imposed. Now you have to tackle this monster which today is a colossal crime against society in our distressed conditions, when we constantly face shortage of food. . . . A citizen who does black-marketing commits, I think, a greater crime than the biggest and most atrocious crimes. These black-marketeers are really knowing, intelligent and certainly responsible people. . . . I think they ought to be very severely punished, because they undermine the entire system of control . . . and cause wholesale starvation and want and even death.

The next thing that strikes me is this. Here again it is a legacy which has been passed on to us . . . the evil of nepotism and jobbery. This evil must be crushed relentlessly. I want to make it quite clear that I shall never tolerate any kind of jobbery, nepotism or any assistance directly or indirectly brought to bear upon me. . . . I know there are people who do not agree with the division of India and the partition of the Punjab and Bengal. Much has been said against it, but now that it has been accepted by the decision of everyone, if you have not to act honourably and accordingly to the agreement which is now final and binding. But on must remember as you said that this rightly revolution that has taken place is unprecedented.

But the question is, whether it was possible or practicable to act otherwise than what has been done. . . . A division had to take place. On both sides, in Hindustan and Pakistan, there are sections of people who may not agree to that who may not like it. But in my judgement there was no other solution and I am sure future history will record its verdict in favour of it. And what is more, it will be proved by actual experience as we go on that that was the only solution. . . . Any idea of a United India could never have worked and in my judgement it would have led us to terrific disaster. May be that view is correct, may be it is not, that remains to be seen.¹²

He seemed unable to move his mind from that eventful period. For the first time he openly challenged his own judgement. He said that it might not have been correct, sensing perhaps that the worst part of the dream—the true tragic nightmare of partition was about to begin, the dream came waiting behind this "cyclical revolution." All the same, he continued in this uncharacteristic troubled monologue of reflection before the partition. . . .

we'd as follow his every word. In this division it was impossible to avoid the question of minorities being in one Dominion or the other."

Now that was unavoidable. There is no other solution. Now what shall we do? Now, if we want to make this great State of Pakistan happy and prosperous we should wholly and solely concentrate on the well-being of the people, and especially of the masses and the poor. If you will work in co-operation, forgetting the past, burying the hatchet, you are bound to succeed. You change your past and work together in a spirit that everyone of you, no matter to what community he belongs, no matter what relations he has with you in the past, no matter what is his colour, caste or creed, is first, second and last a citizen of this State with equal rights, privileges and obligations, there will be no end to the progress you will make.

I cannot emphasize it too much. We should begin to work in that spirit and in course of time we will see a plurality in the major and minority communities, the Hindus, Muslims and the Sikhs, Christians, Shias, Sunnis and so on and among the Hindus you have Brahmins, Vashnavs, Khatrias, so Bengalis, Madrasis and so on, will vanish. Indeed, if we ask ourselves how we can suggest a better way of living to a Hindu, a Christian, a Muslim and a Sikh but for this we would have been free peoples long long ago."

What a remarkable reversal it was, as though he had been transformed overnight once again into the old Ambassador of Hindustan. "Uggy" that Sarojin Nandan loved it so much was laughing too so. In for required confidence, almost free association as he launched extemporaneously. Was it fact over now? Or was it a just about to begin?

You are free, you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan. . . . You may belong to any religion or caste or creed—that has nothing to do with the business of the State. . . . We are starting in the days when there is no discrimination, no distinction between one community and another, no discrimination between one caste or creed and another. We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State. The people of England in course of time had to face the realities of the situation and had to discharge the responsibilities and burdens placed upon them by the government. . . . Today you might say that it is not the same as in England, but I think you will find that it is the same. . . . I think that every man is a citizen, an equal citizen of Great Britain. . . . all members of the Nation."

What was he talking about? Had he simply forgotten where he was? Had the cyclone of events so disorientated him that he was amusing the opposition's brief? Was his pleading for a united India—on the eve of Pakistan—before those hundreds of thousands of ten-foot innocents were slaughtered among their homes, and before their ancestral villages and hamlets to an eternity of oblivion or a relative calm, a strange act? Now the governor-general designated continued: "I think we should keep in front of us our idea, and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State. I shall always be guided by the principles of justice and fairness without any bias as to the particular language, prejudice or 'I was' or other words, partially or favouritism. My guiding principle will be justice and complete equality, and I am sure, and with your support and co-operation, I can look forward to Pakistan becoming one of the greatest Nations in the world."

Yet even as he concluded on so optimistic a note, rumor had reached Jinnah at Asa as well as Jinnah that the strategic Muslim majorities in the area would desert the League, attacking the one and withdrawing resources in Kashmir, were going to be awarded to East Bengal by the British. Liaquat was in Isma that such a revolt—a Jewish would be swayed by Muslims as to grave a breach of faith as to impair future friendly relations between India and the British. Mountbatten reacted, however, that he had "resolved to keep himself out of the whole business" at the boundary commission and had not so much as seen the final maps, which were then brought to his office by Radcliffe after he and his wife had flown from Delhi to Karachi on August 13 to be present at the formal transfer of power, hence welcoming His Majesty as well as his own official greetings to the new Dominion.

Jinnah and Liaquat attended the Mountbattens' not at Karachi airport, inside the entrance hall of government house, which had been devoted up to look over a Hindu-Muslim dinner and the four were subjected to tag-along and retakings under an awkward light and a great deal of the air. Jinnah in some strange way of the manner which he had for the Mountbattens there that night. Liaquat and the other League leaders who had listened to his disjointed ramblings before the constituent assembly then insisted that he should be represented in the last diplomatic corps as well as world press would be represented in the last, yet hall. He rose to adjust his monocle to his eye, unfolding the text of a long speech. "Your Excellency, Your Highness, this is the first time I have great pleasure in proposing a toast to His Majesty the King." The words had been fashioned for him by the best of his bright young clerks. Nothing of this sort was Jinnah's only the first voice that read it aloud in such perfect upper-class English accent. Here I would like to say, Your Excellency, Lord Mountbatten, how much we appreciate your having carried out whole-hearted the policy and the practice that was laid down by the plan of 3rd June. Pakistan and Hindustan will always remember you. Perhaps he did repeat the word "Hindustan" missing upon using it as so many of his followers would do, feeling it a more appropriate appellation for Pakistan's neighbor than "India" which was after all, just an English corruption of the name of Pakistan's neighbor, the Hindus.

Mountbatten sat at dinner between Miss Jinnah and Begum Liaquat Ali Khan interpreted. They both pulled a leg about the incident, ceremoniously, Jinnah saying that it was as astounding that a responsible Government could be guided by such a policy. I returned from retorting that the whole idea to pre-empt the fact that he changed his mind and Jinnah had forgotten that it was Ban Jinnah and had had to change the word early and he himself suggested to a dinner party.

Next morning the Jinnahs drove from the government house to the legislative assembly hall among a great many anti-impedement soldiers as well as police armed to watch for possible assassins. Since reports of a Sikh plan to assassinate Jinnah on the day Jinnah was born and Lord Mountbatten and Jinnah several Jinnahs and the loud shouts of Pakistan Zindabad and Qudus Azhar Zindabad were heard at his carriage. The Mountbattens followed in a separate carriage and since the avoided any regular channel of Pakistan's parliament which had been the legislative assembly. Lord Mountbatten graciously indicated Jinnah Liaquat message from his cousin King George welcoming Pakistan to the Commonwealth. Jinnah replied reading again from the carefully hammered out words of a text prepared by his staff.

Your Excellency, I thank His Majesty on behalf of the Pakistan Constituent Assembly and myself. I once more thank you and Lady Mountbatten for your kindness and good wishes. Yes, we are parting as friends, and I assure you that we shall not be wanting in friendly spirit with our neighbours and with all nations of the world."

Lady Mountbatten pressed Miss Jinnah's hand affectionately as Jinnah sat in the car. He was a cold and remote. He also has a magnetic quality—the sense of leadership.

Lady Mountbatten pressed Miss Jinnah's hand affectionately as Jinnah sat in the car. He was a cold and remote. He also has a magnetic quality—the sense of leadership.

cash balances amounting to some Rs 55 crore. There was hardly any money to meet the day-to-day expenses and the position was really critical. India, believed that this very first blow would finish Pakistan. Could Hyderabad state or the Nizam advance adequate loan to Pakistan to tide over the crisis?

... Never in my life had I seen Mr. Jinnah emotional except on that day. He asked me if I had seen the refugees as I drove from the airport. ... I had of course. Tears rolled down his cheeks several times as he spoke of the mass human misery. ... Soon after that the Nizam sanctioned a loan of Rs. 20 crore to Pakistan. Mr. Jinnah lost no time in publicly announcing that Pakistan had received a loan of that sum from Hyderabad and ... had no further financial problems. ... the leaders of India were just wild and furious over it.²⁰

Jinnah had also sent Isphahani to the United States as Pakistan's ambassador and deputy leader of the UN delegation which future foreign minister Sir Mohammad Zafarullah Khan and Isphahani purchased a book going to Washington for \$ 50,000 to serve as Pakistan's "Chancery" and wrote Jinnah from New York in mid-September to report having

met the top executive of General Motors Company who have taken principal in the construction of a C-46 transport aircraft. General Motors has agreed to make arrangements would be made for the delivery of the car at Karachi as soon as possible and will override all other prior bookings. ... In regard to the special aeroplane my friends and I have contacted some leading manufacturers. ... I hope you are keeping good health.²¹

The super machine cost \$60,000 and was "cavern green". A converted B-24 Bessiecraft was to cost more than the machine, owing to its Jinnah needed on a Vickers Armstrong, instead, the price of which was "not unreasonable".²²

Jinnah ordered Liaquat to move his cabinet secretariat to Lahore in September and joined him there the following month, as relations with India deteriorated to the point of virtual "war".²³ Armed "convoys" of Muslim refugees leaving India could pass through British Sikh territories only with special instructions from Nehru and others. Jinnah's son, Ismay, flew to Karachi in mid-September to meet with Jinnah for no less than eleven hours during which he discussed the situation in detail. His first post-war experience was to find Jinnah a man of great energy and enough to be called "a good fellow" by the Quaid-e-Azam in his

face.²⁴ But the more disturbing part of Ismay's report to his chief was that "Jinnah was full of wrath against Congress, saying that he could never understand these men's hatreds and was now beginning to feel that there was no alternative but to fight it out."

The Muslim nawab of Junagadh, a small princely state on the coast of Kathiawar, acceded to Pakistan in September, though his domain was surrounded by India and the vast majority of its subjects population was Hindu. The apostate nawabs showed disloyalty was Sindh, landowner Sir Salah Nawaz Bhutto, the everprising father of Pakistan's ace prime minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who drafted the documents of accession and personally delivered them to Jinnah. Nehru and Patel were outraged when they learned of Junagadh's "treachery" and demanded martial invasion until November, driving Muslim leaders like the Bhuttos to seek asylum in Pakistan. With their treason and the loss of their state, the Bhuttos served

Before the end of September, Jinnah appeared directly to his closest wealthy colleagues for help in Pakistan's tragic disputes with its closest neighbour. The flood of refugees continued to deplete Punjab and each new arrival brought blood-curdling tales of alleged "atrocities" that fuelled the hatred of Muslims throughout the Northwest and the main focus for revenge against the "infidels", igniting passions with which Jinnah had pressures for retaliation and drawing attention to the danger of further civil war. Sir Archibald Cooper, permanent under-secretary of Commonwealth Relations Office, visited Karachi at this time, and London became more conscious of the urgency of Pakistan's plight and the potential for a continuation of Indo-Pak war. The first flew to Delhi and remained for several nights as Moret-out-as urgent in the government house, porting to stay, waiting for the first flew back to Lahore. "Let India go, honest men committed act of war and see what happens!" Ismay understood Jinnah's thinly veiled threat as apparent, aimed at Kashmir. Moret-out-as chief-of-staff returned to London in early October, meeting in conversation with Jinnah in Karachi on October 2. Family secretary, high birth day.

The procastinating maharaja of Kashmir, Sir Hari Singh, signed a preliminary agreement with Pakistan that permitted petrol supplies and other vital needs of that northernmost state of South Asia to continue flowing over the Pakistan roads that served as its major highways to the world. Hari Singh knew that time was running out. Muslim peasants in Kashmir's mountainous, elevated areas were beginning to rise. That September and October, in Kashmir, India and Nepal, as well as in the Indian border to help their co-religionists fight against the maharaja's forces sent to put down the revolt. By mid-October Pakistan stopped all shipments of vital

supplies to Kashmir. New Delhi then "decided to step into the breach and try to send such things as salt, kerosene and sugar" to "unlocked" Srinagar.²⁰

On October 23, British trucks and jeeps of the Pakistan army, loaded with some 5,000 armed Pathan, Afghani, Waziri and Mahsud tribesmen, of the North-West Frontier crossed the Kashmir border and headed east along the Muzaffargarh-Baramulla road, but did not enter Srinagar itself. That "a vast" of Kashmir from Jammu would long be ruled by Pakistan, a purely "volunteer" action, unaided, spontaneous," by state troops rushing to the aid and support of Muslim brothers. But the trucks, petrol, and drivers were mostly standard British equipment and British officers as well as Pakistani officials along the northern Pakistan route they traversed knew and supposed even if they did not actually organize or instigate that violent October action by which Pakistan seems to have been triggered into integration of Kashmir into the action whose historic name gave rise to "Kashmiri" tribal war. Reports of the tribes burning and razing Muzaffargarh reached New Delhi on the night of October 24 and the ex-minister, Pakistan's headquarters, official returned to New Delhi's station on the morning of the 25th. The "tribes" had "entered Kashmir." Their advance guard, only 35 to 40 miles from Srinagar. Mountbatten's committee on emergency, meeting of the Indian Defence Committee that Saturday morning and they agreed to assemble all the arms and armor they could for far pass a moderate despatch to Srinagar. V. P. Menon was sent through the Mahajana's heights to see if he could convince Hari Singh to sign an accession agreement at this point. Menon returned early Sunday morning, October 28, to report to Mountbatten. He said, and "told the Mahajana" had given pieces of cloth and could "come to no decision." His state's prime minister, M. C. Mahajan, later chief justice of India, however, proved receptive to Menon's mission and returned with him to New Delhi, where he met with Nehru and Patel.

"I requested immediate military aid on any terms," Mahajan told the arguing Nehru to "Give us the military force we need. Take the accession and give what power you desire to the people of Kashmir. I will do it. By to save Srinagar this evening or else I will go to Lahore and meet the terms with Mr. Jinnah." Mahajan reported that Nehru had said and "angry" at the notion of Jinnah's "coming to a decision." Patel detained him, whispering, "Of course, Mahajan, you are not going to Pakistan." Then Sheikh Abdullah, who appears to have been "from an adjoining bedroom in Nehru's Delhi house, sent in a message" to

The next morning the defence council met and decided to airlift the First Sikh Battalion from New Delhi to Srinagar. "In the early hours of the morning of the 27th," Mahajan wrote, "I could hear the noise of the planes flying over Sardar Baldev Singh's house where Mahajan spent the night and carrying the military personnel to Srinagar. At about 9 a.m. I got a message from . . . Srinagar that troops had landed there and had gone into action. On receipt of this message, I flew to Jammu with Mr. V. P. Menon. . . . Mr. Menon and myself met His Highness [Hari Singh] had driven down from Srinagar, he came to the night to the Winter capital at the palace. After some delay, a document was signed which, Mr. Menon took back to New Delhi. . . . I stayed at Jammu. This was a narrow shave."

Mahajan's autobiographical account of his most important sequence of events is of critical variance with the reports given by V. P. Menon and others close to Nehru and Mountbatten associated with the Government of India at the time. Menon insists that Kashmir's "Instrument of accession" was signed and delivered to New Delhi before any Indian troops were flown into action in Srinagar. Mahajan reports the reverse. The actual sequence is of more than casual interest. It does come to Kashmir's aid, in legal terms, based on having secured legitimate instrument of access in principle to lifting any troops into the Vale of Kashmir, at least understanding that to risk at least a few landing troops would be considerable," and if that occurred then two Commonwealth armies, each trained and led by British Commonwealth officers, would move and the first test of Indian troops would be on a battlefield. It would have been so agonizingly so clearly not like a conclusion to his last chapter in India.²¹ That Mountbatten had to move heaven and earth to avoid so tragic a development. He had in fact, struggled over a hundred days and nights, as well as in the past, at Delhi's expense, with less than a dozen Indian and police Indian Sikh regiments, made some gains, but they had kept ready to take off before dawn on October 27. A document was the signed accession, which would be right, reported to his committee fully, and was the position and came to risk of an armed clash with Pakistan forces to the minimum. I shall relate a little further on how the crisis was that his accession was accepted.²² The crisis situation Mountbatten faced during that last terrible week in October obviously did not permit the luxury of holding a plebiscite or referendum. The tribes

an troops over the Hima as an wall that separated Delhi from Srinagar. By the same token, how should time permit the accession of an atrocious maharaja who had 'gone to pieces' died Srinagar and abandoned his own subjects to a fate worse than death, to stand in the way of their salvation?

"Even after this decision had been reached Lord Mountbatten and the three British Chiefs of Staff of the Indian Army, Navy and Air Force pointed out the risks involved in the operation," V. P. Menon reported. "But Nehru asserted that the only alternative to sending troops would be to allow a massacre in Srinagar, which would be followed by a major communal riot across India. Moreover, the British residents in Srinagar would certainly be murdered by the rioters since neither the Pakistan Commander-in-Chief nor the Supreme Commander was in a position to safeguard the natives." What else could Lord Mountbatten possibly have done in the face of such dire warnings, threats, and advice? To hesitate for even an hour might have proved fatal to so precarious an operation.

On October 27, as soon as Government General Jinnah learned of India's airlift to Srinagar, he ordered his Acting British Commander-in-Chief, General Moberly, was in leave. General Sir Douglas Gracey to lead two brigades of the Indian Army into Kashmir. One from Bawalpind and another from Sukkot. The Sukkot army was to march to Jammu, take the city, and then the Muzaffargarh. The Bawalpind army was to march to Srinagar and capture the city. This strategic action could have secured Kashmir for Pakistan, while saving Srinagar from tribal attacks. General Gracey refused, however, to accept these orders from his governor general, warning Jinnah that he was not prepared to issue instructions which would inevitably lead to armed conflict between the two Dominions and he withdrew all British Officers without the approval of the Supreme Commander. (Field Marshal Auchinleck).⁴²

Having just flown in from Karachi, Jinnah was in Lahore at this time and saved with Moberly who was "most aggressive and abusive" over the phone, wanting to know "Why the hell Gracey was not carrying out Mr. Jinnah's orders. What had it got to do with the Supreme Commander? What did it matter if the British Officers were withdrawn? Could he not send the troops on without British Officers? Mr. Jinnah insisted on the orders being issued at once." Gracey returned to Karachi the next day that he thought "Mudie had been drinking," and Mountbatten added to his report of this unpleasant incident to the King, that Sir Francis had apparently "lived up to his reputation." General Gracey informed Field Marshal Auchinleck that he had been told by Jinnah that he had issued a 'Stand Down' order.⁴³ Auchinleck wired his chiefs of staff to

London on October 28. A "stand down" order meant the automatic withdrawal of all British officers from a Dominion army.

The "Auk" flew into Lahore from Delhi this fateful morning of October 29 and was met at the airport by Gracey who stated that the orders Gracey had not obeyed were "neither issued to Pakistan troops 'to seize Baramulla and Srinagar also Bawalpind Pass and to send troops into Mirpur district of Jammu.'" The supreme commander and General Gracey went to confront Jinnah immediately to explain the "chaos on the way British officers very clearly." Auchinleck reported to London. Gracey also emphasized military weakness of Pakistan which I pointed out in my article consequences of military isolation of what now is eastern of India. This is consequence of Kashmir's sudden accession." His approach to Jinnah, Mountbatten reported of Auchinleck's recent confrontation in Lahore was based on the fact that India's acceptance of the accession of Kashmir was not a legally proper and correct decision. Kashmir's accession to Jinnah's accession that India had a perfect right to send troops to the State in response to the Maharajah's request, and on the extreme weakness of the Pakistan Army and its needlessness without British Officers.⁴⁴ Jinnah withdrew orders. Auchinleck was able to report at the end of his longest day in India's service.

Mountbatten and Ismay flew to Lahore without Nehru on November 1, 1947, and met with Liaquat who was quite sick with a fever that morning in his bedroom.

He was sitting up with a rug round his knees looking very ill. I began by giving Liaquat a copy of a statement which had been signed by the three India Commanders-in-Chief intended to dispel the impression in the minds of the Pakistan Government that India had planned the sending of military assistance to Kashmir before the tribal invasion began. . . . I then went on to explain . . . the whole position of Junagadh . . . and of Kashmir, as I saw it. I used the same arguments as I later expanded to Jinnah whom I saw in the afternoon. The burden of Liaquat's reply was that the Maharajah had . . . brought about a serious situation by allowing his Hindu and a particular his State forces, to massacre Muslims particularly in, and across the border of, Jammu. . . . Liaquat appeared to be very depressed and almost disinclined to make any further effort to avoid war, Ismay and I did our best to cheer him up. . . . he . . . backed us very friendly in his reply.⁴⁵

Mountbatten and Ismay went off directly to lunch with Jinnah, and after finishing their food, accompanied the Qaid-i-Azam to his room.

"It was in this speech that I first heard him speak of death," Fatima recalled. "The sufferings of the refugees affected him deeply, and he went to bed again, exhausted and ill. But files kept pouring in, ministers and secretaries came to seek his instructions, so peace and rest were impossible."¹²

23

Ziarat
(1948)

The "all India" Muslim League convened met for the last time. From 1 to December 14-15, 1947. Some 300 members, 180 from India assembled for the capital of Pakistan and voted to elect the Muslim League as the only body had been so constituted. It also adopted a resolution to split the country into two independent and separate Pakistan. The Muslim League left his sick bed to preside over the session. He addressed the nation in English and his speech was later translated into Urdu. Pakistan's national language. He said, "Muslims of India, the first of our children. As you know, the Muslim League has achieved the establishment of Pakistan. Quaid-e-Azam led the way. The Muslims were a united, they were glorified, and they had to suffer. We have achieved Pakistan, not for the League, not for any of our colleagues but for the masses."¹³

Not everyone was satisfied, however. Maulana Jamil Mahommed rose to protest that "Pakistan could hardly take pride in leading itself a Muslim State." He found many un-Islamic things in the State from top to bottom. . . . The behaviour of the Minister is not like that of Muslims. The poor cannot enter the houses of the Ministers, the needy and the lowly cannot enter. Only the courtiers can enter those who possess large bungalows can enter. The name of Islam has been disgraced enough." "We are only a four-month-old child," Jinnah responded, feeling not much stronger himself. "You know somebody would like to overthrow us. I know you would say we have not done such and such a thing, but we are only four months old."

In addition to resolving to divide itself and electing Liaquat Ali Khan "convenor" of the Pakistan Muslim League the Council passed on record

its deep sense of sorrow and its feelings of horror at the widespread acts of organized violence and barbarism which have taken place resulting in the loss of hundreds of thousands of innocent lives, colossal destruction of property, wanton atrocities against women and mass migration of populations, whereby millions of human beings have been uprooted from their hearths and homes and reduced to utter destitution.

The Council also views with grave concern the rising tide of communal antagonism against the Muslim minority in the Indian Union where, in spite of the repeated declarations by the Congress that minorities will be dealt with justly and fairly . . . Muslim life and property continue to be insecure.

Liaquat flew to Delhi for a meeting of the Joint Defence Council on December 22 at which time Nehru handed him a letter charging that the "tribe raiders" of Kashmir have been sent through Pakistan. Faced with such a charge issued from Pakistan, indeed we have reliable reports that the raiders got their training from the army in Pakistan. The government of India demanded an end to all such aid, access, supplies and training. Liaquat promised to reply; and on December 30, 1948, Nehru's secretary issued an official excuse from Pakistan. India submitted its formal complaint to the UN Security Council, as emerged in Mohammed Ali Jinnah's letter to the United Nations, and regretting that India's demand was not accepted the security council "called upon Pakistan to withdraw completely from all assistance it was providing for the tribal invaders of Kashmir, a State which was a part of the Dominion of India and is part of India," or "the Government of India may be compelled to take action to enter Pakistan territory in order to take military action against the invaders."

Pakistan replied to India's complaint on January 15, 1949, and in a sound legal fashion. Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan cross-examined Liaquat's first brief argued "The Pakistan Government emphatically states that they are giving aid and assistance to the so-called invaders or committed any act of aggression against India." And "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Against India," filed the same day in the security council, and no longer document called "Particulars of Pakistan's Case" served to place number of broader issues and problems of international law before born neighbors on the Council's agenda.

At Liaquat's camp in the "White House" in Delhi, the Muslim population of East Punjab, Delhi, Ajmer, and other parts of the Punjab taken by the non-Muslim rulers people after the partition of India.

forces of the States concerned and the Union of India . . . still in progress . . . large numbers of Muslims—running into hundreds of thousands—have been ruthlessly massacred vastly larger numbers maimed, wounded and injured and over five million . . . driven from their homes . . . Brutal and unmentionable crimes have been committed against women and children. Property worth thousands of millions of rupees has been destroyed.

Concluding its cross-complaint Pakistan asked the security council to call upon India to "desist from acts of aggression against Pakistan" and to appoint a commission of commissions of the UN to investigate all of its charges and to arrange for cessation of fighting in the State of Jammu and Kashmir and elsewhere in the subcontinent. A bill of "particulars" of alleged documentation to support these various charges.

Jinnah had no strength left to New York for the debate in India and Pakistan but for his minister Sir Mohamud Zafar Khan performed brilliantly as Pakistan's advocate before the council. He was judicious, articulate and calm against a presentation of charges relating India's charges. The security council met in a room initially of three and later five members, who managed to effect a ceasefire by year's end, but it never won agreement to withdrawal of all the Indian forces that kept pouring into the war-torn State and it could never guarantee a State of Jammu and Kashmir.

"The first World War of 1914-18 was fought to end war," Jinnah said on January 23, 1948, launching the "M.L.S. Muslim World" as his first modern declaration.

This led to the birth of the League of Nations and the idea of collective security, but the League of Nations proved only a pious hope. . . . The destruction caused by the first world war pales into insignificance as compared to the devastation and havoc resulting from the last world war and now with the discovery of the Atom Bomb, one shudders to think of the pattern of future wars. . . . Pakistan must be prepared for all eventualities and dangers. The weak and the defenceless in this imperfect world invite aggression from others. . . . Pakistan is still in its infancy and so is its Navy.

But this infant means to grow up and God willing will grow up much sooner than many people think. You will have to make up for the smallness of your size by your courage and selfless devotion to duty for it is not life that matters but the courage fortitude and determination you bring to it.

A few days earlier, Mahatma Gandhi won the last of his fast-unto-death, pressuring India's cabinet to pay its debt of 55 crores of rupees to

Pakistan: helping to put an end to the slaughter and looting of Muslims in and around Delhi, which has become so tragic a scandal. Angry Sikhs and militant Hindus marched round Birla House with black flags shouting "Let Gandhi die" calling him "Mohammad Gandhi," since he so often advocated Pakistan's cause at prayer meetings and read from the *Quran*. And on January 30, a bomb exploded in Birla House compound, but Gandhi had already finished his prayer meeting.

Three days later his assassin did not miss. At his last prayer meeting on January 29, Gandhi said:

If a man was in distress the key to his happiness lay in labour. God did not create man to eat, drink and make merry. . . . Millionaires who ate without work were perishing. Even if they should call by the sweat of their brow or sweat it go without food. The only person such exception was the disabled. . . . Gandhi then spoke about peasants. If he had his say, our Governor-General and our Premier would be drawn from the *kisans* [peasants]. . . . As real producers of wealth! *They were* the makers while we have enslaved them. . . . It was true, we were all labourers. In honest labour lay our salvation and the satisfaction of all vital needs.⁸

The next evening, before he could reach his prayer platform, Mahatma Gandhi was shot to death by a hate-crazed Hindu Brahmin named Nathuram Godse.

"He was one of the greatest men produced by the Hindu community," wrote Jinnah in his first message of condolence. How ironic must have seemed to him that an orthodox Hindu should have killed his most transgent opponent, believing the Mahatma an "Agent of Pakistan" and a "Muslim over-Norther" *huglyan*, *vo* *resident* of Schomachers Building Group in New York, met with Jinnah in Karachi just a few days after Gandhi's assassination and reported that Jinnah "spoke it (and) much more generous terms than he saw fit to use in his message, acknowledging . . . how great was the loss for the Muslims. Jinnah added that . . . the real trouble was with the extremist groups, and he had a favourable impression by the India's Government's firm line and its following on Gandhi's assassination."⁹ New Delhi, *after* the *Prime Minister* Swamy Seva Sangh and Hindu Mahasabha, putting many of their leaders under a white preventive detention arrest.

Mir Qasim Ali now became premier of Hyderabad, and India's government was most worried by news of the *razakars* 20-crore loan to Pakistan. Because of that loan, of course, Pakistan remained solvent, and its *financial* *position* *was* *not* *affected* *by* *the* *loan* *to* *Pakistan*.

Chaudh Muhammad on February 28. Defence expenditure was projected to be no less than £27.9 million out of the total estimated expenditure of only £39.4 million. Revenues were so meagre moreover that a deficit of £23.1 million was expected. Similarly, the government of India, located over 50 percent of its total budget to arms and projected a deficit of some £20 million. Pakistan did its best to encourage imports from the sterling bloc and the United States, but because of its minimal industrial development, the continuing influx of refugees, and poor agricultural output in 1948, revenues fell below anticipated totals with its deficits soaring higher. Jinnah appealed again for U.S. support, private as well as public. General Motors was offered in installing plants in Pakistan. Ambassador Jinnah reported to his government that March, "The 'treacherous war clouds' over Kashmir kept holding these back." The World Bank and Export Bank were also worried about international financial help for required projects and reported "lost business" *because* *we* *had* *not* *been* *able* *to* *secure* *regular* *loans* *broken* *down* *in* *the* *various* *ways* *of* *expenditure* *and* *income* *before* *doing* *any* *more* *than* *any* *other* *Pakistan* *was* *as* *yet* *unprepared* *to* *present* *such* *detailed* *proposals*.

Jinnah himself had no more left to work on such matters. He could not even answer Jinnah's letters anymore. An old Parsi friend from Bombay visited him in Karachi at this time and found him "working in his garden at the government house. After Jinnah finished work up at night, he would read Jinnah's letters. At present, he had not yet won his greatest son but had outlived his foremost rival. It was high time for him to rest, was it not?"

Nonetheless, his government insisted that he fly to Dacca that March to address the masses of Pakistan's population from their own "group" soil. He had not even gone to the East or set foot in Dacca, the second capital of his nation. Great leader that he was, Jinnah answered the call of his cabinet and addressed a crowd estimated to be over 300,000 in Dacca's maidan on March 21, 1948. That was his last major public address, *because* *he* *delivered* *it* *in* *English* *though* *he* *spoke* *in* *a* *Bengali* *audience* *and* *informed* *them* *in* *the* *clearest* *language* *that* *"the* *State* *Language* *of* *Pakistan* *is* *going* *to* *be* *Urdu* *and* *no* *other* *language* *is* *to* *be* *used* *in* *Pakistan* *politics*.

Any one who tries to mislead you is really the enemy of Pakistan. When our State Language in National assemblies is decided on, policy together and together. I look to the future of our country. Therefore, so far as the State Language is concerned, Pakistan's language shall be URDU. . . . I tell you once again, do not fall into the trap of those who are the enemies of Pakistan. Unfortunately you have

next morning with his clinical pathologist and brought along his microscope and reagents to test Jinnah's blood spurnum and do the usual laboratory work. Their lab "findings" confirmed the colonel's suspicions. With so important a patient, however, further corroboration was considered essential before surrendering hope to the fatal disease that was consuming his lungs. So Baksh visited his own hospital in Lahore and ordered three of its best specialists to fly to Zariat, telling one of them to bring his portable X-ray along. Then he wrote Karachi to special measures. Within the week most of Pakistan's advanced medical people were flown or driven 5,500 feet above sea level to Zariat, having concentrated in the dying old man who so glared without respite in that remote spot whose strange name means "burial place" like the ancient Egyptian burial of Mesopotamia erected at the dawn of civilization to house the remains of a god-king. Baksh soon led

While I was telling him the grave news I watched him intently. He . . . remained quite calm and all he said after I had finished was, "Have you told Mas Jinnah?" I replied, "Yes, Sir . . . I had to take her into confidence." The Quaid-Azam interrupted and said, "No, you shouldn't have done it. After all she is a woman." I expressed regret for the pain caused to his sister . . . The Quaid-Azam listened patiently and in the end said, "It doesn't matter, what is done is done. Now tell me all about it. How long have I had this disease? What are the chances of my overcoming it? How long will he treat me? Lastly I should like to know everything and I must not hesitate to tell me the whole truth." . . . I replied that I . . . felt confident that with the aid of the latest drugs there should be a fair chance of a considerable improvement.²⁶

Spanner flew in from New York that week and offered to arrange for any "medical aid from America" that might be needed, while he was ready to bring in a "special plane" if Dr. Baksh thought advisable. He enquired about the nature of the illness which concerned I could not reveal. Baksh noted, "Knowing Jinnah's friend to see him alone, however. "After his interview he came downstairs visibly moved. I hoped he had not betrayed his anxiety before the patient. In his evident concern he repeated his offer of medical help from America. . . . But there was nothing any American doctor could have done that Baksh was not trying to do. No cure had been discovered to the trouble yet, but the doctor was aware that had by then almost totally consumed both of his lungs.

I . . . saw him only a few days before he died. I . . . did not know how close with Jinnah he must have seen what anyone allowed close enough to look could have seen—the governor general was dying. The

Quaid-Azam would soon be no more, and the burden of leading Pakistan would fall upon his shoulders, his niece, his life, Fatima, who had never really liked either Liaquat or his legacy. Perhaps she blamed them both for helping her find back to India from his Hampstead retreat where she and her beloved brother might have lived their lives out in peace and quiet contentment. Subsequent reports that after Liaquat left, Jinnah told her with trembling voice, "Do you know why he has come? He wanted to know how serious my illness is. How long I will stay?" It was doubtless true, yet hardly as apprehensions as Fatima considered it, under the circumstances. There was, after all, still a nation to be run—millions of displaced persons to be fed and a few for a under area was a Kashmir to be fought, a constitution to be drafted. His friends, the British, Pathans, Baluch, Punjabis and Sindhis so close to be a fished. To Liaquat a displaced Nawab from the United Provinces and Oxford, it must have seemed odd to be there in Zariat, still a mere "courtier" to that supurbious royal couple though it was not so bitter. The prime minister would have but more than three years after Jinnah died or even a third assassin's bullet claimed his life in mid-October 1951 atawal, and Dr. Baksh remarked of Liaquat:

Downstairs in the drawing room I met the Prime Minister. He anxiously enquired about the Quaid-Azam, complimented me on having won the first round in my fight, the patient's confidence, and expressed the hope that it would contribute to his recovery. He also urged me to probe into the root cause of the persistent disease. I assured him that despite the Quaid-Azam's serious condition there was reason to hope that if he responded to the latest medicines which had been sent for from Karachi he might yet overcome the trouble, and that the most hopeful feature was the patient's strong power of resistance. I was moved by the Prime Minister's deep concern for the health of his Chief and old comrade.²⁷

Streptococci arrived and was administered but "miraculous drug" that it was, it could not cure the impossible. Nor did the prayers of Jinnah's nation voiced from every mosque in Pakistan and elsewhere throughout the Muslim world on August 7, suffice to turn the inexorable tide of his illness. Since that chest infection has been followed by a great oedema of the feet set in, and the medical staff surrounding the Quaid decided it would be best to remove him to a lower altitude. Zariat's rarefied atmosphere appeared to be imposing too great a strain on his failing heart and lungs. The doctor decided to move him to a lower altitude. I . . . saw him only a few days before he died. I . . . did not know how close with Jinnah he must have seen what anyone allowed close enough to look could have seen—the governor general was dying. The

him down to Quetta. "This is impossible," the governor-general replied. "The earliest would be the 15th." They feared that date might be too late enlisting Fatima's support in pressing him till at last he agreed.

Jinnah's final journey home began on August 13 at 3.30 p.m. He insisted on wearing "a brand new suit" to match, and a handkerchief in his vanity pocket. Fatima recalled: "I helped him put on his polished pump shoes. He was brought down on a stretcher and was placed in a semi-reclining position in the back of the big Hummer car in which we arrived to Quetta."²⁸ Though many precautions had been taken to keep the move "on secret," cheering crowds lined the road along their winding descent. The Hummer had secret cars and a jeep front and rear, so it was quite a convoy with the governor-general's handsome blue flags flying as they bumped over the creaky surfaced road that had seen a horse so much later in imposing a centaur's before. They stopped for tea about a mile past the Red House, since Jinnah had noticed about a dozen men standing there and wanted no intrusive eyes seeing how weak he was. Dr. Bakht remembered:

We reached Quetta just before sunset after about four hours' driving. The Residency had been cleared of all visitors, and we shifted him on stretcher to his bed-room on the first floor . . . I examined his pulse and found that even though his breath was weakening, I noticed he breathed it in a pose in the exhaustion of the journey and hoped it would disappear with rest. . . . Next morning, August the 14th was the 4th anniversary of the establishment of Pakistan. We visited the Quaid-i-Azam at about 8.30. . . . I said: "Sir, we are very fortunate to have brought you to Quetta with out any mishap. It was risky to shift you from Ziarat in such a weak state . . ." The Quaid-i-Azam smiled, saying, "Yes, I am glad you have brought me here. I was caught in a trap at Ziarat."²⁹

A statement published that morning in Pakistan's daily newspapers was entitled the Quaid-i-Azam's "Message" to the "Citizens of Pakistan" but was obviously, except for Karachi, not Ziarat.

Today we are celebrating the first anniversary of our freedom. We have faced the war with courage, determination and a . . . and the record of our achievements has been a wonderful one in warding off the blows of the enemy. . . . I congratulate you all—my Ministers under the leadership of the Prime Minister.³⁰

Jinnah had written none of it, of course. He wrote nothing any longer, barely glanced at the morning newspapers. How remote that glorious . . .

versary the air ringing with shouts of "Pakistan Zindabad" and his most pressing fear of death then from an unknown assassin's bullet. The countless "traps" set for him, some based so handsomely provocatively, governor prime minister kinship he had electric team and . . . guns, . . . all of them had missed the Grey Wolf. He had proved himself too fast, too elusive, too strong for them.

The third week of August Jinnah's appetite proved slightly. He asked for halva and pusses, two delicacies his doctor usually had feared might be too "rich" for him to digest. But Fatima wisely led to another's favorites, and they seemed to cheer him up. The doctors tried to get him to move as much as possible, to sit up in bed to his meals, then standing him on his feet, walking him a bit, trying to keep his muscles from atrophying, and trying to help his digestive system to function. He became more irritable, he yelled at everyone for not being more "practical" and Fatima explained that he had attached great deal of importance to his health and had a his been most punctilious in it.³¹

Jinnah's doctor was "shocked" to find that his patient weighed only eighty pounds. It was clear to all that at that time Azam's health was, as ever, to be maintained. He would have to be flown back there very soon. Jinnah asked for permission to resume smoking. He had smoked an average of fifty or more Gaiwan 4 cigarettes a day over the last thirty years. The doctor permitted him to have one cigarette a day, ordering him not to inhale. Soon, however, Bakht agreed to double his "ration."

It did us good to see him enjoying it . . . since in a habitual smoker the first sign of recovery was commonly a . . . and pleasure to smoking Next morning I noticed four cigarette stumps in the ashtray on the table by his bedside . . . the patient had exceeded his allowance. . . . Looking at the ashtray, I remarked that it appeared to have enjoyed his cigarettes. The Quaid-i-Azam took the hint and ingeniously replied, "Yes but didn't you see there was no harm in smoking if I didn't inhale?" . . . his mind was regaining its old legal quality, and we welcomed this additional sign of recovery.³²

Let me smoke, it did help heal his lungs, however, so the doctors continued advising him to moderate his smoking and return to Karachi. But Jinnah did not want to go "home" to the governor-general's mansion as an invalid. He suggested a few quieter places on the plains: Sibi and Malir, . . .

He said to Bakht, "Don't take me to Karachi on a stretch. I want to go there when I can walk from the car to my room. You know, from the porch

The trip from the airport to the government house took half as long as the return flight from Quetta. They reached the governor-general's mansion at 6.10 p.m. He slept for about two hours. Fatima noted "then he opened his eyes and . . . whispered, 'Fati . . .'. His head dropped slightly to the right, his eyes closed. I ran out of the room crying. Doctor, doctor. Come quickly. My brother is dying. Where are the doctors?" In a few moments they were there, examining him and giving him injections. I stood there, motionless, speechless. Then I saw them cover his body, head to foot, with the sheet . . . and fainted on the floor."

Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah died at 10.20 p.m. on September 11, 1948. At that time one of him weighed only seventy pounds. Wrapped in a simple shroud, he was buried in Karachi, where a handsome mausoleum now stands, housing the remains of one of his country's most remarkable and courageous political figures.

Fatima Jinnah, who inherited most of her brother's estate, remained in Pakistan until her death on Jan. 9, 1967. In 1946-48, the *Mother of the Nation* ("Mother of the Nation") tried to follow her brother's political footsteps, for president of Pakistan against Field Marshal Ayub Khan. She ran a vigorous campaign as the candidate for Ayub's hated opponents and won great support in the east, but she was defeated because of Ayub's "basic democracy" technique of electing the electors. After that she resigned her formal role of his political activities, spending the final years of her life in seclusion and reflecting on the remarkable man to whom she had devoted herself.

Jinnah's daughter Dina never joined her father in Pakistan while he lived; she came to Karachi only for his funeral. When Dina married Neville Wadia, a Parsi-born Christian, Jinnah tried his best to dissuade her, going almost as far as Sir Denchaw Pataudi with his daughter. As Justice Chagla recalled, "Jinnah, in his usual imperious manner, told her that there were millions of Muslims in India and she could have any one she chose. Then the young lady who was more than a match for her father replied, 'Father, there were millions of Muslim girls in India. Why did you not marry one of them?'"⁴¹ Jinnah never spoke to his daughter after she married. And though they did correspond he always addressed her as "Mrs. Wadia" and never talked of her to his friends, insisting, indeed, that he had "no daughter."⁴²

Dina and Neville Wadia kept out of all mention in all Jinnah's official communications. After his death, however, she was invited to the various commemorative and testimonial events there, passed control of his business on to

his son Nush who chairs the board of Wadia Industries Ltd. and has two sons, Jinnah's only great-grandchildren, who live in Bombay as citizens of India. Dina and Neville had a daughter as well, who apparently lives in Manhattan as something of a "recluse" but was "too young to remember Jinnah" and saw little of him, according to her father. Neville Wadia left India after divorce, Dina choosing to reside in Switzerland. Dina moved to New York City and lived alone in a splendid apartment on Madison Avenue until at least 1952. Thus, none of Jinnah's direct descendants ever opted for Pakistan.

Notes

CHAPTER 1. KARACHI

- 1 Fazl-e-Rahman, *Islam: Character of the Message* (1969), pp. 213-9.
- 2 A. A. Raza, "Islam: Message and Mission," *A Cultural History of India*, ed. A. L. Basham (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), chap. 9.
- 3 C. Athina, *Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah: The Story of A Nation* (Lahore: Freezsons Ltd, 1961), p. 3.
- 4 Jinnah's sisters, Rahnmat, Maryam, Fatima, and Shireen, followed in that order, while the youngest of his siblings were his two brothers, Ahmed Ali and Burhan Ali.
- 5 M. A. Haque, "Quaid-e-Azam: What's his date of birth?" in M. A. Haque, *Quaid-e-Azam 1924* (Karachi: Times Press, 1976), pp. 47-53 is the best primary source evidence concerning the puzzling question of Jinnah's actual birth date.
- 6 Fatima Jinnah, "My Brother," an unpublished personal memoir preserved in the Nation Library of Pakistan, Islamabad, P.F. 143.
- 7 Akbar, *Quaid-e-Azam: Pakistan's Present and Future* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 4.
- 8 M. H. Saeed, *Mohammed Ali Jinnah* (Lahore: S. M. Ashraf, 1948), p. 2.
- 9 Jinnah, "My Brother."
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- 11 Jinnah, "My Brother."
- 12 Ibid.
- 13 John Evelyn Wrench, *The Immortal Years, 1937-1944* (London: Faber and Faber, 1945), p. 1.
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- 18 Jinnah, "My Brother."
- 19 Jinnah, "My Brother."
- 20 Jinnah, "My Brother."

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20. Chagla, *Roses in December*, p. 25.
21. Pirzada, *Foundations*, vol. I, pp. 353-54.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 361.

CHAPTER 4: LUCKNOW TO BOMBAY (1916-1918)

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2. S. M. Edwards, *Memoir of Sir Dinshaw Manockjee Petit* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 3.
3. K. F. Dwarkadas, *Radi Jinnah* (Bombay: Kanti Dwarkadas, 1983), p. 9.
4. Sayid, *Jinnah*, appendix I, p. 842.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 848.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 851.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 854-55.
8. A. Iqbal, *Pakistan Movement*. All quotations in the following paragraph are from Sayid, *Jinnah*, pp. 849-50.
9. Sayid, *Jinnah*, pp. 41-42.
10. Pirzada, *Foundations*, vol. I, pp. 371-73.
11. The portion of Jinnah's address does not appear in this, which used the Muslim League's Official Pamphlet reprint of Jinnah's presidential address as its primary source. The quoted passage was deleted in a later pamphlet but has been preserved in Sayid, *Jinnah*, appendix I, pp. 872-89, esp. 873.
12. Sayid, *Jinnah*, pp. 878-79.
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 879-80.
14. President A. C. M. Jinnah's address to the Lucknow Congress, 1916, *ICC* [I, 19], p. 1274.
15. Quoted in Stanley A. Wolpert, *Tilak and Gokhale* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1982), p. 275.
16. Chagla, *Roses in December*, p. 110.
17. Edwin S. Montagu, *An Indian Diary*, ed. Venetia Montagu (London: William Heinemann, 1930), November 26, 1917, pp. 8-10.
18. *Ibid.*, November 23, 1917, pp. 8-10.
19. *Ibid.*, November 29, 1917, p. 58.
20. Quoted, *Every Day*, p. 394.
21. Sayid, *Jinnah*, p. 150.
22. Pirzada, *Foundations*, vol. I, p. 427.
23. Budget Debate, 1917, 18, Proceedings of the Indian Legislative Council, Government of India, p. 388.
24. Raja of Mahmudabad, "Some Memories," in *The Partition of India*, ed. C. H. Philips and M. D. Wainwright (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1970), p. 335.
25. M. K. Gandhi, *The Story of My Life*, trans. with English (Gandhi's *Autobiography*) trans. Mahadev Desai (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1948), p. 539.
26. *Ibid.*, pp. 541-42.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 543.
28. April 24, 1918, Sayid, *Jinnah*, p. 182.
29. Sayid, *Jinnah*, p. 182.

30. Chelmsford to Montagu, September 17, 1918, *Chelmsford Papers*, v. 4, Reel 2, 379.
31. Sayid, *Jinnah*, p. 184.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 188.
33. Bolitho, *Jinnah*, p. 75.
34. Sayid, *Jinnah*, pp. 199-200.
35. Gandhi to Jinnah, July 4, 1918, *Syed Sa'aduddin Pirzada et al. Qaid-e-Azam Jinnah's Correspondence* 3d rev. ed. Karachi: East and West Publishing Company, 1977), p. 82.
36. Gandhi, *My Experiments*, p. 545.
37. Gandhi to Jinnah, August 9, 1918, *Chelmsford Papers*, 20, 48.
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39. C. H. Philips, ed., *The Evolution of India and Pakistan, 1858 to 1947* (Selected Documents), London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1962), pp. 267-68.
40. Sayid, *Jinnah*, pp. 223-25.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 211.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 213.
43. The marble plaque inscription on the wall, Syed Hashim Raza, "The Charisma of Qaid-e-Azam," in *Papers* [IV, 11], vol. V, p. 207.

CHAPTER 5: AMRITSAR TO NAU PULI (1919-1921)

1. Mohammad Yusuf Khan, *The Glory of Qaid-e-Azam* (Lahore: Caravan Book Centre, 1976), pp. 30-31.
2. Sayid, *Jinnah*, p. 205-39.
3. Pirzada, *Foundations*, vol. I, p. 475.
4. Chaman Lal, "The Qaid-e-Azam As I Knew Him," in Ahmad, *Qaid-e-Azam*, p. 167.
5. Jinnah to Montagu, June 12, 1919, *Montagu Papers*, Reel 5 MSS EUR D 523/24.
6. This and the following notes from the same interview were reported in the *Bombay Chronicle*, November 17, 1919, in the *Chelmsford Papers*, Reel 2.
7. Gandhi to Jinnah, June 28, 1919, CWMG, [III 15], vol. XV, pp. 398-99.
8. Lady Dhanoo and Ramu Rao's personal recollections of Ruttie's visit to the Club in Los Angeles, March 4, 1919. Another old friend of Ruttie, Mrs. P. Jayappa, reported much the same characteristics as dominant in an interview in Los Angeles on May 15, 1981.
9. Pirzada, *Foundations*, vol. I, pp. 517-27.
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11. *Ibid.*, p. 544.
12. J. H. Brown, *Gandhi's Rise To Power: Indian Politics 1915-1922* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), p. 273.
13. Jinnah's letter dated 20-20 is reproduced in M. R. Jayakar, *The Story of My Life* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1958), vol. I, p. 405.
14. Gandhi to Jinnah, October 25, 1920, CWMG [III, 15], vol. XV, pp. 372.
15. Sayid, *Jinnah*, pp. 264-65.
16. CWMG [III 15], vol. XIX, pp. 59-62.
17. *Time of Jinnah*, p. 50.
18. Jinnah to Jinnah, p. 229.
19. Jinnah to Jinnah, p. 229.
20. Jinnah to Jinnah, p. 229.
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97. Jinnah to Jinnah, p. 229.
98. Jinnah to Jinnah, p. 229.
99. Jinnah to Jinnah, p. 229.
100. Jinnah to Jinnah, p. 229.

CHAPTER 6: RETREAT TO BOMBAY (1921-1924)

1. Chagla, *Roses in December*, p. 120
2. *Ibid.*
3. Sayid Jinnah pp. 269-72. The quotes that follow are from Chagla, *Roses in December*, pp. 276-79.
4. *Young India*, 18-8-21, in CWMG [III 15], vol. XX, p. 1827
5. Jayakar, *Story*, vol. I, p. 504.
6. "Notes" December 20, 1921 CWMG [III 15] vol. XXII, pp. 66-67
7. Pirzada *Foundations*, vol. I, p. 557
8. *Bombay Chronicle*, January 14, 1922 CWMG [III 15] vol. XXII, p. 178
9. *Young India*, 10-1-21 *ibid.*, p. 218.
10. *Young India*, 10-2-22 *ibid.*, pp. 418-16.
11. Jayakar, *Story*, vol. I, p. 555.
12. *Ibid.*
13. *Ibid.*, p. 567
14. Dwarikadas, *Ruffie*, pp. 24-25.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 28.
16. Chagla, *Roses in December*, pp. 118-19
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CHAPTER 7: NEW DIRECTION 1924-1928

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2. M. Rafique Afzal, *Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah Speeches in the Legislative Assembly of India, 1924-30* (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, 1978) p. xxi.
3. February 14, 1924 *ibid.* p. 8.
4. February 11, 1924 *ibid.* p. 5.
5. February 14, 1924 *ibid.* p. 8.
6. *Ibid.* pp. 21-22
7. *Ibid.* p. 56
8. *Ibid.* p. 57
9. Pirzada *Foundations*, vol. I pp. 576-77
10. *Ibid.*, p. 577
11. *Ibid.*, p. 581
12. Gandhi to Motilal Nehru, August 9, 1924 CWMG [III 15] vol. XXIV p. 508
13. Fattahji Sitar-amayya, *The History of the Indian National Congress 1885-1935* Bombay: Padma Publications Ltd. 1937 vol. I p. 269
14. Jawaharlal Nehru, *Toward Freedom* New York: The John Day Company, 1941, pp. 105, 25.
15. Sitar-amayya, *Indian National Congress*, vol. I, pp. 272-73.
16. August 31, 1924, CWMG [III 15], vol. XXV, p. 6.
17. Dwarikadas, *Ruffie* p. 27
18. *Ibid.* pp. 27-28
19. *Ibid.* pp. 29-30. In next parts is a note 30.
20. August 2, 1925 *ibid.* p. 11
21. August 2, 1925 *ibid.* p. 11
22. *Ibid.* p. 19

23. *Ibid.*, p. 41.
24. December 19, 1925, Qureshi, *Every Day*, p. 394. "Plain Mr. Jinnah" is the title of vol. I of selections from *Shamshad Hasan Collection* by Syed Shamshad Hasan, secretary to the Muslim League Karachi: Royal Book Company 1978
25. Dwarikadas, *Ruffie*, p. 43.
26. *Ibid.*, pp. 45-46
27. Hasan, *Collection*, p. 83.
28. Only Clement Attlee, one of the two Labour members on the commission, attained great distinction
29. Second Earl of Birkenhead, F. E. *The Life of F. E. Smith, First Earl of Birkenhead* (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1960), p. 514.
30. July 4, 1927 National Archives of Pakistan, F. 15. 20.
31. Pirzada *Foundations*, vol. II, p. 114
32. *Ibid.*, p. 127

CHAPTER 8: CALCUTTA 1924

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2. *Young India*, February 2, 1918, CWMG [III 15], vol. XXXVI, p. 15.
3. Birkenhead to Jinnah, January 19, 1928. Second Earl of Birkenhead, F. E. Smith, p. 515
4. *Ibid.* p. 516.
5. Report of the Commission All Parties Conference, 1928. All India Congress Committee, 1928, p. 21
6. Nehru to Gandhi, February 23, 1928, CWMG [III 15], vol. XXXVI, p. 58.
7. The proposals are in Jinnah's pamphlet "History of the Origin of Fourteen Points," in Ahmad Saad, *Writings of the Quaid-e-Azam* (Lahore: Progressive Books, 1967) pp. 48-49
8. *Ibid.* p. 54.
9. Irwin to Birkenhead, March 15, 1928. FOI, MSS F18 C 152 20, in Washeed Ahmad, *Jinnah India Correspondence 1927-1930* (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, 1989), p. 9
10. Second Earl of Birkenhead, F. E. Smith, p. 59
11. Birkenhead's letter was written on T. & A. stationery 30-3-28. National Archives of Pakistan, 20.
12. Sayid Jinnah, pp. 400-2
13. "Al-Qa'id-e-Azam," p. 172.
14. *Ibid.*
15. *Ibid.*
16. Chagla, *Roses in December*, p. 95
17. *Ibid.*, p. 98
18. All Parties Conference, p. 42.
19. Press conference, October 28, 1918, in Qureshi, *Every Day*, p. 337
20. Sayid Jinnah, p. 413
21. Motilal Nehru to Jinnah, October 28, 1928, National Archives of Pakistan, F. 15.
22. Jinnah to Motilal Nehru, November 2, 1928. Pirzada *Quaid-e-Azam*, p. 289
23. Muhammad Asad Khattak, "My personal contacts and impressions about Quaid-e-Azam Ali Muhammad Jinnah" (Vol. I and Vol. II)
24. Motilal Nehru to Jinnah, November 2, 1928, National Archives of Pakistan, F. 15.
25. Jinnah to Motilal Nehru, November 2, 1928, National Archives of Pakistan, F. 15.

26. Chagla, *Roses in December*, p. 98.
27. Saiyid, *Jinnah*, p. 419.
28. *Ibid.*, pp. 426-27.
29. Saiyid, *Jinnah*, pp. 428-29.
30. *Ibid.*, pp. 432-33.

CHAPTER 9: SIMLA (1929-1930)

1. Aga Khan, *Memoirs* [II, 26], p. 221.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 222.
3. Dwarkadas Rastogi, p. 58.
4. Lau, "Quaid-i-Azam," pp. 172-73.
5. Dwarkadas Rastogi, p. 57.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 58.
7. Chagla, *Roses in December*, p. 12.
8. March 12, 1929, Qureshi, *Every Day*, pp. 85-86.
9. Hasan, *Collection*, p. 48.
10. Though originally fifteen in number, the last two points were merged in order to limit the number to that which echoes President Wilson's famous "Fourteen Points."
11. Hasan, *Collection*, p. 48.
12. Saiyid, *Jinnah*, pp. 437-38.
13. Hasan, *Collection*, p. 48-49.
14. Irwin to Dawson, May 20, 1929, Ahmad, *Correspondence*, p. 13.
15. Pir Khair and Pershad, *Voice of Freedom*, p. 62n18.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 54n11.
17. Saiyid, *Jinnah*, pp. 450-51.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 453. The following quotes are from *ibid.*, pp. 450-59.
19. Irwin's report quoted in *Second Year of Turkenhead, F. & Smith*, p. 522.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 523.
21. MacDonald to Jinnah, August 14, 1929, National Archives of Pakistan, F/15/5.
22. Jinnah to MacDonald, September 7, 1929, National Archives of Pakistan, F/15/7.
23. Irwin to Jinnah, October 1929, National Archives of Pakistan, F/15/7. The following quote is *ibid.*, p. 18.
24. Saiyid, *Jinnah*, p. 465.
25. Gandhi to Nehru, November 8, 1929, CWMG [III, 15], vol. XLIII, p. 10.
26. Minutes of the meeting taken by Sir George Cunningham, the British viceroy's secretary, were mailed to Jinnah on December 27, 1929 (National Archives of Pakistan, F/15/5). From which the quotes of the meeting are taken. The report that rocked the viceroy's train was planted and ignited by the revolutionary Yashpal, 1903-76, a leader of the Hindustan Socialist Republican Army, an autobiography, edited and translated by Crime Frome, was recently published as *Yashpal Looks Back* (Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1981).
27. National Archives of Pakistan, F/15/54.
28. *Ibid.*, F/15, 55-58.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 57.
30. *Ibid.*, F/15, 58-59.
31. Sitaramayya, *Indian National Congress*, p. 103.
32. Saiyid, *Jinnah*, p. 461.
33. Saiyid, *Jinnah*, p. 461.
34. Saiyid, *Jinnah*, p. 461.
35. Saiyid, *Jinnah*, p. 461.

36. Gandhi to Irwin, May 18, 1930, CWMG [III, 15], vol. XLIII, pp. 411-19.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 416.
38. Jinnah to Irwin, June 24, 1930, Ahmad, *Correspondence*, p. 41-42.
39. July 23, 1930, CWMG [III, 15], vol. XLIV, pp. 42-43.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 44.
41. Jinnah to Irwin, August 8, 1930, Ahmad, *Correspondence*, pp. 43-44.
42. CWMG [III, 15], vol. XLIV, p. 81.
43. Jinnah to Irwin, August 19, 1930, Ahmad, *Correspondence*, pp. 46-47.
44. Appen, III, CWMG [III, 15], vol. XLIV, pp. 470-71.
45. Jinnah to Irwin, September 9, 1930, Ahmad, *Correspondence*, p. 51.

CHAPTER 10: LONDON (1930-1933)

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2. Hailey to Irwin, November 14, 1930, Indian Office Library, London, MSS EUR E 220-34.
3. K. J. Moore, *The Crisis of Indian Unity, 1917-1940* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 128.
4. Aga Khan, *Memoirs* [II, 86], p. 328.
5. *Indian Round Table Conference*, 12 November 1930-19 January 1931, *Proceedings*, vol. 1, 1930, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 431, p. 32.
6. *Round Table*, vol. 1, p. 32.
7. *Round Table*, vol. 1, p. 146.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 147.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 149.
10. *Round Table* [5] November 21, 1930, p. 182.
11. Hailey to Irwin, December 13, 1930, Indian Office Library, London, MSS EUR E 220-34.
12. Hailey to Irwin, December 15, 1930, *ibid.*
13. MacDonald to Jinnah, December 23, 1930, India Round Table Conference, 1930, *MacDonald Papers*, His Majesty's Stationery Office, Kew, 30/79, 578 II.
14. *Proceedings*, vol. 1, p. 159.
15. *MacDonald Papers*, Public Record Office, X 13.
16. *Kam Dwa Khay, India's Fight for Freedom 1913-1937* (Bombay: Populair Prakashan, 1968), p. 165.
17. Ziauddin Ahmad, *Mohammad Ali Jinnah: Founder of Pakistan* (Karachi: Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Government of Pakistan, 1976), p. 89.
18. *Round Table* [5], January 10, 1931, p. 512.
19. Simon to Dube, National Archives of Pakistan, February 26, 1931, F/15/92.
20. *Bolton's Jinnah*, p. 101.
21. F. C. Merville, Jinnah's private secretary, to Jinnah, March 17, 1931, National Archives of Pakistan, F/15/109.
22. Sir A. P. Patro to Jinnah, March 19, 1931, *ibid.*, p. 110.
23. MacDonald to Jinnah, June 18, 1931, *ibid.*, p. 141.
24. Henderson to Jinnah, May 5, 1931, *ibid.*, p. 135.
25. Raza, "The Charisma of Quaid-i-Azam" in *Papers* [IV, 1], vol. V, p. 209.
26. Haroon to Jinnah, March 24, 1931, National Archives of Pakistan, F/15, 115-16.
27. Patro to Jinnah, March 19, 1931, *ibid.*, p. 112.
28. *Proceedings*, vol. 1, p. 159.
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29. *Ibid.*, p. 368n1.
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53. *Ibid.*, p. 530.
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 4 *Ibid.* p. 815.
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 6 Luthitgow to Amery, June 6, 1943, *ibid.* p. 1045.
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 8 Luthitgow to Amery, June 10, 1943, *ibid.* p. 1053.
 9 Luthitgow to Amery, June 10, 1943, *ibid.* p. 1053.
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34. Twynam to Wavell, April 9, 1944. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power* vol. V, p. 873.
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39. Amery to Wavell, May 11, 1944, *ibid.*, p. 935.
40. Wavell to Amery, May 1, 1944, *ibid.*, p. 941.
41. June 12, 1944, *ibid.*, pp. 1022-23.
42. June 20, 1944, *ibid.*, p. 1035. The following quote is from *ibid.*
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70. *Ibid.*, p. 42.
71. September 29, 1944, Mansergh, *Transfer of Power* vol. V, pp. 56-57.

CHAPTER 16: SMIA, 1944-1945

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4. Wavell to Amery, November 29, 1944, *ibid.*, p. 252.
5. December 6, 1944, *ibid.*, pp. 279-80.
6. Casey to Wavell, December 17, 1944, *ibid.*, p. 308.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 309. The following quote is from *ibid.*
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13. Jinnah to J. A. K. Qasbi, March 25, 1945, *Hasan Collection*, vol. III, p. P.
14. Wavell to Amery, January 14, 1945, Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. V, p. 400.
15. Enclosure no. 202, January 17, 1945, *ibid.*, p. 406, and pp. 411-12.
16. January 19, 1945, *ibid.*, p. 423.
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30. Wavell to Amery June 15, 1945. *ibid.*, pp. 1126-27
 31. Joe 18, 1945 Moon, Wavell p. 142
 32. June 24, 1945 *ibid.*, pp. 144-45
 33. *ibid.*, p. 146. The following quote is from *ibid.* pp. 146-47
 34. Wavell to Amery June 25, 1945 Mansergh, *Transfer of Power* vol. VI pp. 1135-36 The following quotes are from *ibid.* pp. 1, 56-57
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 37. *ibid.* p. 503.
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 39. July 11, 1945, Moon, Wavell, p. 151
 40. *ibid.*
 41. July 14, 1945. *ibid.* p. 155
 42. Wavell to Amery, July 15, 1945. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power* vol. VI p. 1262
 43. July 12, 1945, *ibid.*, p. 1237 The following quote is from *ibid.*
 44. August 6, 1945, Moon, Wavell, p. 181

CHAPTER 17 Q. UETTA AND PESHAWAR (1945-1946)

1. August 1 1945 Mansergh, *Transfer of Power* vol. VI, p. 6.
 2. August 2, 1945 *ibid.* pp. 22-23 The following quote is from *ibid.*
 3. August 6 1945. Ahmad, *Recent Speeches*, vol. II p. 387 The following quote is from *ibid.*
 4. *ibid.* pp. 390-91
 5. Pethick Lawrence to Wavell August 11 1945, Mansergh, *Transfer of Power* vol. VI p. 37 The following quote is from *ibid.* p. 68
 6. Wavell to Pethick Lawrence August 12 1945 *ibid.* p. 50.
 7. Clarity to Wavell, August 6, 1945 *ibid.* pp. 1, 2
 8. Wavell to Pethick Lawrence August 21 1945 *ibid.* p. 13 The following quote is from *ibid.*
 9. Cabinet minutes, August 29 1945 *ibid.* pp. 174-75
 10. August 31 1945 Moon, Wavell, p. 188
 11. Ahmad, *Recent Speeches*, vol. II p. 411
 12. Wavell to Pethick Lawrence, October 16, 1945, Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. VI p. 348
 13. October 27, 1945 Ahmad, *Recent Speeches* vol. II pp. 423-24
 14. November 1, 1945, *ibid.* pp. 428-28
 15. Pethick Lawrence to Wavell, November 8, 1945, Mansergh, *Transfer of Power* vol. VI p. 463
 16. Cabinet minutes, November 9, 1945, *ibid.* p. 501
 17. Wavell to Pethick Lawrence November 23 1945 *ibid.* p. 524
 18. November 24, 1945 *ibid.* pp. 53, 34.
 19. "Secret" intell. grace Bureau enclosure November 20 1945 *ibid.* p. 53
 20. November 24 1945 Ahmad, *Recent Speeches*, vol. II p. 438-39
 21. *ibid.*, pp. 440-43.
 22. Carry to Wavell, December 2, 1945 Mansergh, *Transfer of Power* vol. VI, p. 580.
 23. December 3, 1945, *ibid.*, pp. 580-81
 24. December speech to Punjab MLCs. See also Ahmad, *Recent Speeches* vol. II p. 461.

25. December 21 1945, *ibid.* p. 584
 26. Pethick Lawrence to Jinnah December 21 1945. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. VI, pp. 672-73.
 27. *ibid.* p. 240
 28. *ibid.* p. 240 Mansergh, *Transfer of Power* vol. VI p. 948
 29. *ibid.* pp. 646-50
 30. *ibid.* p. 646-50
 31. Wavell to Pethick Lawrence, February 13, 1946, *ibid.* pp. 951-55
 32. February 18, 1946, *ibid.* p. 1006
 33. February 22, 1946, *ibid.*, p. 1048.
 34. March 23 1946, *ibid.*, vol. VII, p. 1.
 35. Note by Wyatt, March 28, 1946, *ibid.* pp. 22-24
 36. Note by Coyne, March 1946 *ibid.* pp. 50-60
 37. April 3 1946 Moon, Wavell, p. 226
 38. Secretary's report of Gandhi interview April 3, 1946. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power* vol. VII, p. 18
 39. April 4 1946 Moon, Wavell, p. 227
 40. April 4, 1946 Mansergh, *Transfer of Power* vol. VII, pp. 119-21. Following quote is from *ibid.*
 41. See also note by Duckworth, April 4, 1946, *ibid.* p. 138
 42. See also note by Wyatt, *ibid.* p. 176
 43. *ibid.* p. 179
 44. *ibid.* p. 184
 45. July 14 1946 Moon, Wavell, p. 246
 46. April 16, 1946 11. See Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. VII, pp. 241-2.
 47. *ibid.* pp. 283-84. Following quotes are from *ibid.*

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1. April 9, 1946 Pirzada, *Foundations*, vol. I, pp. 522-23.
 2. *ibid.* p. 523
 3. *ibid.* pp. 514-15
 4. *ibid.* pp. 516-20
 5. *ibid.* pp. 517-24
 6. *ibid.* p. 524
 7. *ibid.* p. 524
 8. *ibid.* p. 524
 9. *ibid.* p. 524
 10. *ibid.* p. 524
 11. *ibid.* p. 524
 12. *ibid.* p. 524
 13. *ibid.* p. 524
 14. *ibid.* p. 524
 15. *ibid.* p. 524
 16. *ibid.* p. 524
 17. *ibid.* p. 524
 18. *ibid.* p. 524
 19. *ibid.* p. 524
 20. *ibid.* p. 524
 21. *ibid.* p. 524
 22. *ibid.* p. 524
 23. *ibid.* p. 524
 24. *ibid.* p. 524
 25. *ibid.* p. 524
 26. *ibid.* p. 524
 27. *ibid.* p. 524
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 33. *ibid.* p. 524
 34. *ibid.* p. 524
 35. *ibid.* p. 524
 36. *ibid.* p. 524
 37. *ibid.* p. 524
 38. *ibid.* p. 524
 39. *ibid.* p. 524
 40. *ibid.* p. 524
 41. *ibid.* p. 524
 42. *ibid.* p. 524
 43. *ibid.* p. 524
 44. *ibid.* p. 524
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 46. *ibid.* p. 524
 47. *ibid.* p. 524
 48. *ibid.* p. 524
 49. *ibid.* p. 524
 50. *ibid.* p. 524
 51. *ibid.* p. 524
 52. *ibid.* p. 524
 53. *ibid.* p. 524
 54. *ibid.* p. 524
 55. *ibid.* p. 524
 56. *ibid.* p. 524
 57. *ibid.* p. 524
 58. *ibid.* p. 524
 59. *ibid.* p. 524
 60. *ibid.* p. 524
 61. *ibid.* p. 524
 62. *ibid.* p. 524
 63. *ibid.* p. 524
 64. *ibid.* p. 524
 65. *ibid.* p. 524
 66. *ibid.* p. 524
 67. *ibid.* p. 524
 68. *ibid.* p. 524
 69. *ibid.* p. 524
 70. *ibid.* p. 524
 71. *ibid.* p. 524
 72. *ibid.* p. 524
 73. *ibid.* p. 524
 74. *ibid.* p. 524
 75. *ibid.* p. 524
 76. *ibid.* p. 524
 77. *ibid.* p. 524
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 79. *ibid.* p. 524
 80. *ibid.* p. 524
 81. *ibid.* p. 524
 82. *ibid.* p. 524
 83. *ibid.* p. 524
 84. *ibid.* p. 524
 85. *ibid.* p. 524
 86. *ibid.* p. 524
 87. *ibid.* p. 524
 88. *ibid.* p. 524
 89. *ibid.* p. 524
 90. *ibid.* p. 524
 91. *ibid.* p. 524
 92. *ibid.* p. 524
 93. *ibid.* p. 524
 94. *ibid.* p. 524
 95. *ibid.* p. 524
 96. *ibid.* p. 524
 97. *ibid.* p. 524
 98. *ibid.* p. 524
 99. *ibid.* p. 524
 100. *ibid.* p. 524

33. Nehru to Jinnah, May 10, 1946, Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. VII, p. 502.
34. May 11, 1946, *ibid.*, p. 507.
35. May 13, 1946, Moon, Wavell, p. 267. Following quote is from *ibid.* p. 268.
36. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. VII, p. 591.
37. *Harijan*, May 17, 1946, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 615.
38. Record of meeting, May 18, 1946, *ibid.*, p. 616.
39. Note by George Abell, May 18, 1946, *ibid.*, p. 619.
40. Record of meeting, May 19, 1946, 11:00 A.M., *ibid.*, p. 623.
41. May 19, 1946, Moon, Wavell, p. 273.
42. May 19, 1946, Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. VII, p. 622.
43. Moon, Wavell, p. 273.
44. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. VII, p. 634.
45. Gandhi to Pethick-Lawrence, May 20, 1946, *ibid.*, pp. 636-37.
46. *ibid.*, p. 638.
47. May 20, 1946, *ibid.*, p. 644.
48. *ibid.*, p. 635.
49. Record of meeting, May 24, 1946, *ibid.*, pp. 675-78.
50. Note by Wyatt, May 25, 1946, *ibid.*, p. 684.
51. *ibid.*, pp. 685-86.
52. *ibid.*, pp. 686-87 (Italics in original).
53. May 26, 1946, *ibid.*, pp. 705-6.
54. June 3, 1946, Moon, Wavell, p. 285-86.
55. Note by Intelligence Bureau, June 5, 1946, Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. VII, pp. 819-20.
56. June 6, 1946, Ahmad, *Recent Speeches*, vol. II, pp. 402-4.
57. *ibid.*, p. 406.
58. June 8, 1946, Moon, Wavell, p. 286.
59. June 7, 1946, *ibid.*
60. Wavell's Note of Interview with Jinnah, Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. VII, p. 839.
61. June 11, 1946, Moon, Wavell, p. 290.
62. Record of meeting, June 11, 1946, Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. VII, p. 893-2.
63. June 12, 1946, Moon, Wavell, p. 290.
64. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. VII, pp. 866-67; see heading and *his* note, p. 867.
65. *ibid.*, p. 867.
66. *ibid.*, p. 868. This was clearly Jinnah's position from the start and Wavell's account of it is jumbled and inaccurate, where he first notes (June 11, 1946, Moon, Wavell, p. 290) that "Cripps has spent several hours with Jinnah last night and said that he had agreed to this." (By "this" was meant a meeting with Nehru.) The viceroy later wrote in his journal (Moon, Wavell, p. 292): "At 3:40 P.M., when I was due to see Nehru and Jinnah at 4 P.M., Cripps came in and told me that Jinnah would not come; he had written a letter earlier in the day that he did not feel he could meet Nehru, unless the parity basis was conceded. With so much changing every hour those days, Wavell obviously found it impossible to keep clear in his mind the exact sequence of events, even with daily notes.
67. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. VII, p. 806.
68. *ibid.*, p. 887.
69. *ibid.*

60. June 13, 1946, Moon, Wavell, p. 292.
61. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. VII, p. 910.
62. Moon, Wavell, p. 314.
63. June 14, 1946, Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. VII, pp. 931-33.
64. Moon, Wavell, p. 324.
65. *ibid.*, p. 296.
66. Record of meeting, June 21, 1946, Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. VII, p. 906. Following quotes are from *ibid.*, pp. 996-97.
67. June 23, 1946, *ibid.*, pp. 1012-13. Following quote is *ibid.*, p. 1014.
68. *ibid.*, p. 1017. Following quotes are *ibid.*, pp. 1017-18.
69. *ibid.*, p. 1037.
70. Note by viceroy, June 25, 1946, *ibid.*, p. 1039.
71. *ibid.*, pp. 1044-47.
72. June 25, 1946, Moon, Wavell, p. 366.

CHAPTER 19: BOMBAY TO LONDON (1946)

1. July 28, 1946, Ahmad, *Recent Speeches*, vol. II, p. 407.
2. *ibid.*, pp. 408-11.
3. Pirzada, *Foundations*, vol. II, pp. 548-49.
4. *ibid.*, pp. 548-49. Following quotes are from *ibid.*
5. *ibid.*, p. 551. Following quotes are *ibid.*, pp. 551-52.
6. *ibid.*, pp. 557-58.
7. *ibid.*, p. 560.
8. Pethick-Lawrence to Wavell, Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. VIII, p. 102.
9. Minute by Scott, August 1, 1946, *ibid.*, p. 174.
10. Wavell's minute, *ibid.*, p. 175.
11. *ibid.*, p. 188.
12. Nehru to Jinnah, August 13, 1946, *ibid.*, p. 238.
13. Jinnah to Nehru, *ibid.*
14. August 18, 1946, *ibid.*, p. 248.
15. Burrows to Wavell, August 16, 1946, *ibid.*, p. 239.
16. Francis Tuker, *While Memory Serves* (London: Cusell, 1950), p. 158.
17. *ibid.*, append. V, pp. 597-98.
18. *ibid.*, pp. 160-61.
19. *ibid.*, append. V, pp. 599-600.
20. *ibid.*, pp. 601-3.
21. Margaret Bourke-White, *Halfway To Freedom* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1949), p. 23.
22. Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, August 21, 1946, Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. VIII, p. 274.
23. Ahmad, *Recent Speeches*, vol. II, p. 433.
24. August 24, 1946, Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. VIII, p. 307.
25. Ahmad, *Recent Speeches*, vol. II, p. 444.
26. August 25, 1946, Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. VIII, p. 322.
27. *ibid.*, p. 323.
28. *ibid.*, p. 332. The following quote is *ibid.*, p. 334.
29. August 29, 1946, *ibid.*, p. 344.
30. Ahmad, *Recent Speeches*, vol. II, pp. 423-25.
31. A. P. Le Mesurier's report, September 2, 1946, Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. VIII, p. 385.

32. Nehru's broadcast, September 7, 1946, in Dorothy Norman, ed., *Nehru: The First Sixty Years* (London: The Bodley Head, 1965), vol. II, pp. 248-51.
33. September 8, 1946, Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. VIII, pp. 455-59.
34. September 10, 1946, Moon, *Wavell*, pp. 348-49.
35. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. VIII, p. 478.
36. Record of meeting at 10 Downing Street, September 23, 1946, 10:30 A.M., *ibid.*, pp. 570-72. Following quotes are from *ibid.*
37. Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, September 26, 1946, *ibid.*, p. 588.
38. September 26, 1946, Moon, *Wavell*, pp. 352-53.
39. Wavell's note, October 1, 1946, Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. VIII, pp. 631-32.
40. "Top Secret Note" of interview with Jinnah, October 2, 1946, *ibid.*, pp. 643-44.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 683.
42. Nehru to Jinnah, October 6, 1946, *ibid.*, p. 673.
43. Jinnah to Nehru, October 7, 1946, *ibid.*, p. 673.
44. October 11, 1946, *ibid.*, p. 694.
45. October 11, 1946, Moon, *Wavell*, p. 356.
46. Wavell's note, October 12, 1946, Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. VIII, p. 704.
47. *Hindustan Times*, October 21, 1946, *ibid.*, p. 770n4.
48. Nehru to Wavell, October 23, 1946, *ibid.*, p. 785.
49. Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, October 23, 1946, *ibid.*, p. 785.
50. October 24, 1946, Moon, *Wavell*, p. 363.
51. October 30, 1946, *ibid.*, p. 367.
52. Dow to Wavell, November 9, 1946, Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. IX, p. 39.
53. *Dawn*, November 15, 1946, *ibid.*, pp. 73-75.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 125.
55. November 21, 1946, *ibid.*, p. 128.
56. Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, November 23, 1946, *ibid.*, p. 153.
57. Pethick-Lawrence to Wavell, November 27, 1946, *ibid.*, p. 187.
58. November 29, 1946, Moon, *Wavell*, p. 385. The final quote is from *ibid.*, December 1, 1946.

CHAPTER 20: LONDON-FINAL FAREWELL (1946)

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2. Note of conversation with Jinnah by Wyatt, December 3, 1946, *ibid.*, pp. 246-47.
3. Cabinet meeting, December 4, 1946, *ibid.*, pp. 252-53.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 253-55.
5. Cabinet minutes, December 4, 1946, 12:15 P.M., *ibid.*, pp. 260-61.
6. Meeting, December 4, 1946, 10:30 A.M., *ibid.*, pp. 255-56. Following quotes are from *ibid.*
7. *Ibid.*, p. 259.
8. Meeting with Jinnah and Liaquat Ali, *ibid.*, pp. 262-64.
9. Cabinet meeting, 10 Downing Street, December 6, 4:00 P.M., *ibid.*, p. 269.
10. Cabinet meeting, 6:00 P.M., p. 297. Following quotes are from *ibid.*, pp. 298-300.
11. Dwarkadas, *Ten Years To Freedom*, pp. 190-91.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 192.

13. Parthasarathy, *The Hindu*, p. 629.
14. Begum Shah Nawaz, "Reminiscences," in Ahmad, *Quaid-i-Azam*, p. 99.
15. *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, Fifth Series, vol. 431, pp. 1175-76. Following quote is from *ibid.*, p. 1178.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 1346.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 1360-67.
18. Norman, *Nehru*, vol. II, pp. 278-80.
19. Alan Campbell-Johnson, *Mission With Mountbatten* (New York: Dutton & Co., 1953), December 19, 1946, pp. 17-18.
20. Reuter's "Report of Jinnah's Meeting in Cairo," in Atique Z. Sheikh and M. R. Malik, eds., *Quaid-i-Azam and the Muslim World: Selected Documents* (Karachi: Royal Book Co., 1978), p. 166.
21. Cairo, December 20, 1946, *ibid.*, p. 169.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 169.

CHAPTER 21: NEW DELHI (1947)

1. January 2, 1947, Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. IX, pp. 444-45.
2. Mountbatten to Attlee, January 3, 1947, *ibid.*, pp. 451-52.
3. Enclosure to No. 304, January 24, 1947, *ibid.*, pp. 542-43.
4. Jenkins to Pethick-Lawrence, January 28, 1947, *ibid.*, p. 557.
5. January 29, 1947, *ibid.*, p. 572.
6. Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, February 1, 1947, *ibid.*, p. 593.
7. Cabinet minutes, February 5, 1947, *ibid.*, p. 618.
8. February 6, 1947, Moon, *Wavell*, p. 418.
9. "Indian Policy" (Cmd. 7047), February 20, 1947, Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. IX, p. 774.
10. *Hindustan Times*, February 21, 1947, *ibid.*, pp. 775-78.
11. *Dawn*, February 21, 1947, *ibid.*, pp. 777-78.
12. Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, February 22, 1947, *ibid.*, pp. 785-86.
13. February 25, 1947, Moon, *Wavell*, p. 424. For inset, see Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. IX, p. 824n3.
14. Jenkins to Pethick-Lawrence, February 23, 1947, *ibid.*, p. 815.
15. Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, February 20, 1947, *ibid.*, p. 819, recounting what had been reported in *Caroe* to Wavell, February 22, 1947, *ibid.*, p. 788.
16. Jenkins to Wavell, March 3, 1947, *ibid.*, p. 830.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 832.
18. *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, Fifth Series, March 5, 1947, vol. 434, pp. 502-5.
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 609-73.
20. *Ibid.*, pp. 673-74.
21. February 28, 1947, Moon, *Wavell*, p. 424.
22. Jenkins to Wavell, March 7, 1947, Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. IX, p. 879.
23. Enclosure of Resolutions Passed, March 8, 1947, *ibid.*, pp. 899-900.
24. Nehru to Wavell, March 9, 1947, *ibid.*, p. 898.
25. M. H. Shahid, ed., *Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah (Speeches, Statements, Writings, Letters)* (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1976), pp. 50-51. The final segment of this quote is from Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. IX, p. 927n3.
26. Jenkins to Wavell, March 10, 1947, *ibid.*, p. 912.
27. Baldev Singh to Wavell, March 11, 1947, *ibid.*, pp. 914-16.
28. Cabinet meeting, March 13, 1947, 5:15 P.M., *ibid.*, p. 940.

29. Krishna Menon to Mountbatten, March 13, 1947, *ibid.*, pp. 948-49.
30. Jenkins to Abell, March 17, 1947, *ibid.*, p. 962.
31. *ibid.*, pp. 967-69.
32. Attlee to Mountbatten, March 18, 1947, *ibid.*, pp. 972-74.
33. Minutes of meeting, March 22, 1947, 10:30 p.m., *ibid.*, pp. 1011-12.
34. Campbell-Johnson, *Mountbatten*, March 23, 1947, p. 41.
35. Parthasarathy, *The Hindu*, p. 616.
36. Campbell-Johnson, *Mountbatten*, March 25, 1947, p. 44.
37. Annex I to Mountbatten's "Personal Report," no. 2, April 9, 1947, India Office Library, London, L/P.O./433/31. Hereafter cited *Mountbatten's Personal Report*.
38. Record of Mountbatten-Gandhi interview, April 1, 1947, Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. X, p. 69.
39. Record of Mountbatten-Nehru interview, April 1, 1947, *ibid.*, p. 70.
40. "Top Secret" interview, Mountbatten-Jinnah, April 5-8, 1947, *ibid.*, p. 137.
41. Mountbatten's personal recollection in an interview at his home, summer of 1978.
42. Record of interviews, April 5 and 6, 1947, Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. X, pp. 138-39.
43. April 7, 1947, *ibid.*, p. 149.
44. April 8, 1947, *ibid.*, pp. 150-50.
45. *ibid.*, p. 164.
46. "Top Secret," April 11, 1947, *ibid.*, p. 190.
47. *ibid.*
48. *ibid.*
49. Note by Jenkins, April 16, 1947, *ibid.*, pp. 232-33.
50. Parthasarathy, *The Hindu*, p. 649.
51. Record of Mountbatten-Liaquat Ali interview, April 10, 1947, Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. X, pp. 331-32.
52. *ibid.*, p. 333.
53. "Top Secret" record of discussion, *ibid.*, p. 349.
54. Record of interview with Krishna Menon, April 22, 1947, *ibid.*, p. 372.
- The following quote is from *ibid.*
55. April 24, 1947, *ibid.*, p. 388. The following quote is from *ibid.*, p. 359.
56. Record of interview with Jinnah, April 26, 1947, *ibid.*, pp. 452-53.
57. *ibid.*, p. 453. The following quote is from *ibid.*, p. 454.
58. Merville to Mountbatten, April 29, 1947, *ibid.*, p. 479.
59. Mountbatten's Personal Report, No. 5, May 1, 1947, *ibid.*, pp. 537-38.
60. *ibid.*, p. 540.
61. Mountbatten to Jinnah, May 10, 1947, *ibid.*, p. 770.
62. Nehru to Mountbatten, May 11, 1947, *ibid.*, p. 756.
63. Record of interview with Liaquat Ali, May 15, 1947, *ibid.*, p. 825.
64. Jinnah's note, May 17, 1947, *ibid.*, pp. 852-53.
65. Cabinet minutes, May 19, 1947, *ibid.*, p. 856.
66. Butler's report, May 21, 1947, p. 929.
67. Cabinet minutes, May 20, 1947, *ibid.*, p. 922.
68. Krishna Menon to Mountbatten, May 21, 1947, *ibid.*, p. 940.
69. Campbell-Johnson, *Mountbatten*, June 1, 1947, p. 98.
70. Record of Churchill-Mountbatten interview, May 22, 1947, Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. X, pp. 945-46.
71. June 5, 1947, *Mountbatten's Personal Report*, no. 8, p. 117. Following quote is from *ibid.*

72. That doodle is reproduced in a photograph in Campbell-Johnson, *Mountbatten*, facing p. 97.
73. June 5, 1947, *Mountbatten's Personal Report*, no. 8, p. 117.
74. Campbell-Johnson, *Mountbatten*, June 3, 1947, pp. 102-3.
75. June 3, 1947 Plan, *ibid.*, pp. 364-68.
76. *ibid.*, p. 367.
77. Jinnah's broadcast of June 3, 1947, Shahid, *Quaid-i-Azam Speeches*, pp. 77-79.
78. June 3, 1947, Campbell-Johnson, *Mountbatten*, p. 107. Following quote is from *ibid.*
79. June 5, 1947, *Mountbatten's Personal Report*, no. 8, pp. 122ff.
80. Campbell-Johnson, *Mountbatten*, June 9, 1947, pp. 115-16.
81. *Morning Herald*, June 10, 1947, and *Morning News*, June 11, reported in Pirzada, *Foundations*, vol. II, pp. 566-67. Following quote is from *ibid.*, p. 587.
82. June 12, 1947, *Mountbatten's Personal Report*, no. 9, p. 125.
83. Pirzada, *Foundations*, vol. II, p. 588.
84. June 12, 1947, *Mountbatten's Personal Report*, no. 9, p. 125.
85. "The Greatest Betrayal," Aziz, *Rahmat Ali*, vol. I, pp. 291-301.
86. June 12, 1947, *Mountbatten's Personal Report*, no. 9, p. 127.

CHAPTER 23: KARACHI—"PAKISTAN ZINDABAD" (1947)

1. June 27, 1947, *Mountbatten's Personal Report*, no. 10, p. 139.
2. July 4, 1947, *ibid.*, no. 11, p. 180.
3. *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, Fifth Series, vol. 440, pp. 227-29. The Attlee quote is from *ibid.*, pp. 253-54.
4. July 13, 1947, Shahid, *Quaid-i-Azam Speeches*, p. 82.
5. Penderel Moon, *Die Dilemma and Quit* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962), p. 85 (Deletion in original).
6. July 25, 1947, *Mountbatten's Personal Report*, no. 14, pp. 202-3.
7. Campbell-Johnson, *Mountbatten*, July 25, 1947, p. 143.
8. August 8, 1947, *Mountbatten's Personal Report*, no. 16, p. 228.
9. *ibid.*, pp. 233-34.
10. Karachi Club, August 9, 1947, *Speeches of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah as Governor General of Pakistan* (Karachi: Sind Observer Press, 1948), pp. 4-5.
11. August 11, 1947, *ibid.*, p. 8.
12. *ibid.*, pp. 7-9.
13. *ibid.*, pp. 9-10.
14. *ibid.*, p. 10.
15. *ibid.*
16. August 16, 1947, *Mountbatten's Personal Report*, no. 17, p. 247.
17. Campbell-Johnson, *Mountbatten*, August 13, 1947, p. 154. Following quote is from *ibid.*, p. 155.
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